Paula Piehl v. Narayan Saheta , 602 F. App'x 111 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1387
PAULA A. PIEHL, Individually and as Personal Representative
of The Estate of Martin Abraham Piehl; FORREST PIEHL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
NARAYAN P. SAHETA, M.D.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-00254-WMN)
Submitted: January 28, 2015 Decided: March 5, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henry L. Belsky, Mitchell E. Rosensweig, SCHLACHMAN, BELSKY &
WEINER, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Matthew H.
Fogelson, Frederick W. Goundry, III, VARNER & GOUNDRY,
Frederick, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Paula and Forrest Piehl (“the Piehls”) brought this
diversity action against cardiologist Narayan Saheta alleging
medical negligence and wrongful death in Saheta’s treatment of
Martin Piehl (“Mr. Piehl”). Following a jury verdict in
Saheta’s favor on all counts, the Piehls appeal.
The Piehls assert that the district court erred in
three different respects at trial. First, they contend that
they were prejudiced by improper remarks in both opening
statements and closing arguments. Second, the Piehls argue that
the district court permitted an improper voir dire of an expert
witness. Finally, the Piehls contend that the district court
erred in rejecting six of their proposed jury instructions.
Having considered the record, the briefs, and the applicable
law, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
The Piehls contend that the district court erred when
it overruled their objection to Saheta’s reference to the theory
of contributory negligence in opening statements. The Piehls
further contend that, at the conclusion of the trial, the court
should have explained to the jury that contributory negligence
was not an issue in the case.
During closing arguments the jury heard from both the
court and the Piehls that contributory negligence was “not an
issue” (J.A. 360), and the Piehls did not request a further
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instruction from the court on the matter. The jury was
instructed to decide only the issue of Saheta’s negligence.
There was no instruction for the jury to consider whether Mr.
Piehl was negligent. The court instructed the jury not to
consider counsels’ statements or arguments as evidence.
Jurors are presumed to follow the law. See United
States v. Min, 704 F.3d 314, 322 n.6 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)). There is
nothing in the record to suggest that the jury ignored the
instructions and imputed contributory negligence on Mr. Piehl’s
part in finding that Saheta was not negligent. Accordingly, we
conclude that, even if the district court erred, the Piehls were
not prejudiced in either instance.
In their second assignment of error, the Piehls assert
that the district court allowed Saheta to improperly voir dire
their expert witness, Dr. Jonathan Arden, by referencing a
report irrelevant to his qualifications as an expert in forensic
pathology. A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed
for abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the district
court’s decision “is guided by erroneous legal principles or
rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.” United States
v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Further, evidentiary rulings are
subject to harmless error review, such that any error is
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harmless if we may say “with fair assurance, after pondering all
that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the
error.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides,
with some exceptions, that all relevant evidence is admissible.
Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the
jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Rule 611(b) provides that “[c]ross-
examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the
direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s
credibility. The court may allow inquiry into additional
matters as if on direct examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(b).
The district court “is vested with broad discretion to control
the mode of interrogation and presentation of evidence.” United
States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 955-56 (4th Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Saheta
to question Dr. Arden concerning the report, but in any event,
any error in permitting that cross-examination was harmless
given that the jury never reached the issue addressed by Dr.
Arden’s testimony, that of causation.
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In their third and final assignment of error, the
Piehls assert that the district court erred in rejecting a
number of their proposed instructions. In determining whether
the district court erred in instructing the jury, we review the
trial court’s jury instructions as a whole. Rowland v. Am. Gen.
Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2003). “Instructions
will be considered adequate if construed as a whole, and in
light of the whole record, they adequately inform the jury of
the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing
the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” Id.(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Where a
party objects to the trial court’s failure to give a requested
instruction, we review for abuse of discretion. See id.With respect to the Piehls’ proposed instructions
numbered 3, 10, and 11, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in rejecting these instructions. The
court’s instructions adequately conveyed the material proposed
in instructions 3 and 10. To the extent that the Piehls
preserved their objection regarding proposed instruction 11,
they fail to establish that it stated a controlling principle of
Maryland law. With respect to the Piehls’ proposed instructions
numbered 5, 6, and 13 addressing causation, we conclude that any
error in rejecting them was harmless in light of the fact that
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the jury found that Saheta did not breach the standard of care
and, accordingly, never reached the issue of causation.
We affirm the judgment of the district court. We
grant Saheta’s motion and dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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