Williams v. State of Louisiana ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30385 Document: 00516667439 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/06/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 6, 2023
No. 22-30385 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Vincent Williams,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
State of Louisiana, on behalf of Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, on behalf of David Wade
Correctional Center,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:21-cv-441
Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Vincent Williams, an African American correctional officer at the
David Wade Correctional Center (“DWCC”), brought suit against the State
of Louisiana claiming that the DWCC’s alleged policy of not promoting
union members disproportionately affects African Americans. The district
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-30385
court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. For essentially the same reasons,
we AFFIRM.
I. Background
Vincent Williams has more than 24 years of experience working in
correctional facilities. He has attained the rank of Captain, but “cannot attain
a promotion to that of Major.” He claims that his “union membership is the
deciding factor” as “[i]t is common knowledge that upper management does
not like the union.” Since “the promotion process favors non-union
members,” Williams claims that it “disproportionally affects African
American[s].” After the state filed a motion to dismiss but before it was ruled
on, Williams amended his complaint to, inter alia, add an allegation that the
DWCC also discriminates against those above the age of 40. Williams also
added information about a select sample of upper management, recently
promoted officers, and the promotion selection committee, including the
race of each individual and, for some, whether they were younger and/or less
experienced than Williams.
After Williams’ amendment, the State filed a second motion to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion with prejudice on the grounds
that Williams had failed to state “a viable disparate-impact claim for racial
discrimination under Title VII.” “In short,” the memorandum opinion
concluded, “Williams’s complaint alleges neither facts which lead to a
justifiable inference that there is a statistically significant impact upon
employees of one race as compared to similarly situated employees of a
different race, nor that filtering employees for promotion based on union
membership or age is causally connected to any such discrepancy if one
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exists.” 1 Williams subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment, which the district court denied as having shown no manifest errors
of law in the initial decision. This appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2019). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter which, when taken as true, states ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P’ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations,” but the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “[a] district court … errs by requiring
‘a showing of each prong of the prima facie test for disparate treatment.’”
Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766 (quoting Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331
(5th Cir. 2013)). However, though plaintiffs need not “submit evidence to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage, [they must] plead
sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim
1
Relying on sovereign immunity, the district court also dismissed any potential
claims of discrimination based on union affiliation under the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935 or claims of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967. Neither law was expressly raised in the complaint, and Title VII, on which the
claims purport to rely, provides no support for either. As Williams fails to contest on appeal
any of these claims, we leave this part of the district court’s reasoning undisturbed. See
Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2003).
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to make [their] case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d
467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016). We have held that those ultimate elements are “(1)
an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her
protected status.’” Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Raj, 714 F.3d at 331). “Failure to promote is clearly an adverse employment
action,” Haire v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll., 719 F.3d
356, 364 (5th Cir. 2013), so Williams has adequately pleaded the first
element.
As to the latter, however, Williams has provided no more than
conclusory allegations, which we need not accept as true. See BRFHH
Shreveport, LLC v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 49 F.4th 520, 525 (5th Cir.
2022). Certainly, a plaintiff does not need to provide a detailed statistical
analysis at the pleading stage, but the evidence must demonstrate some
causal relationship – some “because” – between the protected status and the
adverse employment action.
Here, the complaint fails to demonstrate that African Americans are
disproportionately affected by the alleged anti-union policy. The amended
complaint attempts to make examples of two individuals who were promoted
despite having less experience than Williams. But as both of those individuals
are African Americans, these examples do nothing for Williams’ disparate
impact claim. Williams also lists five Captains (that is, individuals currently
holding the same title as Williams) who outrank Williams despite having less
work experience – and two of those five are African Americans. Finally,
Williams lists the six members of “the advancement committee,” of which
three are African Americans. As the complaint lacks all but the barest of
context, it is impossible to say whether these numbers demonstrate bias.
There is no allegation, for example, that the union is comprised of solely or
even mostly African Americans, or that more African Americans at DWCC
are union members than non-union members, or that African Americans at
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DWCC are more likely to be union members than are Caucasians. Nor does
the complaint give any sense as to the general racial breakdown of DWCC
employees – for example, whether most employees are African American or
whether most of the members of management are Caucasian. Nothing in the
complaint gives a court the ability to make a causal connection between
Williams’ race and the failure to promote him.
Williams’ complaint might sufficiently allege an anti-union bias, but
Title VII provides no protection on that basis. Nor does Title VII provide
protection for employment decisions based on age – and even if it did (or
Williams provided a separate statutory hook), Williams has shown no age-
based discrimination. Vague statements that certain individuals are “younger
than plaintiff” or that others “have less work experience than plaintiff” are
not allegations that management favors individuals under 40 – on the face of
the complaint, the individuals listed could be 70 or could be 20. In sum,
Williams’ pleadings are insufficient. 2
III. Conclusion
Williams fails to plead even the basic elements of a disparate treatment
claim. The district court was therefore correct to dismiss the claim. We
AFFIRM.
2
In one sentence, and without directly challenging the district court’s decision to
dismiss with prejudice, Williams raises the prospect of further amendment after discovery.
However, “[a] party that asserts an argument on appeal, but fails to adequately brief it, is
deemed to have waived it. . . . We have often stated that a party must ‘press’ its claims.”
United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Williams has thus waived any challenge to the “with prejudice” element
of his dismissal.
5