United States v. Shawn Miles , 595 F. App'x 250 ( 2015 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4487
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    SHAWN MILES,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.  Henry E. Hudson, District
    Judge. (3:13-cr-00205-HEH-1)
    Submitted:   December 16, 2014            Decided:    March 4, 2015
    Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L.
    Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal
    Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
    Boente, United States Attorney, Heather L. Hart, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Shawn Miles pled guilty to one count of being a felon
    in possession of a firearm in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1)
    (2012) and one count of possession of cocaine base with intent
    to distribute in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(C)
    (2012).      Miles pled not guilty to one count of possessing a
    firearm     in    furtherance          of   a       drug    trafficking       offense     in
    violation    of    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)         (2012),      and    a   federal    jury
    acquitted him of that count.                 Miles was sentenced to a term of
    forty-six months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of
    supervised       release.         Miles     contends       that    the    district     court
    erred in applying a two-level enhancement at sentencing pursuant
    to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2013) for
    possessing a firearm when the jury had acquitted him of that
    conduct.
    This     court       reviews        a   sentence       for    reasonableness,
    applying     an    abuse     of    discretion         standard.           Gall v.    United
    States,    
    552 U.S. 38
    ,    51    (2007);       see    also    United    States     v.
    Layton, 
    564 F.3d 330
    , 335 (4th Cir. 2009).                               In so doing, we
    examine     the     sentence        for      “significant          procedural       error,”
    including “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
    Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
    to   consider       the     [18     U.S.C.]         § 3553(a)       [(2012)]     factors,
    selecting     a    sentence       based      on     clearly       erroneous    facts,     or
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    failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”                          Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    .          We presume on appeal that a sentence within a
    properly      calculated   advisory      Guidelines       range   is     reasonable.
    United States v. Allen, 
    491 F.3d 178
    , 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see
    Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 346-56 (2007) (upholding
    appellate     presumption      of    reasonableness       for   within-Guidelines
    sentence).
    Upon   review,    we    conclude     that    the    court       did   not
    procedurally err or violate Miles’ right to a jury trial by
    considering acquitted conduct proved by a preponderance of the
    evidence in determining the applicable Guidelines range, within
    the   proper    statutory      penalty    range.      See       United    States     v.
    Brooks, 
    524 F.3d 549
    , 562-63 (4th Cir. 2008).                       Moreover, the
    district court did not err in applying the enhancement on the
    facts of this case.         See United States v. Harris, 
    128 F.3d 850
    ,
    852-53 (4th Cir. 1997).             Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
    the district court.         We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts   and    legal   contentions       are   adequately       presented      in   the
    materials     before   this    court     and   argument     would      not    aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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