Mark Leyse v. Bank of America NA ( 2013 )


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  •                                                              NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 12-3249
    _____________
    MARK LEYSE, individually and on behalf
    of all others similarly situated,
    Appellant
    v.
    BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. No. 2-11-cv-07128)
    District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
    _____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    March 21, 2013
    BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH and GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: April 24, 2013)
    _____________
    OPINION
    _____________
    McKEE, Chief Judge.
    Mark Leyse appeals the District Court‟s dismissal of his Complaint against Bank
    of America (“BoA”), in which he alleged a violation of the Telephone Consumer
    Protection Act (“TCPA”), 
    47 U.S.C. § 227
    (b)(1)(B). For the reasons that follow, we will
    affirm.1
    I.
    As we write only for the parties who are familiar with this case, we will recite only
    the facts and procedural history relevant to our conclusion.
    On March 11, 2005, DialAmericaMarketing, Inc. (“DialAmerica”), on behalf of
    BoA, made a call with a prerecorded message to Leyse‟s residential telephone line, which
    it associated with Leyse‟s roommate, Genevieve Dutriaux. Prior to filing this action,
    Leyse had filed a TCPA action based on this same call in the Western District of North
    Carolina. BoA successfully moved to transfer the case to the Southern District of New
    York (“SDNY”), which dismissed the suit. Leyse v. Bank of Am., N.A., 09 Civ. 7654,
    
    2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58461
    , at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2010). The SDNY concluded
    that Leyse was not the “called party,” and therefore, lacked standing to seek statutory
    damages under the TCPA. 
    Id. at *15-16
    . Bluebook R3.2(a). On February 8, 2011, the
    Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarily affirmed the SDNY‟s ruling.
    The District Court ruled that Leyse‟s Complaint in this action is barred by the
    doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues decided
    in a prior action. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 
    126 F.3d 461
    ,
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     and 1332(d)(2)(A).
    We have appellate jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo the District
    Court‟s application of defensive collateral estoppel, Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v.
    L’Oreal USA, Inc., 
    458 F.3d 244
    , 248 (3d Cir. 2006), and statutes of limitations, Nelson
    v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
    60 F.3d 1010
    , 1012 (3d Cir. 1995).
    2
    474 (3d Cir. 1997). Dismissal under the doctrine of collateral estoppel is appropriate
    where: “„(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior
    action, (2) the issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid
    judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.‟” Nat’l R.R.
    Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    288 F.3d 519
    , 525 (3d Cir. 2002) (alterations
    in original) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine, 
    63 F.3d 1227
    ,
    1231-32 (3d Cir. 1995)).
    Leyse contends that he is not precluded from bringing this action because the
    Second Circuit affirmed the SDNY‟s dismissal in response to BoA‟s motion to dismiss,
    which was based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under New York law. Thus, he
    claims that the affirmance was not based on the merits of the SDNY‟s decision. We
    disagree.
    Although the Second Circuit affirmed in response to BoA‟s motion to dismiss, it
    nonetheless summarily affirmed the SDNY‟s order. Nothing in the Second Circuit‟s
    summary affirmance leads us to believe, as Leyse contends, that that court adopted
    BoA‟s position in its motion to dismiss and displaced the SDNY‟s ruling. The Second
    Circuit‟s summary affirmance leaves the SDNY‟s order undisturbed as a final and valid
    judgment.
    The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from cases in which the appellate
    court made clear that it was setting aside or declining to rule on specific conclusions
    reached by the district court. Cf. Thomas v. Horn, 
    570 F.3d 105
    , 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[I]f
    the appellate court terminates the case by final rulings as to some matters only, preclusion
    3
    is limited to the matters actually resolved by the appellate court.” (quoting 18A Charles
    Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §
    4432 (2d ed. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the Second Circuit‟s
    summary affirmance neither displaced nor communicated a decision not to address the
    SDNY‟s ruling that Leyse lacked standing to assert the TCPA claims in his complaint.
    Accordingly, Leyse is bound by that ruling.
    We therefore affirm the District Court‟s ruling that Leyse‟s Complaint is barred by
    the doctrine of collateral estoppel.2
    II.
    For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the Order of the District Court
    dismissing Leyse‟s Complaint.
    2
    The District Court also ruled that Leyse‟s claim is untimely. Because we will
    affirm on collateral estoppel grounds, we need not reach the issue of whether Leyse‟s
    claim is also time-barred.
    4