United States v. Selena Flores ( 2019 )


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  •      Case: 18-50229       Document: 00515145943         Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/04/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 18-50229
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                       October 4, 2019
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                       Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    SELENA FLORES,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:17-CR-804-1
    Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Selena Flores challenges her jury-trial convictions for conspiracy to
    transport illegal aliens and illegal alien transportation for commercial
    advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. At trial,
    the Government introduced evidence of Flores’ prior arrest, under similar
    circumstances, for illegal-alien transportation.
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 18-50229     Document: 00515145943        Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/04/2019
    No. 18-50229
    For the only issue raised on appeal, Flores asserts the district court
    abused its discretion in admitting this evidence, contending the probative
    value of the arrest was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
    Whether to admit evidence of prior arrests is governed by Federal Rule of
    Evidence Rule 404(b) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
    admissible to prove a person’s character . . . . This evidence may be admissible
    for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
    plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”). On appeal,
    “[w]e review the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for an abuse of discretion
    with a heightened review in criminal cases”. United States v. Olguin, 
    643 F.3d 384
    , 389 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). To be admissible, extrinsic-offense
    evidence (1) must be “relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character”
    and (2) “must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by
    its undue prejudice”. United States v. Beechum, 
    582 F.2d 898
    , 911 (5th Cir.
    1978) (en banc).
    The district court ruled evidence of Flores’ prior arrest was relevant to
    her intent, state of mind, and knowledge—permissible uses of extrinsic
    evidence under Rule 404(b)—in conjunction with both counts of the indictment.
    See Huddleston v. United States, 
    485 U.S. 681
    , 682, 685 (1988). Because our
    court has held pleading not-guilty to conspiracy puts a defendant’s intent at
    issue for purposes of Rule 404(b), see United States v. Gonzalez, 
    76 F.3d 1339
    ,
    1347 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), and because knowledge of a person’s
    status as an illegal alien is an element of 8 U.S.C. § 1324, the evidence
    proffered was relevant to an issue other than Flores’ character. Flores does
    not contest the court’s ruling. The ruling, however, informs our consideration
    of the prejudicial-effect issue raised by Flores.
    2
    Case: 18-50229    Document: 00515145943     Page: 3   Date Filed: 10/04/2019
    No. 18-50229
    In other words, at issue is only whether the undue prejudice to Flores
    substantially outweighed the evidence’s probative value.      In deciding that
    question, courts consider “(1) the government’s need for the extrinsic evidence,
    (2) the similarity between the extrinsic and charged offenses, (3) the amount
    of time separating the two offenses, and (4) the court’s limiting instructions”.
    United States v. Kinchen, 
    729 F.3d 466
    , 473 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
    Our review utilizes “a lens that gives great deference to the district court’s
    informed judgment in weighing the factors”. 
    Id. (citation omitted).
          The facts surrounding Flores’ prior arrest resemble those pertinent to
    the current offense. In both instances, Flores was stopped at a temporary
    checkpoint on Farm to Market Road 2644 while driving an illegal alien. In the
    instant case, this similarity was probative of Flores’ knowledge of her
    passenger’s illegal-alien status and Flores’ intent to commit the charged
    offense. Although a close resemblance between extrinsic-offense evidence and
    a charged offense can increase the risk of unfair prejudice to defendant, the
    evidence of Flores’ prior arrest was not unfairly prejudicial because the prior
    misconduct was neither violent nor greater in magnitude than the charged
    offenses. See United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 
    162 F.3d 863
    , 872 (5th Cir.
    1998) (holding, inter alia, the admission of prior-conviction evidence was not
    improper, as it “lacked the hallmarks of highly prejudicial evidence” because
    “[t]hey were not violent acts, nor were they greater in magnitude than the
    crimes for which [defendant] was on trial”).
    Further, Flores’ prior arrest occurred approximately three years before
    the instant offense. Our court has upheld the admission of extrinsic-offense
    evidence that was as many as 18 years old. See United States v. Arnold, 
    467 F.3d 880
    , 885 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
    3
    Case: 18-50229    Document: 00515145943     Page: 4   Date Filed: 10/04/2019
    No. 18-50229
    Finally, the risk of unfair prejudice to Flores was minimized by the
    court’s Federal Rule of Evidence 105 jury instruction that the evidence could
    be considered only for the limited purpose of determining whether she had the
    requisite intent or state of mind to commit the charged offense. See 
    Kinchen, 729 F.3d at 474
    (holding the prejudicial effect of evidence “was further
    diminished by the district court’s instructions to the jury regarding the limited
    purpose[ ] for which any evidence of other similar acts may be considered”)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Our court has consistently rejected challenges, like Flores’, to the
    admission of evidence regarding prior instances of transporting illegal aliens,
    ruling:   the evidence was relevant to defendant’s state of mind; and its
    probative value was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. See
    
    Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 871
    –72; United States v. Robles-Vertiz, 
    155 F.3d 725
    , 730 (5th Cir. 1998).
    AFFIRMED.
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