United States v. David Shanton, Sr. ( 2012 )


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  •                    Certiorari granted, October 1, 2012
    Vacated by Supreme Court, October 1, 2012
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4617
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DAVID WILBERT SHANTON, SR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.    Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
    (1:08-cr-00142-CCB-1)
    Submitted:   January 17, 2012               Decided:    January 20, 2012
    Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, LaKeytria W. Felder,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for
    Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, George J.
    Hazel, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    After a jury trial, David Wilbert Shanton, Sr., was
    convicted     of   two        counts       of     armed      bank    robbery          and    related
    firearm   offenses.             On    appeal,          Shanton      argues       that        (1)    the
    district court erred admitting testimony of a DNA expert without
    requiring the testimony of those persons involved in conducting
    that DNA testing, and (2) the court erred by ordering that he
    serve a consecutive ten year sentence for the first of his two
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (2006) convictions.                              Finding no error, we
    affirm.
    At trial, Jennifer Luttman, a forensic examiner for
    the FBI, and an expert in the area of forensic DNA analysis,
    testified     that,      in     her       opinion,      the    results          of    DNA    testing
    performed by her staff on a piece of gum found at one of the
    crime scenes showed the presence of DNA belonging to Shanton.
    Shanton      argues      that    because          Luttman      was       relying        upon       data
    generated     by    members          of    her     staff,      and       that    the        data    was
    testimonial, it was incumbent upon the Government to present as
    witnesses      those      persons           who       conducted          the     tests,        citing
    Melendez-Diaz       v.    Massachusetts,               
    129 S. Ct. 2527
        (2009)       and
    Crawford v. Washington, 
    451 U.S. 35
     (2004).
    In   United       States       v.       Summers,      __    F.3d        __,    
    2011 WL 6276085
    , *7-8 (4th Cir. 2011), this court concerned itself with
    a   nearly    identical         situation.              We    held       that    the        raw    data
    2
    generated       by    the    analysts        was      not    testimonial        and    that       the
    forensic examiner was properly permitted to give his opinion as
    to   the    meaning      of    the      data.          We    conclude,       therefore,          that
    Summers controls the outcome of this issue, that Shanton’s right
    to confrontation was not violated and that the district court
    did not err permitting the FBI forensic examiner to give her
    expert opinion.
    Shanton also argues that the district court erred by
    ordering that he serve a consecutive ten year sentence for the
    first      of   two    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)           convictions,        claiming         that
    another     conviction         provided       for      a     greater       mandatory       minimum
    sentence.          This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
    holding in Abbott v. United States, 
    131 S. Ct. 18
     (2010).                                         The
    Court      held      “that    a     defendant          is    subject       to   a     mandatory,
    consecutive        sentence       for    a    §    924(c)      conviction,          and     is    not
    spared      from      that    sentence       by       virtue    of    receiving        a    higher
    mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction.”                                    Id., 
    131 S. Ct. at 23
    .          The Court held that the statute’s “except” clause
    refers     to     conduct     proscribed          by    § 924(c):           possession       of    a
    firearm in connection with a predicate crime.                                Id., 
    131 S. Ct. at 26
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentence.
    We   dispense        with    oral    argument          because       the    facts     and    legal
    3
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-4617

Filed Date: 1/20/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021