Frederick Levin Waterfield, Jr. v. Alane Laboda , 518 F. App'x 667 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-13257 Date Filed: 05/01/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-13257
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00110-JES-DNF
FREDERICK LEVIN WATERFIELD, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALANE LABODA,
DARRYL CASANUEVA,
CHRIS W. ALTENBERND,
JAMES W. WHATLEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(May 1, 2013)
Before HULL, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Frederick Levin Waterfield, Jr., a Florida prisoner, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint
that he filed against four Florida state judges (the judges), as well as the denial of
his subsequent motion for rehearing or a new trial. Liberally construed, Waterfield
argues on appeal that the Florida state courts did not have jurisdiction over his
criminal prosecution, and that the judges violated his rights by denying his
post-conviction motions on procedural grounds. After consideration of
Waterfield’s brief and careful review of the record, we affirm.
As an initial matter, the district court did not err by sua sponte dismissing
Waterfield’s complaint without requiring a response from the judges. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A establishes a screening procedure for prisoner complaints that requires the
district court to review a complaint and dismiss it for failing to state a claim as
soon as possible, preferably before the complaint is even docketed. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). As such, dismissal prior to a responsive pleading from the judges was
not only permissible, but was encouraged by the statute. Cf. Vanderberg v.
Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a provision analogous to § 1915A, allows a district court to sua
sponte dismiss a prisoner’s complaint for failure to state a claim before service of
process).
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Dismissal of Waterfield’s complaint, moreover, was warranted under
§ 1915A. 1 The judges were absolutely immune from civil liability for their
handling of Waterfield’s criminal case and post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g.,
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d
1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). The district court, furthermore, did not err by
refusing to issue an injunction instructing the judges on how they should have
resolved Waterfield’s state-court proceedings, or detailing what actions they
should take in the future with regard to his criminal judgment. See Pompey v.
Broward Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1546-50 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
principles of federalism, comity, and equity that militate against a federal judge
issuing an injunction against state judges, even in the absence of ongoing
state-court proceedings); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“[I]n any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”).
To the extent Waterfield attempted to attack his criminal convictions,
prisoners are prohibited from using § 1983 to challenge the fact or duration of their
confinement. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005); Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (explaining that “the hoary principle that civil tort
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We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for
failure to state a claim. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).
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actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement”).
Waterfield’s contention that the state courts lacked jurisdiction over his criminal
proceedings would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction, and
§ 1983 therefore was not an appropriate vehicle for his argument. See Heck, 512
U.S. at 486-87. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Waterfield’s motion for rehearing or a new trial because Waterfield simply sought
to relitigate the merits of his § 1983 complaint. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons,
Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A motion for reconsideration cannot be
used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have
been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” (quotation omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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