United States v. Gilberto Cortez , 548 F. App'x 240 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 12-50784      Document: 00512466498         Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/10/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 12-50784                                 FILED
    Summary Calendar                        December 10, 2013
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    GILBERTO CORTEZ, also known as Gilbert Cortez, also known as Roberto
    Cortez,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:11-CR-974-1
    Before WIENER, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Defendant-Appellant Gilberto Cortez appeals his jury trial conviction for
    possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun and possession of a firearm by
    a convicted felon.      He contends that the district court erred when it (1)
    overruled his objection to the prosecutor’s comment during opening arguments
    that the evidence would show that he moved in the direction of using the
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 12-50784    Document: 00512466498     Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/10/2013
    No. 12-50784
    firearm and (2) denied his motion for a mistrial based on that comment. He
    urges that the comment improperly raised the possibility of a violent,
    uncharged offense. Cortez insists that the comment was improper because the
    government did not introduce any evidence showing that he intended to use
    the firearm. He asserts that the comment prejudiced him by implying that he
    intended to shoot a police officer.     Cortez contends that the prosecutor
    magnified the improper comment by soliciting testimony regarding the
    dangerousness of the ammunition found in the shotgun and by stating during
    closing arguments that it was fortunate that other officers entered the
    residence behind the lead officer. He claims that the comment deprived him of
    a fair trial because the evidence against him was weak.
    In reviewing assertions of prosecutorial misconduct based on an
    allegedly improper remark, we perform a two-step analysis. United States v.
    McCann, 
    613 F.3d 486
    , 494 (5th Cir. 2010). We first determine whether the
    remark was improper. 
    Id. If we
    conclude that the remark was improper, we
    review whether the remark affected the defendant’s substantial rights. 
    Id. In assessing
    whether an improper remark affected the defendant’s substantial
    rights, we consider “(1) the magnitude of the statement’s prejudice, (2) the
    effect of any cautionary instructions given, and (3) the strength of the evidence
    of the defendant’s guilt.” 
    Id. at 496
    (internal quotations marks and citation
    omitted). We review whether a remark was improper de novo, and we review
    a district court’s determination that a remark did not affect the defendant’s
    substantial rights and its denial of a mistrial motion for abuse of discretion.
    
    Id. at 494-95.
          The evidence presented by the government showed that Cortez was
    partially on a sofa reaching towards a second sofa when Officer Mark Gallardo
    entered the residence. Further evidence showed that the shotgun was on the
    2
    Case: 12-50784    Document: 00512466498     Page: 3   Date Filed: 12/10/2013
    No. 12-50784
    armrest of the second sofa, in the area towards which Cortez was reaching.
    Even though the evidence also showed that Cortez quickly complied with
    Officer Gallardo’s command to get back on the sofa and that Officer Gallardo
    could not see the object for which Cortez appeared to be reaching, there was
    sufficient evidence from which the prosecutor could argue that a reasonable
    inference from the evidence to be presented was that Cortez was reaching for
    the shotgun. See United States v. Jenkins, 
    442 F.2d 429
    , 434-35 (5th Cir. 1971).
    The prosecutor’s remark implied that Cortez was reaching for the
    shotgun and that he intended to use it. Arguments based on inferences are
    permissible, however, so long as the inferences are based on evidence
    presented at trial. See United States v. Delgado, 
    672 F.3d 320
    , 336 (5th Cir.
    2012). Although no evidence was presented regarding the acts Cortez intended
    to carry out if he had reached the shotgun, the prosecutor’s comment merely
    made the reasonable inference that Cortez intended to use the shotgun in an
    unspecified manner if he had reached it; and arguments concerning inferences
    regarding the defendant’s intent are not improper if they are based on
    evidence. See United States v. Andrews, 
    22 F.3d 1328
    , 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994).
    We have held that a prosecutor may not argue that the defendant committed
    offenses extraneous to the offenses being tried, but that holding involved
    extraneous offenses committed outside of the scope of the offense being tried.
    By contrast, the challenged statement in this case concerned only Cortez’s
    actions at the time of the offense that was being tried. See United States v.
    Murrah, 
    888 F.2d 24
    , 26-27 (5th Cir. 1989). As prosecutors are allowed wide
    latitude in making arguments to the jury, Cortez has not shown that the
    challenged statement by the prosecutor was improper. See United States v.
    Holmes, 
    406 F.3d 337
    , 356 (5th Cir. 2005).
    3
    Case: 12-50784   Document: 00512466498     Page: 4   Date Filed: 12/10/2013
    No. 12-50784
    Moreover, even if the remark was somehow improper, Cortez has not
    shown that his substantial rights were affected.    As explained above, the
    remark was marginally improper if it was improper at all, so it was not such a
    serious impropriety “that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial.”
    United States v. Alaniz, 
    726 F.3d 586
    , 616 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Additionally, the district court instructed the
    jury that the statements of the attorneys were not evidence. And, contrary to
    Cortez’s assertion, the evidence against him was strong.      The undisputed
    evidence showed that Cortez was alone in a room where the shotgun was
    sitting in plain sight. This was sufficient to show that Cortez possessed the
    shotgun. See United States v. Meza, 
    701 F.3d 411
    , 421 (5th Cir. 2012). Given
    the minor nature of the possibly improper statement, the curative instruction,
    and the evidence against Cortez, he has not shown that his substantial rights
    were affected or that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
    request for a mistrial. See United States v. Turner, 
    674 F.3d 420
    , 439-40 (5th
    Cir. 2012).
    AFFIRMED.
    4