United States v. Joseph Brown, Jr. , 595 F. App'x 258 ( 2015 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4779
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JOSEPH FRANKLIN BROWN, JR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.    Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
    Judge. (8:08-cr-00529-DKC-1)
    Submitted:   February 27, 2015              Decided:   March 5, 2015
    Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Allen H. Orenberg, ORENBERG LAW FIRM, P.C., North Bethesda,
    Maryland, for Appellant.     Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
    Attorney, James I. Pearce, Special Assistant United States
    Attorney, Arun Rao, Assistant United States Attorney, Sujit
    Raman, Chief of Appeals, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Joseph       Brown,     Jr.,     appeals    his     conviction        following    a
    guilty plea to using, carrying, or brandishing a firearm during
    a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (2012). 1
    Brown asserts that the district court, relying on then-existing
    law, failed to inform him that brandishing was an element of the
    § 924(c) offense that must be proven by the Government.                               Brown
    also       argues    that      the    district     court    failed      to    adequately
    establish that he had, in fact, brandished a firearm.                               Finding
    no reversible error, we affirm.
    Because Brown did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, we
    review his challenge to his plea for plain error.                         United States
    v. Sanya, 
    774 F.3d 812
    , 815 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v.
    Adepoju, 
    756 F.3d 250
    , 259 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying plain error
    review to unpreserved error under Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
     (2013)).             To establish plain error, a defendant must
    show: (1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the
    error      affected      his   substantial        rights.     Henderson        v.    United
    States,      
    133 S. Ct. 1121
    ,    1126     (2013).     In    the      guilty    plea
    context,       a    defendant         meets   this    burden       by     “show[ing]     a
    reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not
    1
    Brown also pled guilty to conspiracy to commit armed bank
    robbery, armed bank robbery, and being a felon in possession of
    a firearm. He does not challenge these convictions on appeal.
    2
    have entered the plea.”               United States v. Davila, 
    133 S. Ct. 2139
    , 2147 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).                              Even if a
    defendant    satisfies       these    requirements,            we    will    exercise      our
    discretion    to    remedy     the    error      only    if     “the    error      seriously
    affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings.”         Henderson,       
    133 S. Ct. at 1126-27
           (internal
    quotation marks and brackets omitted).
    In   Alleyne,     the     Supreme       Court      held     that    any       fact   that
    increases    a     mandatory     minimum         sentence       must    be     charged      by
    indictment and admitted by the defendant or found by a jury
    beyond a reasonable doubt.             133 S. Ct. at 2163; United States v.
    Strayhorn,    
    743 F.3d 917
    ,     926     (4th      Cir.)       (applying      Alleyne),
    cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2689
     (2014).                      Accordingly, we conclude
    that, in light of Alleyne, the district court plainly erred when
    it misrepresented to Brown the Government’s burden of proof on
    the element of brandishing. 2               See Bousley v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 614
    , 618-19 (1998).             However, Brown has not shown, or even
    asserted,    that    he     would     not    have       pled    guilty       had    he    been
    correctly    apprised     of    the    elements       of    the      offense.        Because
    2
    The district court correctly stated the law as it existed
    at the time of Brown’s plea.    See Harris v. United States, 
    536 U.S. 545
     (2002), overruled by Alleyne, 
    133 S. Ct. at 2163
    .
    However, plain error is assessed based on the state of the law
    at the time of our review, not at the time of the district
    court’s actions.   Johnson v. United States, 
    520 U.S. 461
    , 468
    (1997).
    3
    there is no evidence that the error actually affected Brown’s
    decision    to    plead    guilty,       we   hold     that       Brown       has    failed      to
    establish that the error affected his substantial rights.
    We also hold that the facts admitted by Brown during the
    plea hearing establish an adequate factual basis to support the
    plea.     See United States v. Ketchum, 
    550 F.3d 363
    , 366 (4th Cir.
    2008)    (providing       standard).          A    defendant           is    liable       for   his
    coconspirator’s act of brandishing a firearm when he “actively
    participated      in     the     underlying        .    .    .     crime       with        advance
    knowledge that a confederate would [brandish] a gun during the
    crime’s    commission.”          Rosemond         v.   United      States,          
    134 S. Ct. 1240
    ,    1243    (2014).       Brown     admitted       in       the    factual       statement
    accompanying his plea that a coconspirator brandished a rifle
    throughout the bank robbery to coerce the bank’s manager and
    that Brown helped plan the robbery, provided the coconspirator
    with the rifle, and was with him during part of the time when he
    was     brandishing      it.       See    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(4)          (defining
    “brandish”).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    We    dispense    with    oral    argument         because       the        facts    and    legal
    contentions      are   adequately        presented          in   the        materials       before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4