Quirk v. Mustang Engineering, Inc. ( 1998 )

REVISED - JULY 10, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________________________
No. 97-31289
___________________________
GERARD QUIRK and ROSE QUIRK, individually and on behalf of
JOEY QUIRK, GERRY QUIRK and RUSTY QUIRK,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VERSUS
MUSTANG ENGINEERING, INC., DEEPWATER PRODUCTION SYSTEMS, INC.,
BP EXPLORATION & OIL, INC., and TATHAM OFFSHORE, INC.,
Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VERSUS
J. FRAZER GAAR, M.D.,
Defendant-Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
___________________________________________________
June 29, 1998
Before GARWOOD, DAVIS, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Dr. J. Frazer Gaar appeals from an order of the district court
denying his motion for summary judgment based on absolute quasi-
judicial immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
On June 5, 1993, while working as a pipe fitter for Seawolf
Services, Inc., appellee Gerard Quirk tripped and fell backwards on
an offshore platform, injuring his back. He was immediately
treated at a local hospital emergency room. Quirk did not return
to work after the accident and began receiving benefits under the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).
Soon after the accident, Quirk was examined by his family
physician, Dr. Joseph Patton. Dr. Patton referred Quirk to Dr.
Stuart Phillips, an orthopedic surgeon. After months of treatment,
Dr. Phillips recommended that Quirk undergo surgery to correct a
herniated disc. At the request of his employer’s insurance
company, Gray Insurance (“Gray”), Quirk was examined by Dr. Clifton
Shepherd. Dr. Shepherd concluded that Quirk did not need surgery.
On July 15, 1994, a claims adjuster for Gray wrote Quirk’s
attorney concerning the conflicting medical opinions and suggested
that Quirk submit to an Independent Medical Examination (“IME”) by
a third physician. The parties agreed to have Dr. Gaar perform the
IME. After examining Quirk and reviewing his chart, Dr. Gaar
issued a report in which he concluded that Quirk did not need
surgery and that he was able to return to work. Consequently, in
October 1994, Gray terminated Quirk’s benefits.
Quirk subsequently filed a complaint with the Department of
2
Labor (“DOL”) contesting the termination of his benefits.1 On
December 1, 1994, an informal conference was held by a DOL claims
examiner.2 After the conference, the claims examiner reviewed the
materials in Quirk’s file, including Dr. Gaar’s report, and decided
that Quirk was not entitled to further workers’ compensation
benefits.3 In his memorandum of conference, the examiner expressly
relied on Dr. Gaar’s opinions, stating that “Dr. Gaar, the IME
physician agreed to by both parties, released the claimant to
return to work at his previous work and activities. As this was an
IME agreed to by both parties and the doctor found no disability,
there are no benefits due . . . .”
1
Under the regulations governing the administration of the
LHWCA, an employee may contest an employer’s or a carrier’s
termination of benefits by filing a complaint or notice of contest
with the office of the DOL district director having jurisdiction.
See 20 C.F.R. § 702.261.
2
The district director may hold an informal conference in
an attempt to resolve a dispute. 20 C.F.R. § 702.311. Such
conferences are conducted by the district director or a designee.
20 C.F.R. § 702.312.
3
If the parties cannot come to an agreement during an
informal conference, the district director or his or her designee
brings the conference to a close, evaluates all the evidence
available to him or her, and prepares a memorandum of conference
setting forth all outstanding issues, such facts or allegations as
appear material, and his or her recommendations and rationale for
resolution of such issues. 20 C.F.R. § 702.316. Copies of the
memorandum are sent to each of the parties who indicate whether
they agree or disagree with the recommendations. Id. If either of
the parties disagrees, then the district director or his or her
designee may schedule further conferences as may bring about an
agreement. Id. If the district director or his or her designee is
satisfied that additional conferences would be unproductive, or if
any party has requested a hearing, the case is transferred to an
administrative law judge. Id.
3
On December 5, 1995, Dr. Phillips performed an emergency
spinal fusion on Quirk. After the surgery, Quirk’s DOL complaint
became moot as Gray voluntarily reinstated Quirk’s worker’s
compensation benefits and paid Quirk over $16,000 in benefits
previously denied.
