United States v. Muhammad ( 1999 )

Revised February 17, 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-10960
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RUTH MUHAMMAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
January 15, 1999
Before GARWOOD, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
For this expedited appeal from an order committing federal
prisoner Ruth Muhammad to hospitalization for treatment, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 4245, disposition having been by a magistrate judge,
acting by written consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(1), at issue are: whether the magistrate judge lacked
jurisdiction; the constitutionality of the preponderance of the
evidence standard in § 4245(d); the sufficiency of the evidence;
and whether the commitment violates Muhammad’s right to free
exercise of her religion under the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. We AFFIRM.
I.
Muhammad is serving a 63-month sentence in federal prison for
robbing a bank in California in March 1997. (She had been released
from a California state prison only a few days earlier.) On 3
March 1998, following her conviction on the bank robbery charge,
Muhammad was examined by a Bureau of Prisons psychiatrist, who was
of the opinion that Muhammad was then suffering from a mental
disease or defect requiring custodial care and treatment in a
suitable psychiatric hospital. Accordingly, on 4 March 1998, she
was transferred to the Federal Medical Center, Carswell, in Fort
Worth, Texas.
But, on 9 April, Muhammad refused admission to the Psychiatric
Unit. Therefore, on 17 April, the Government filed a “Petition to
Determine Present Mental Condition of an Imprisoned Person, ... and
for Appointment of Counsel and Qualified Examiner Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 4245 and 4247”, seeking Muhammad’s commitment for
psychiatric care and treatment. On 22 April, the district court
entered an agreed order referring the appointment of counsel
request to a magistrate judge.
A consent to the transfer of that request had been signed by
both the Assistant United States Attorney and, on behalf of
Muhammad, by an Assistant Federal Public Defender. On 23 April,
the magistrate judge appointed the Federal Public Defender to
represent Muhammad, and ordered him to file a report stating
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whether Muhammad continued to object both to treatment and to being
transferred to a suitable facility for that purpose.
On 11 June, a “Consent to Referral to Magistrate Judge ...”,
signed by the Assistant United States Attorney and by an Assistant
Federal Public Defender (who also represents Muhammad on appeal)
was filed. That Assistant Federal Public Defender, whose office is
in California, had represented Muhammad there on the 1997 bank
robbery charge, which resulted in her current imprisonment.
The consent stated that the Government, by and through the
Assistant United States Attorney, and Muhammad, “by and through her
attorney”, stipulated and agreed that
they consent to a hearing and determination to
be had by United States Magistrate Judge ...,
on the petition to determine present mental
condition of an imprisoned person as requested
by the petition filed by [the Government].
[The Government] and [Muhammad] consent that
this case be transferred for all purposes to
the United States Magistrate Judge ... for any
determinations to be made in this case as
requested by the petition of [the Government].
Pursuant to that consent, the district court ordered that the case
be “reassigned and transferred to” the magistrate judge “for the
conduct of all further proceedings and the entry of judgment”.
On 12 August, the magistrate judge conducted a hearing on the
Government’s petition. The magistrate judge granted the petition
and “committed [Muhammad] to the custody of the United States
Attorney General for hospitalization for treatment in a suitable
facility until [she] is no longer in need of such custody for care
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or treatment or until the expiration of her sentence of
imprisonment, whichever occurs earlier”.
The next day, the magistrate judge denied Muhammad’s motion
for a stay of the commitment order pending appeal. Our court
denied Muhammad’s similar motion, but granted her motion to
expedite her appeal.
II.
Muhammad contends (1) that the magistrate judge lacked
jurisdiction; (2) that the preponderance of the evidence standard
in § 4245(d) is unconstitutional because due process instead
requires clear and convincing evidence; (3) that the Government
failed to establish that Muhammad posed a present danger to herself
or others; and (4) that Muhammad’s commitment violates her right to
free exercise of her religion under the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.*
A.
