United States v. Jesus Trevino ( 2019 )


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  •       Case: 17-50585          Document: 00514902076            Page: 1   Date Filed: 04/04/2019
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 17-50585
    FILED
    April 4, 2019
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ADALID MONTIEL-FIGUEROA, also known as Jesus Trevino,
    Defendant-Appellant
    -----------------------------------------------------
    Consolidated with 17-51062
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    JESUS TREVINO, also known as Adalid Montiel-Figueroa,
    Defendant-Appellant
    -------------------------------------------------------
    Consolidated with 17-51069
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ADALID MONTIEL-FIGUEROA, also known as Jesus Trevino,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Case: 17-50585      Document: 00514902076         Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/04/2019
    No. 17-50585
    c/w No. 17-51062
    c/w No. 17-51069
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:15-CR-1609-1
    USDC No. 2:16-CR-438-1
    Before KING, SOUTHWICK, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    In these consolidated appeals, Adalid Montiel-Figueroa, also known as
    Jesus Trevino, appeals his illegal reentry conviction and sentence and the
    revocation of his supervised release. The district court sentenced Montiel-
    Figueroa to 36 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release
    for the illegal reentry conviction.        The district court sentenced him to 24
    months of imprisonment for the revocation of his supervised release, to run
    consecutively to the illegal reentry sentence. For the reasons that follow, we
    AFFIRM both judgments.
    The claims of error that Montiel-Figueroa raises in his pro se brief
    pertain to the illegal reentry conviction and sentence; Montiel-Figueroa does
    not brief any challenge to the revocation of his supervised release. Therefore,
    he has abandoned the appeal of the revocation, and the revocation judgment is
    affirmed. See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Montiel-Figueroa argues that the district court failed to provide notice
    that it was considering a departure from the guidelines range; he seems to also
    argue, with the benefit of liberal construction, that the district court erred in
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    2
    Case: 17-50585     Document: 00514902076     Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/04/2019
    No. 17-50585
    c/w No. 17-51062
    c/w No. 17-51069
    failing to provide notice that it was considering a variance from the guidelines
    range. This claim of error is unavailing because the district court did not
    impose a departure and was not required to give notice of the variance. See
    Irizarry v. United States, 
    553 U.S. 708
    , 713-16 (2008).
    Montiel-Figueroa also argues that the district court failed to adequately
    explain the sentence. The record reflects that the district court primarily relied
    on Montiel-Figueroa’s prior 57- and 87-month illegal reentry sentences and
    cited relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. This record “makes the sentencing
    judge’s reasoning clear and allows for effective review; no further explanation
    was required.” United States v. Fraga, 
    704 F.3d 432
    , 439 (5th Cir. 2013). There
    was no error, plain or otherwise, in the adequacy of the explanation of the
    sentence.
    In the body of his brief, Montiel-Figueroa also argues that the sentence
    was substantively unreasonable. He seems to argue that the district court
    gave too much weight to his criminal history, which does not distinguish him
    from other illegal reentry defendants; improperly relied on two uncounseled
    prior convictions; failed to give him notice of its intent to rely on his
    underrepresented criminal history; and effectively imposed a consecutive
    sentence by failing to order that the sentence run concurrently with the
    revocation sentence.
    Montiel-Figueroa did not preserve a challenge to the district court’s
    reliance on uncounseled convictions or the lack of notice, and these aspects of
    his claim of error are subject to plain error review. See United States v.
    Mondragon-Santiago, 
    564 F.3d 357
    , 361 (5th Cir. 2009). Given that the district
    court relied primarily on the prior illegal reentry sentences to justify the
    sentence, Montiel-Figueroa cannot show that his substantial rights were
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    Case: 17-50585     Document: 00514902076      Page: 4   Date Filed: 04/04/2019
    No. 17-50585
    c/w No. 17-51062
    c/w No. 17-51069
    affected by the district court’s reliance on uncounseled convictions. See United
    States v. Davis, 
    602 F.3d 643
    , 647 (5th Cir. 2010). The district court did not
    err, plainly or otherwise, in failing to give Montiel-Figueroa notice of its intent
    to vary from the guidelines range on the basis of his criminal history. See
    
    Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 713-16
    . The district court gave compelling and case-
    specific reasons for varying from the guidelines range and effectively imposing
    a consecutive sentence, and Montiel-Figueroa’s disagreement with the district
    court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors fails to show any abuse of discretion,
    especially considering the deference given to the district court’s reasoning. See
    Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007); United States v. Smith, 
    440 F.3d 704
    , 708 (5th Cir. 2006).     There was no error, plain or otherwise, in the
    substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
    The record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair
    evaluation of Montiel-Figueroa’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; we
    therefore decline to consider the claim without prejudice to collateral review.
    See United States v. Isgar, 
    739 F.3d 829
    , 841 (5th Cir. 2014). Finally, Montiel-
    Figueroa waived his claim of error regarding the denial of his motion to dismiss
    the indictment by entering an unconditional guilty plea. See United States v.
    Daughenbaugh, 
    549 F.3d 1010
    , 1012 (5th Cir. 2008).
    AFFIRMED.
    4