Woodruff v. Caris MPI ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 21-11249     Document: 00516487841          Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/28/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 28, 2022
    No. 21-11249                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Joseph Woodruff; Erica Jobe;
    Mandee Katz; Scott Babjak,
    Plaintiffs—Appellants,
    versus
    Caris MPI, Incorporated;
    Caris Life Sciences, Incorporated,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:21-CV-2993
    Before Jones, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam: *
    Defendants Caris MPI, Inc. and Caris Life Sciences, Inc. (collectively,
    “Caris”) required their then-employees, Plaintiffs Joseph Woodruff, Erika
    Jobe, Mandee Katz, and Scott Babjak, to receive the COVID-19 vaccine or
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 21-11249        Document: 00516487841             Page: 2       Date Filed: 09/28/2022
    No. 21-11249
    face termination.       Following the denials of their exemption requests,
    Plaintiffs sought a TRO, preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing
    their termination, or, alternatively, an injunction ordering their
    reinstatement pending resolution of their respective complaints with the
    Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (“EEOC”).                          Following a
    hearing, the district court denied the preliminary injunction request based on
    a lack of irreparable harm, but it did not reach the alternative request, which
    was not yet ripe. After Plaintiffs appealed, Caris fired them. Caris moves to
    dismiss the appeal. We VACATE as moot the district court’s order denying
    injunctive relief but REMAND for further proceedings.
    Caris implemented a policy on September 17, 2021 that required its
    employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine on or before December 1, 2021.
    Employees who worked exclusively from home were excluded from the
    mandate, and others could seek exemptions for medical or religious reasons.
    Non-compliant, non-exempt employees were subject to termination.
    Woodruff, Jobe, Katz, and Babjak each requested religious
    exemptions, while Jobe and Katz also sought medical exemptions. Caris
    denied those requests. 1 It also declined to grant any appeals. Plaintiffs then
    filed discrimination complaints with the Equal Opportunity Employment
    Commission (“EEOC”).                Babjak received a notice of Charge of
    Discrimination, but the record reflects no additional activity involving the
    EEOC. 2
    1
    Caris did, however, apparently grant religious exemptions to four employees
    under Woodruff’s supervision.
    2
    We were informed during oral argument that one plaintiff has received a right to
    sue letter.
    2
    Case: 21-11249      Document: 00516487841           Page: 3     Date Filed: 09/28/2022
    No. 21-11249
    On November 30, Plaintiffs concurrently filed a complaint and an
    application seeking a TRO, preliminary and permanent injunctions. First,
    Plaintiffs sought to “enjoin CARIS from enforcing its vaccine mandate and
    firing [them] because the mandate is illegal because it violates Governor
    Abbot’s [Executive Order GA-40].” That first basis for injunctive relief
    relates to Plaintiffs’ claims under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2201
    (a) for a declaration that
    the vaccination mandate violates GA-40.             Second, Plaintiffs sought
    “injunctive relief pending the outcome of their EEOC complaints.” This
    second basis for injunctive relief relates to Plaintiffs’ religious discrimination
    claims under Title VII and disability discrimination claims under the ADA,
    asserted by Katz and Jobe.
    On December 1, the district court held a hearing and orally denied
    Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, following up with a formal order two
    days later. The court ruled exclusively on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to
    establish a substantial threat of immediate and irreparable harm if their
    application was not granted. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
    Caris terminated Woodruff, Jobe, and Katz soon after the court’s
    order, and it terminated Babjak almost three months later for his failure to
    comply with the vaccine policy. Plaintiffs seek in this appeal the relief not
    mentioned by the district court, “reinstatement of their positions while
    awaiting [] a decision from the EEOC.” Plaintiffs’ appeal is limited to their
    Title VII claims. Because they mention neither the request for declaratory
    relief based on GA-40 nor Katz’s and Jobe’s ADA claims, those issues are
    forfeited. Caris filed a merits brief in response and moved to dismiss the
    appeal as non-justiciable due to mootness or lack of standing. This court
    carried the motion to dismiss with the case.
    We review questions of federal jurisdiction, including mootness and
    standing, de novo. Envtl. Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 
    529 F.3d 519
    , 524
    3
    Case: 21-11249      Document: 00516487841           Page: 4   Date Filed: 09/28/2022
    No. 21-11249
    (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also James v. City of Dallas, 
    254 F.3d 551
    , 562 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Whether mootness or standing
    analysis comes first is discretionary because a reviewing court can “choose
    among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits[.]”
    Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 
    526 U.S. 574
    , 585, 
    119 S. Ct. 1563
    , 1570
    (1999). Because this appeal is moot, we need not address standing.
    “A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a Case or
    Controversy for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no
    longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”
    Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 
    568 U.S. 85
    , 91, 
    133 S. Ct. 721
    , 726 (2013)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court must dismiss an
    action “[i]f an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal
    stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation[.]”
    Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 
    136 S. Ct. 663
    , 669, 
    193 L. Ed. 2d 571
     (2016)
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But that situation occurs
    only “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever
    to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000,
    