Muhammad presents three bases in support of her claim that the
magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction (authority) to enter the
commitment order: (1) that Muhammad did not personally consent to
the disposition of the petition by the magistrate judge; (2) that
§ 4245 commitment proceedings are not “civil” matters; and (3) that
*
In September 1998, before Muhammad filed her appellate
brief, the Government moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground
that it is frivolous. The motion was carried with the case. As
discussed infra, although the issues raised by Muhammad are without
merit, they are not frivolous. The motion is DENIED.
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Article III forbids even consensual reference of a § 4245
proceeding to a magistrate judge.
The statutory authority for disposition of this matter by the
magistrate judge, rather than his preparing a report and
recommendation for disposition by the district judge, is found in
28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a
... magistrate [judge] ... may conduct any or
all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil
matter and order the entry of judgment in the
case, when specially designated to exercise
such jurisdiction by the district court or
courts he serves....
(2) If a magistrate [judge] is
designated to exercise civil jurisdiction
under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
clerk of court shall, at the time the action
is filed, notify the parties of the
availability of a magistrate [judge] to
exercise such jurisdiction. The decision of
the parties shall be communicated to the clerk
of court. Thereafter, either the district
court judge or the magistrate [judge] may
again advise the parties of the availability
of the magistrate [judge], but in so doing,
shall also advise the parties that they are
free to withhold consent without adverse
substantive consequences. Rules of court for
the reference of civil matters to magistrate[]
[judges] shall include procedures to protect
the voluntariness of the parties’ consent.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and (2) (emphasis added).
Needless to say, “when the magistrate [judge] enters judgment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), absence of the appropriate
consent and reference (or special designation) order results in a
lack of jurisdiction (or at least fundamental error that may be
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complained of for the first time on appeal)”. Mendes Junior Int’l
Co. v. M/V Sokai Maru, 978 F.2d 920, 924 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted; emphasis added). Earlier, in Archie v. Christian, 808
F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), our court had exercised its
supervisory powers to require that, “before commencing the actual
trial of any civil case in which a magistrate [judge] is to preside
pursuant to the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), jury or nonjury,
[the magistrate judge] shall inquire on the record of each party
whether he has filed consent to the magistrate [judge]’s presiding
and shall receive an affirmative answer from each on the record
before proceeding further”. Id. at 1137 (footnote omitted).
As noted, Muhammad, by and through her attorney, consented to
disposition of this matter by the magistrate judge. Now, by and
through that same attorney, she challenges the jurisdiction of the
magistrate judge to act in the very manner to which she had
consented. No authority need be cited for the long-established
rules that personal, but not subject matter, jurisdiction can be
waived; that we examine subject matter jurisdiction throughout a
proceeding, concomitantly raising the issue sua sponte if need be;
and that we freely review jurisdictional questions.
That said, we note that the Government does not contest
Muhammad’s, in essence, framing this issue as one of subject matter
jurisdiction. Along that line, the Government does not urge that,
in the light of the consent in district court, Muhammad is
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precluded from raising this issue here. This is in line with the
above-quoted passages from Mendes Junior Int’l Co. and Archie.
We proceed in the same fashion. See, e.g., Archie, 808 F.2d
at 1134. This notwithstanding, we are troubled greatly by counsel
filing the consent, for and on behalf of his client, in district
court, then participating in the commitment proceeding without any
objection or other notice that the magistrate judge lacked
jurisdiction, and then making that claim, albeit one of
jurisdiction, for the first time on appeal.
In short, this issue should have been presented in district
court for a host of obvious reasons; these include ensuring that
Muhammad received the most expeditious treatment (should she be
found in need of same), and judicial efficiency and economy. While
we do not question counsel’s good faith in presenting the issue at
this late date, we caution/note the obvious: this is no way to
proceed. This issue should have been raised when this proceeding
began approximately nine months ago. Cf. Carter v. Sea Land
Servs., Inc., 816 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1987), concerning a pre-trial
attempt to withdraw consent to trial before a magistrate judge.