During the interim, on June 6, 1994, Quirk and his wife filed
this action against defendants-appellees Mustang Engineering, Inc.,
and Deepwater Production Systems, Inc., subsequently adding
defendants-appellees BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. and Tatham
Offshore, Inc. Quirk alleged that defendants-appellees were
responsible for the injuries he sustained. On June 27, 1997,
defendants-appellees filed a third-party complaint against Dr.
Gaar, alleging medical malpractice. On July 22, 1997, Quirk added
Dr. Gaar as a defendant, also alleging medical malpractice.
On October 8, 1997, Dr. Gaar filed a motion for summary
judgment based on absolute quasi-judicial immunity. After a
hearing on November 13, 1997, the district court orally denied Dr.
Gaar’s motion. Dr. Gaar appeals. We have jurisdiction over
interlocutory appeals from orders denying summary judgment based on
absolute immunity where, as here, there are no material factual
issues in dispute. See Williams v. Collins, 728 F.2d 721, 726 (5th
Cir. 1984).
II.
Dr. Gaar argues that he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
4
immunity from any civil liability based on the opinions he rendered
in connection with the IME he performed on Quirk. He contends that
he is entitled to such immunity because his opinions were relied on
by the claims examiner and he thus functioned as a witness at the
informal conference.
Witnesses receive absolute quasi-judicial immunity from
subsequent damages liability arising from their participation in
judicial proceedings because they are considered an “integral” part
of the judicial process. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335
(1983). “It is precisely the function of a judicial proceeding to
determine where the truth lies,” id. at 335 (quoting Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 439 (1976) (White, J., concurring)), and
witnesses play an essential role in that endeavor. If witnesses
were subject to liability arising from their participation in
judicial proceedings, however, they might be less inclined to come
forward and provide “candid, objective, and undistorted” testimony.
Id. at 333-34. Accordingly, witnesses are given absolute immunity
so that “the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should
be left as free and unobstructed as possible.” Id. at 333
(quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)). In Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
an “adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares
enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those
who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from
5
suits for damages.”
Although the parties dispute whether the informal conference
was an “adjudication within a federal administrative agency,” we
need not decide that issue. Even if we were to determine that the
informal conference was such an adjudication, we would nevertheless
conclude that Dr. Gaar is not entitled to immunity. At the time
Dr. Gaar rendered his opinions, not only was he unaware that his
opinions would be used in an adjudicatory proceeding relating to
Quirk’s claim for LHWCA benefits, but no such proceeding was
pending, scheduled, or even contemplated. As Dr. Gaar did not
render his opinions in connection with or in anticipation of an
adjudicatory proceeding, none of the considerations supporting
witness immunity apply. Accordingly, there is no reason to afford
Dr. Gaar immunity.
III.
For the reasons set out above, we conclude that the district
court did not err in denying Dr. Gaar’s motion for summary
judgment.4
AFFIRMED.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority rejects Dr. Gaar’s claim of immunity because at
the time that Dr. Gaar gave his opinions, he was “unaware that his
opinions would be used in an adjudicatory proceeding” and because
“no such proceeding was pending, scheduled, or even contemplated.”
4
We, of course, express no opinion as to Dr. Gaar's
libility to Quirk or Mustang.
See ante at 5. In denying his claim for witness immunity, the
majority incorrectly focuses on what Dr. Gaar thought at the time
that he rendered his opinions. Dr. Gaar’s mental state at that
time and his corresponding medical opinion had no legal effect
until Gray and the Department of Labor (“DOL”) used his medical
opinion (i.e., Gray terminated Quirk’s benefits and the DOL
rejected Quirk’s claim to further workers’ compensation). It was
this use of Dr. Gaar’s opinion that provided the basis for Quirk’s
medical malpractice claim. Because the use of Dr. Gaar’s medical
opinion occurred in “an adjudication within a federal
administrative agency,”5 he is entitled to immunity for his medical
opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
5
The DOL informal conference shares enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process to constitute “an
adjudication within a federal administrative agency.” Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2913-14, 57 L. Ed.
2d 895 (1978).
7