Mejia v. Unknown Officers ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-30663
Summary Calendar
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ELIAS RAYAS MEJIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNKNOWN OFFICERS, Individually and in their official capacities
as City of Lake Charles police officers,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(96-CV-2037)
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January 6, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.*
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Mejia is currently incarcerated in federal
prison on conviction for drug trafficking offenses. In February,
1994, when he and his brother were driving through Louisiana, he
was stopped by police officers from the Lake Charles, Louisiana
Police Department for a traffic violation. Sergeant Cole asked
Mejia for permission to search his vehicle, was given it, and
seized $39,000 in currency found under the rear seat. Mejia and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
his brother were released without being charged with an offense.
Two and one-half years later, Mejia filed suit alleging violation
of equal protection rights, illegal seizure of his property, and
denial of due process. The district court accepted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because under Louisiana’s one-year limitations
period for torts, the complaint was facially time-barred. We
affirm.
On appeal, Mejia contends that he was unaware, until
Sergeant Cole testified at the drug trial in Florida in December
1995, that the police department had no intention of returning his
property. Viewed from this perspective, Mejia filed suit within
one year of his knowledge of the deprivation.
The law is clear on several points. First, section 1983
actions borrow the forum state’s general personal injury
limitations. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 243-48 (1989). In
Louisiana, the applicable section 1983 limitation is one year. See
Louisiana Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492 (West 1994); Elzy v. Roberson,
868 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1989). Federal law determines, however,
when a section 1983 cause of action accrues, and it accrues when
the aggrieved party knows, or has reason to know of, the injury or
damages which form the basis of the action. Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995). As Piotrowski explains,
if the plaintiff knows of the injury and the connection between the
injury and the defendant’s actions, or if the circumstances would
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lead a reasonable person to investigate the matter further, then
the cause of action has accrued.
In this case, Mejia was immediately aware on the date of
the traffic stop of the injuries he allegedly suffered in terms of
the constitutional violations he later alleged. First, if he
thought that his car was not pulled over for a legitimate traffic
violation, then he would have immediately suspected that Sergeant
Cole stopped him because he and his brother were racially Hispanic.
Second, the money was confiscated and not returned although Mejia
and his brother were permitted to proceed. Third, from and after
February 1994, Mejia knew he had not received “process” of any kind
before or after the taking of the currency.
The nature of these events was so unequivocal and the
results so dramatic that Mejia cannot excuse his failure to take
timely action by a reference to Sergeant Cole’s testimony in
December 1995. No reasonable person would have thought that there
was any doubt that the municipality would keep the currency unless
Mejia did something.
Whether Mejia could read the English-language consent to
search form and waiver form that the officers had him sign is
immaterial to the running of prescription. His pleadings are
inconsistent on whether he understood what the officers were
telling him, and the transcript attached to his brief on appeal
suggests that Mejia and his brother both expressly disclaimed
ownership of the currency verbally on more than one occasion.
Regardless of the precise circumstances, Mejia knew his money had
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been taken, and he suspected the basis for the initial traffic
stop. This knowledge gave rise, at the least, to a duty to
investigate further, and the prescription period immediately began
running.
For these reasons, the district court’s dismissal is
AFFIRMED.
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