Our court stated:
We are not persuaded that a litigant has such
a right. We find nothing in the statute or
the legislative history that requires
continuing expressions of consent before a
magistrate [judge] can exercise authority
under a valid reference. Nor will we accept
the slippery-slope invitation to read into the
statute a rule that would allow a party to
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express conditional consent to a reference,
thereby obtaining what amounts to a free shot
at a favorable outcome or a veto of an
unfavorable outcome. Any such rule would
allow the party to hold the power of consent
over the magistrate [judge] like a sword of
Damocles, ready to strike the reference should
the magistrate [judge] issue a ruling not
quite to the party’s liking. We will not
countenance such fast and loose toying with
the judicial system.
Id. at 1020-21.
1.
Again, even though Muhammad’s counsel signed the consent form
agreeing to the transfer of this matter to the magistrate judge
“for all purposes”, Muhammad, represented on appeal by the same
counsel, now contends that the consent was invalid because it was
given by her lawyer, rather than by her personally. In support,
she relies on Archie; EEOC v. West Louisiana Health Services, Inc.,
959 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1992), in which our court stated that
“[c]onsent to trial by a magistrate [judge] under [§] 636(c) cannot
be implied”; Glover v. Alabama Bd. of Corrections, 660 F.2d 120,
124 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted), in which our court stated
that Congress intended to require “a clear expression of consent by
the parties before allowing a magistrate [judge] authority under [§
636](c)”; and Form 34 (“Consent to Exercise of Jurisdiction by a
United States Magistrate Judge”) of the Forms Following the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the signature of the
party or parties.
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a.
Although the cited statute and authorities refer to the
consent of the parties, they do not state that an attorney’s
consent on behalf of his client is invalid for purposes of §
636(c). As the Supreme Court recognized in Link v. Wabash Railroad
Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), our judicial system is based on
“representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by
the acts of his lawyer-agent”. Id. at 634; see also National Ass’n
of Gov’t Employees v. City Public Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 40 F.3d
698, 709 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Frank v. County of Hudson, 962 F.
Supp. 41, 43 (D.N.J. 1997) (attorney’s consent to proceed before
magistrate judge is sufficient). One can only imagine the havoc
that would ensue should we allow otherwise.
b.
In any event, Muhammad maintains that the magistrate judge
violated Archie by failing at the hearing to ask her on the record
whether she had consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, or
whether she was aware of the alternatives to such consent, or
whether she was aware that her counsel had consented on her behalf.
The requirement in Archie that the magistrate judge inquire of the
parties on the record as to their consent was created to ensure
that the record reflected that the parties had consented. In
Archie, our court considered the consent issue sua sponte. 808
F.2d at 1133-34; id. at 1137 (Higginbotham, J., specially
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concurring). The court noted that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contain “explicit provisions safeguarding the
voluntariness” of the consent required under § 636(c), and that the
official forms contain a consent form for that purpose. 808 F.2d
at 1135-36 & n.3; see FED. R. CIV. P. 73. However, the parties in
Archie apparently did not complete such a form. See id. at 1137
(Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). Accordingly, the record
in Archie, unlike the record in the proceeding before us, contained
no explicit evidence of the parties’ consent.
Muhammad’s counsel’s signature on the consent form, which was
filed in the record, satisfies Archie’s requirement that consent be
on the record.
c.
Muhammad’s contention that her right to a civil commitment
hearing presided over by an Article III judge is an inherently
personal right that can be waived only by her personal consent is
likewise unavailing. In Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th
Cir. 1973) (en banc), our court held that the right of a criminal
defendant, indicted for murder, to a constitutionally composed
grand jury could be waived by the defendant’s attorney. Obviously,
such a right is no more personal or important than Muhammad’s
claimed right to have an Article III judge preside over her
commitment hearing. See also Carter, 816 F.2d at 1021 (fundamental
right can be waived).
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2.
Next, Muhammad contends that, even assuming the validity of
her counsel’s consent on her behalf, the magistrate judge
nevertheless lacked jurisdiction, based on her claim that 18 U.S.C.