    567 U.S. 298
    , 307, 
    132 S. Ct. 2277
    , 2287 (2012) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    Further, we have “long been careful to note an exception to the
    general principle of mootness in instances where some issues of a case have
    become moot but the case as a whole remains alive because other issues have
    not become moot.” La. Env’t Action Network v. EPA, 
    382 F.3d 575
    , 581 (5th
    Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words,
    “[w]here several forms of relief are requested and one of these requests
    subsequently becomes moot, [courts have] still considered the remaining
    requests.” Powell v. McCormack, 
    395 U.S. 486
    , 496 n.8, 
    89 S. Ct. 1944
    , 1951
    (1969) (citing Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 
    258 U.S. 346
    ,
    4
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    No. 21-11249
    394, 
    42 S. Ct. 360
    , 361 (1922)); see also University of Texas v. Camenisch,
    
    451 U.S. 390
    , 
    101 S. Ct. 1830
    , 1833 (1981) (acknowledging “another instance
    in which one issue in a case has become moot, but the case as a whole remains
    alive because other issues have not become moot[]”); Hinkley v. Envoy Air,
    Inc., 
    968 F.3d 544
    , 548 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (“[R]esolution of a
    particular issue may be moot even if other issues on appeal remain ripe.”).
    This case is a paradigm of the La. Env’t Action Network “exception.”
    Plaintiffs’ appeal is moot, but a live controversy remains in the district court.
    As to the appeal, the district court only denied Plaintiffs’ request for an
    “order enjoining CARIS from enforcing its vaccine mandate and terminating
    their employment[.]” After Caris terminated Plaintiffs, no order of this court
    could affect the parties’ rights regarding whether Plaintiffs’ terminations
    should have been enjoined. See Marilyn T., Inc. v. Evans, 
    803 F.2d 1383
    , 1384
    (5th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Lacking the ability to grant any effectual
    relief with respect to the completed terminations, we must dismiss this
    appeal as moot. See id; see also Knox, 
    567 U.S. at 307-08
    , 
    132 S. Ct. at 2287
    (citations omitted).
    As to the underlying action, it remains alive. The district court did
    not rule on Plaintiffs’ alternative request, still pending, for “an injunction
    requiring reinstatement” pending resolution of their EEOC complaints.
    Their request is based on Fifth Circuit precedent holding that federal courts
    can in some circumstances order employers to reinstate former employees
    “pending final disposition of [their] charge[s] before the [EEOC].” 3 See
    3
    Other circuits appear to be in accord, though their decisions are of similar older
    vintage. See Wagner v. Taylor, 
    836 F.2d 566
    , 574 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Aronberg v. Walters,
    
    755 F.2d 1114
    , 1116 (4th Cir. 1985); Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 
    676 F.2d 877
    , 887-
    903 (2d Cir. 1981); McNail v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North
    America, 
    549 F.2d 538
    , 542 n. 10 (8th Cir. 1977); Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist.,
    5
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    No. 21-11249
    E.E.O.C. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
    475 F.2d 579
    , 579-80 (5th Cir. 1973) (per
    curiam), cert. denied, 
    414 U.S. 854
    , 
    94 S. Ct. 152
     (1973). In addition, “[w]hen
    an appeal from an interlocutory order concerning injunctive relief becomes
    moot, appellate courts routinely decline to address the other issues remaining
    before the district court.” Marilyn T., Inc., 
    803 F.2d at
    1385 n.5 (collecting
    cases); see also 
    id.
     (citing Crowell v. Mader, 
    444 U.S. 505
    , 506, 
    100 S. Ct. 992
    (1980)(per curiam). That precedent is applicable here and counsels us to
    decline to consider the reinstatement remedy in the first instance. We leave
    the resolution of that claim to the district court.
    For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE as moot the district court’s
    order denying injunctive relief and REMAND for further proceedings
    consistent herewith.
    
    528 F.2d 1208
    , 1211 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 
    434 U.S. 158
    , 
    98 S. Ct. 623
    (1977).
    6