§ 4245 commitment proceedings are not “civil” matters, and thus not
covered by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Muhammad points out that Title
18 is entitled “Crimes and Criminal Procedure”, which she claims is
significant because “the title of a statute and the heading of a
section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the
meaning of a statute”. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, ___, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1226 (1998) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Muhammad asserts further that commitment proceedings are
similar to habeas corpus proceedings, which are not civil actions
for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626. See Davis v.
Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1998) (habeas proceeding under
28 U.S.C. § 2241); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir.
1997) (habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254); United States v.
Cole, 101 F.3d 1076, 1077 (5th Cir. 1996) (28 U.S.C. § 2255
proceeding). Muhammad contends that the same reasoning applies
with even greater force in the context of § 4245 proceedings, in
which a defendant is accorded constitutional and statutory rights
unavailable to typical civil litigants. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4245(c),
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4247(d). Citing United States v. Williams, 919 F.2d 266, 268-71
(5th Cir. 1990), in which our court held that magistrate judges are
not authorized to adjudicate proceedings for the revocation of
supervised release, Muhammad analogizes the constitutional and
statutory protections applicable in § 4245 commitment proceedings
to those applicable to proceedings for the revocation of supervised
release.
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court
stated that “a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be
equated to a criminal prosecution”. Id. at 428. Addington
involved a Texas court’s indefinite commitment of an ordinary
citizen (not a prisoner, such as Muhammad) to a state mental
hospital. More to the point, the Fourth Circuit, addressing the
due process requirements for commitment proceedings under § 4245,
held that such proceedings are civil matters. See United States v.
Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 842 (4th Cir.) (citing Addington), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 872 (1995). We agree with the Fourth Circuit
that, in a § 4245 commitment proceeding, the Government’s power is
not wielded in a punitive manner. See Baker, 45 F.3d at 844 (“The
government’s efforts to civilly commit a person are not punitive in
nature”); cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428. Likewise, we agree that
a § 4245 commitment proceeding is “civil” in nature and can
therefore be disposed of by a magistrate judge under § 636(c).
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3.
Muhammad’s final basis for her lack-of-authority claim is
grounded in the premise that such proceedings present compelling
liberty interests and thus cannot be delegated to non-Article III
judges. That Article provides, in pertinent part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
“Article III, § 1, serves both to protect the role of the
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of
tripartite government, and to safeguard litigants’ right to have
claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Citing Schor, Muhammad contends that, although
a litigant may, by consent, waive the “personal” right to an
Article III judge, id. at 848-49, a litigant may not, by consent,
waive the “structural” interest. Id. at 850-51.
In this regard, Muhammad maintains that, even though a § 4245
commitment proceeding is not a full-blown criminal proceeding, it
nevertheless involves a similarly compelling liberty interest, the
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deprivation of which cannot be delegated to a non-Article III
adjudicator. And, she asserts that another factor indicating that
the disposition of § 4245 petitions by magistrate judges violates
Article III is that their decisions are not subject to supervision,
or de novo review, by Article III judges, but only to appellate
review by the court of appeals, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).
These contentions are totally without merit. As stated, this
is a civil proceeding. Our court has already decided that parties
in a civil action can consent to waive their constitutional right
to trial before an Article III judge, and to the entry of judgment
by a non-Article III judge. See Carter, 816 F.2d at 1020-21;
Archie, 808 F.2d at 1134 (“Certainly Congress must have believed
that [§ 636(c)] was constitutional and that a magistrate [judge]
exercising such powers—with the consent of the parties, one
component of which was necessarily a waiver of their rights to an
Article III presiding judicial officer—was doing so with
jurisdiction, or it would not have enacted such a law”); id. at
1137 (citing Puryear v. Ede’s, Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984))
(“we have upheld Section 636(c) against attack on constitutional
grounds”).
B.
Section 4245 provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Determination and disposition.—If,
after the hearing, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person
is presently suffering from a mental disease
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or defect for the treatment of which he is in
need of custody for care or treatment in a
suitable facility, the court shall commit the
person to the custody of the Attorney
General....
18 U.S.C. § 4245(d) (emphasis added).
For the first time on appeal, Muhammad contends that the §
4245(d) preponderance of the evidence standard is unconstitutional;
that due process requires that commitment determinations be instead
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Muhammad relies on
Addington, 441 U.S. at 433, in which the Supreme Court held that
the involuntary civil commitment of an ordinary citizen for an
indefinite period to a state mental hospital must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence.
Muhammad concedes that, because she did not assert this claim
before the magistrate judge, we review it only for plain error.
E.g., United States v. Milton, 147 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1998);
Highlands Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 27 F.3d 1027,
1031-32 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying plain error standard in civil
case), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995). For plain error, there
must be a clear or obvious error that affects substantial rights.
Milton, 147 F.3d at 420. “And, even then, we have discretion to
correct such errors; generally, we will do so only if they
‘seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings’”. Id. (quoting United States v. Atkinson,
297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
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Maintaining that the asserted error was clear or obvious,
Muhammad urges us to use our discretion to reverse because of the
serious consequences of civil commitment. But, we do not agree
that there was a clear or obvious error. Addington is
distinguishable; it dealt with the civil commitment of an ordinary
citizen, not a prisoner such as Muhammad.
In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), the Supreme
Court upheld the indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant who
had been found not guilty by reason of insanity; that commitment
was based on a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 366-67. The
Court distinguished Addington on the ground that there were
“important differences between the class of potential civil-
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees that
justify differing standards of proof”. Id. at 367.
Closer to home, in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), the
Supreme Court suggested that involuntary commitment of convicted
felons, who are already confined in prison, is less a curtailment
of liberty than the involuntary commitment of ordinary citizens.
Id. at 491-93.
Congress apparently recognized such a distinction; 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(d) requires clear and convincing evidence for the commitment
of inmates whose sentences have expired and who are otherwise
eligible for release from confinement. Obviously, there is far
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less infringement of liberty involved in the commitment of
prisoners who do not fall within § 4246(d).
For these reasons, and for the purposes of our narrow plain
error review, it is, at the very least, arguable that the
preponderance of the evidence standard specified in § 4245(d)
satisfies due process requirements. Therefore, there was no
“clear” or “obvious” error. That ends our review; there was no
plain error.
C.
Contending that the Government failed to meet its burden of
proving that she is a present danger to herself or others, Muhammad
asserts that the Government did not establish that she is
assaultive, violent, or disruptive; that the only danger is the
risk that medical problems will go undetected because she refuses
to undergo medical examinations. Muhammad maintains that the risk
that she might suffer some illness which would go undiagnosed and
untreated is not enough to override her substantial liberty
interests in avoiding unwanted treatment. The Government concedes
that Muhammad has a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
treatment, but asserts that her interest is outweighed by the
Government’s important interest in preventing Muhammad from harming
herself or others.
Section 4245 of Title 18 provides the procedures for
hospitalization of an imprisoned person suffering from a mental
disease or defect. Subsection (a) provides that, if the prisoner
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or her attorney objects (as did Muhammad) to being transferred to
a suitable facility for care or treatment, “an attorney for the
Government, at the request of the director of the facility in which
the person is imprisoned, may file a motion with the court for the
district in which the facility is located for a hearing on the
present mental condition of the person”. 18 U.S.C. § 4245(a).
“The court shall grant the motion if there is reasonable cause to
believe that the person may presently be suffering from a mental
disease or defect for the treatment of which he is in need of
custody for care or treatment in a suitable facility.” Id.
Subsection (c) requires the court to conduct a hearing on the
motion. Prior thereto, “the court may order that a psychiatric or
psychological examination of the person may be conducted, and that
a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court”. 18
U.S.C. § 4245(b). Subsection (d) provides:
If, after the hearing, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person
is presently suffering from a mental disease
or defect for the treatment of which he is in
need of custody for care or treatment in a
suitable facility, the court shall commit the
person to the custody of the Attorney General.
The Attorney General shall hospitalize the
person for treatment in a suitable facility
until he is no longer in need of such custody
for care or treatment or until the expiration
of the sentence of imprisonment, whichever
occurs earlier.
18 U.S.C. § 4245(d).
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The district court granted Muhammad’s pre-hearing motion for
a psychiatric examination. However, at the 12 August 1998 hearing,
Muhammad’s counsel informed the magistrate judge that Muhammad
would not cooperate or be examined by the psychiatrist chosen by
Muhammad’s counsel.
At the hearing, the Government introduced into evidence the
report of its expert, Bureau of Prisons Chief Psychiatrist Dr.
Shelley R. Stanton, dated only nine days before the hearing. Dr.
Stanton reported that Muhammad was housed in a Special Housing Unit
and refused to be housed in a less restrictive setting because of
her belief that other inmates would attempt to kill her because she
is Muslim; that Muhammad did not interact with staff or other
inmates except when she needed something; that she spent virtually
all of her waking hours engaged in ritualistic behavior surrounding
her “religious delusions”; that she kept her back to the cell door
and would not look at people when they talked to her; that she read
and prayed all day and frequently tore pages out of religious books
and glued them to the wall or window with toothpaste; that she
refused to leave her cell to bathe, preferring to instead use the
small sink in her cell; that she twice refused her own attorney’s
request that she be interviewed by a psychiatrist of his choosing;
and that she had refused medical evaluation despite the existence
of records indicating a diagnosis of severe anemia.
Dr. Stanton concluded that Muhammad’s deterioration in
functioning and her severe isolation were due to a “severe
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psychotic process in which she suffers from persecutory and
religious delusions”. He diagnosed Muhammad as suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia and anemia. Concerning the former, Dr.
Stanton concluded:
Typically, the individual suffering from this
illness becomes severely paranoid and
suspicious of those around her. She often
believes she is the target of conspiracies
and/or persecutions of others and can believe
her life is in danger. These beliefs may
cause the individual to engage in behaviors
which are detrimental to her physical and
emotional health and well being. These
individuals typically avoid seeking any kind
of psychiatric care because of the belief that
such help is simply part of the ongoing
conspiracy against them. These individuals
often go to great lengths to protect
themselves, sometimes even resorting to
suicide or violence towards others because of
the fear and distress they experience. The
very nature of their illness precludes them
from having insight into the need for
treatment and prevents them from engaging in
rehabilitative, recreational or social
activities available within the institution.
Dr. Stanton concluded that
[t]he prognosis for Ms. Muhammad is entirely
dependent upon her receiving psychiatric
medication and treatment. It is highly likely
that medication will significantly reduce the
intensity and scope of her paranoid thoughts
and should result in significant improvement
in her mental and physical functioning, such
that she is able to take part in
rehabilitative opportunities. Without such
treatment, it is likely she will continue to
remain in total isolation from even minimal
social interactions and will continue to be
housed in a single cell in a Special Housing
Unit. In addition, any physical or medical
problems that may be contributing to her
current state will continue to go undiagnosed
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and untreated because of her refusal of any
and all such treatment.
Muhammad’s counsel introduced into evidence a competency
evaluation that had been performed approximately 16 months earlier,
in April 1997. That evaluation had served to determine whether
Muhammad was competent to stand trial for the March 1997 bank
robbery. The evaluation reflects that Muhammad’s trial counsel
(the same lawyer who represents her on this appeal) had requested
the competency evaluation because of his knowledge that Muhammad
had a prior placement at a California mental hospital. The
evaluator had then (April 1997) diagnosed Muhammad as suffering
from a personality disorder not otherwise specified with
schizotypal and compulsive features and severe anemia. The report
concluded, however, that Muhammad was competent to stand trial
because she did not seem to suffer from a severe mental illness or
defect that would render her incompetent to appreciate the nature
or consequences of the charges against her or to assist with her
defense. The April 1997 evaluation notes that Muhammad was
diagnosed with severe anemia in March 1997, and had suffered from
it for 16 years; and that she was not interested in being treated
for it.
Muhammad’s counsel also introduced into evidence a competency
report dated 31 August 1995, approximately three years prior to the
commitment hearing, which concluded that Muhammad’s competency had
been restored. That evaluation notes that Muhammad had been
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hospitalized in June 1995 with a diagnosis of psychosis, and was at
that time receiving an antipsychotic psychotropic medication.
No other evidence was presented at the hearing. Muhammad
twice declined the magistrate judge’s invitation to make a
statement to the court.
Muhammad’s counsel argued at the hearing that, although
Muhammad’s religion, as she interpreted it, required her to take
actions that most would view as bizarre and perhaps as
counterproductive to her own health, she was not a danger to
herself or others. The Government responded that it was often
faced with lawsuits by prisoners claiming lack of proper medical
attention, and that it had a duty to protect Muhammad’s well-being.
The magistrate judge found that Muhammad suffered from a
mental disease or defect and was in need of custodial care or
treatment. He also found that Muhammad “is very much a danger to
herself by her refusal to have medical treatment”, as pointed out
by Dr. Stanton, because whatever physical or medical problems she
had or might have in the future would go undetected or undiagnosed.
We conclude that the Government met its burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that Muhammad was “presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect for the treatment of
which [s]he is in need of custody for care or treatment in a
suitable facility”. 18 U.S.C. § 4245(d). The only evidence of
Muhammad’s mental condition as of the date of the hearing was the
report of the Government’s expert psychiatrist, who opined that
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Muhammad was suffering from a severe mental illness and was in need
of psychiatric medication and treatment. That report constitutes
sufficient evidence to satisfy the Government’s burden of proof,
especially in the light of the fact that Muhammad presented no
evidence to contradict it.
D.
Finally, Muhammad contends that her commitment was ordered
because she refused, in the light of her devout Islamic beliefs, to
submit to medical examinations and take medication; and that the
Government did not demonstrate a compelling interest to justify
overriding her right to the free exercise of her religion under the
First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (RFRA).
Although Muhammad’s counsel stated in a report ordered by the
magistrate judge that Muhammad believed that the administration of
medication would interfere with her religious faith, and, as noted,
stated at the hearing that Muhammad’s religion, as she interpreted
it, required her to take actions that many would view as bizarre or
counterproductive to her own health, he did not oppose the
Government’s petition on the ground that ordering Muhammad’s
commitment would violate the First Amendment or the RFRA.
Accordingly, because this issue is being raised for the first time
on appeal, we review it only for plain error.
Muhammad contends that the Government was obligated to
establish a compelling governmental interest to justify infringing
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her rights under the First Amendment and RFRA, and to use the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Government
counters that, in a prison setting, it need demonstrate only a
“legitimate penological objective”, and that the court should defer
to the judgment of prison administrators. The parties also
disagree as to the constitutionality of the RFRA as applied to
federal governmental action. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997) (RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the States
because Congress exceeded its enforcement powers under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792
n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting doubt as to continued viability of RFRA
in federal context); cf. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 856, 863 (8th Cir.) (RFRA is
constitutional as applied to federal law), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998).
We need not resolve these disputes because, even assuming
arguendo the existence of error that is “clear” or “obvious” and
affects Muhammad’s substantial rights, we will not exercise our
discretion to correct it in this instance. In the light of this
record, we will not undermine one of the most important purposes of
the plain error rule, which is to require parties to present issues
to the district court for resolution, and potentially avoid
unnecessary, wasteful appeals as to issues that the district court
might have decided in the appellant’s favor, had the court simply
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been given an opportunity to do so. This rule carries extra force
when, as here, the issues are in whole or in part fact-driven.
Because Muhammad did not challenge her commitment on First
Amendment or RFRA grounds, the Government had no opportunity to
present factual evidence of either its compelling governmental
interests or the legitimate penological, or other, objectives to be
served by Muhammad’s commitment, or to argue the legal issues of
which standard applies or the constitutionality of RFRA as applied
to federal governmental action. Likewise, the magistrate judge had
no opportunity to consider, or rule on, those issues. Under these
circumstances, the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of
judicial proceedings are not seriously affected by our
discretionary decision to enforce our long-standing, well-
established, salutary requirement that issues be first considered
by the district court.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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