U.S. v. Chagra ( 1992 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 91–5623.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Elizabeth Nichols CHAGRA, Defendant–Appellant,
and
Jamiel Chagra, Movant–Appellant.
April 2, 1992.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before JOLLY and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and SHAW,
District Judge.*
SHAW, Chief District Judge:
Petitioner appeals the denial of her motion for reduction of
sentence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 15, 1982, Elizabeth Nichols Chagra ("Mrs. Chagra"),
along with her husband Jamiel Chagra ("Jimmy"), her brother-in-law
Joe Chagra and Charles Harrelson, was indicted for conspiring to
commit first degree murder of a federal judge. Jimmy and Joe
Chagra were also charged with first degree murder. On a motion by
the Government, Jimmy's trial was severed from the other
defendants; he was acquitted on both counts. Mrs. Chagra was
tried and convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. She
appealed her conviction.
*
Chief District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana,
sitting by designation.
Pending her appeal, Mrs. Chagra's husband Jimmy entered a plea
of guilty in an unrelated matter. The sealed plea agreement
provided in pertinent part that
should Elizabeth Nichols Chagra properly move for a reduction
in sentence pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35,
Fed.R.Crim.P., if her conviction is affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as a result of
her now pending appeal, the United States shall recommend that
the United States District Judge before whom said motion is
pending reduce the total, aggregate sentence of 30 years,
which she is presently serving in federal confinement, to a
total, aggregate sentence of 20 years in the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States.
On appeal, we reversed Mrs. Chagra's conviction for conspiracy
to commit murder. United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, reh'g
denied, 766 F.2d 186 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908,
106 S. Ct. 277, 88 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1985). We explained that since the
criminal intent of premeditation and malice aforethought is an
essential element of the underlying offense of first degree murder,
"proof of premeditation and malice aforethought is also required to
sustain a conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree
murder...." Harrelson, 754 F.2d at 1172. Because the trial
court's instructions allowed the jury to convict Mrs. Chagra of
conspiracy to commit first degree murder without the requisite
proof of premeditation and malice aforethought, we reversed her
conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1174.
Following reversal of her conviction, Mrs. Chagra was indicted
in a superseding indictment for conspiracy to commit second degree
(unpremeditated) murder. United States v. Chagra, 807 F.2d 398,
400 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832, 208 S. Ct. 106, 98
L. Ed. 2d 66 (1987). Mrs. Chagra's second trial resulted in a
conviction, and she was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Her
second conviction was affirmed. Chagra, 807 F.2d at 398.
Mrs. Chagra then filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal
1
Procedure 35 to reduce her sentence maintaining that the plea
agreement entered into by Jimmy entitled her to a reduction of
sentence. When the district court denied her motion, she filed a
motion to reconsider, and Jimmy intervened, filing a motion to
specifically enforce his plea agreement. Concluding that the plea
agreement was to benefit Mrs. Chagra only if her first conviction
was affirmed, the district court denied her Rule 35 motion, and
this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Breach of the Plea Agreement
The Government maintains that the terms of the plea agreement
are unambiguous and that by its terms the Government was obligated
to recommend a reduction in Mrs. Chagra's sentence only if her
first conviction was affirmed as a result of her "pending appeal."
Characterizing the Government's interpretation as "hypertechnical",
Mrs. Chagra contends that she is entitled to a reduction in the
1
For offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, Rule 35
permitted a defendant to move for a reduction of sentence within
120 days after the sentence was imposed. Rule 35 has
subsequently been amended.
sentence she is now serving because the Government's agreement to
reduce her sentence induced Jimmy to plead guilty.
The existence of a plea agreement is a factual issue to which
the clearly erroneous standard of review is applied. United States
v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1079 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 896, 108 S. Ct. 228, 98 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1987); United States v.
Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975, 99
S. Ct. 1543, 59 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1979). Emphasizing that plea
bargaining is "an essential component of the administration of
justice," Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S. Ct. 495,
498, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 432 (1971), the Supreme Court cautioned that
"when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of
the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
"This circuit has applied the principles enunciated in
Santobello by requiring that the government adhere strictly to the
terms and conditions of the plea agreement it negotiates with
defendants. United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228 (5th
Cir.1978); United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723 (5th
Cir.1977)." United States v. Avery, 621 F.2d 214, 216 (5th
Cir.1980). A plea agreement "must have explicit expression and
reliance and is measured by objective, not subjective, standards."
Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir.1972). Applying an
objective standard, we must "determine whether the government's
conduct is consistent with what [was] reasonably understood by
[Jimmy] when entering [his] plea of guilty." United States v.
Huddleston, 929 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir.1991).
In his affidavit submitted in support of Mrs. Chagra's Rule 35
motion, Jimmy stated that he pled guilty because the Government
agreed to reduce Mrs. Chagra's sentence "to a term not to exceed 20
years." Further, he claimed that in a discussion relating to Mrs.
Chagra's "appellate status" that he remembers stating: "
"[w]hatever happens at the end of everything, she [Elizabeth]
doesn't end up with more exposure than twenty years.' "
First, we conclude that it was not reasonable for Jimmy to
have understood that the district court was required to reduce Mrs.
Chagra's sentence to 20 years. Although the Government may
recommend a particular sentence, " "such recommendation shall not
be binding upon the court.' " United States v. Babineau, 795 F.2d
518, 520 (5th Cir.1986) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(B)).2
Next, we find that the language of the plea agreement was
clear that "if [Mrs. Chagra's] conviction is affirmed ... as the
result of her now pending appeal, the United States shall recommend
that the ... Judge before whom said motion is pending reduce the
total, aggregate sentence of 30 years, which she is presently
2
Rule 11(e)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part that the
Government will "make a recommendation ... for a particular
sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation ...
shall not be binding upon the court[.]" Fed.R.Crim.P.
11(e)(1)(B).
serving in federal confinement, to a total, aggregate sentence of
20 years...." (emphasis added). The precise language of the
agreement imposes a limitation based upon the affirmation of Mrs.
Chagra's prior conviction. The agreement was not applicable once
her conviction was reversed. Given the unambiguous wording of the
agreement, Jimmy could not have reasonably understood that the
Government would recommend a reduction unless Mrs. Chagra's first
conviction was affirmed.
We reject Mrs. Chagra's argument that the Government's
interpretation of the plea agreement is "hypertechnical." Rather,
we find the Government's interpretation accurate and the only
interpretation that can be reasonably construed. The plea
agreement specifically refers to Mrs. Chagra's "pending appeal" and
her "total aggregate of 30 years which she is now serving in
federal confinement...." If Mrs. Chagra were successful in her
appeal and retried, as she was, neither the Government nor Jimmy
could predict that she would be convicted and if so, what her
sentence would be after the new trial.
Indeed, the language of the plea agreement would not make
sense if after her new trial Mrs. Chagra had been sentenced to 21
years imprisonment, and it would have been meaningless if she had
been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Moreover, Mrs. Chagra
could have bargained for her own plea agreement. As a result, we
conclude that it was not reasonable for Jimmy to believe that the
Government would recommend a reduction in Mrs. Chagra's sentence if
her appeal was successful.
B. Violation of Due Process
Additionally, Mrs. Chagra argues that the Government's
interpretation of the plea agreement punishes her for the
successful exercise of her statutory right to appeal.
"[I]mposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having
successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal ... [is] a
violation of due process of law." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 724, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 669 (1969).
Upon retrial after appeal, due process is offended only in
those cases that "pose a realistic likelihood of "vindictiveness.'
" Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 2102, 40
L. Ed. 2d 628, 634 (1974). Prosecutorial vindictiveness exists "if
the prosecution acts arguably to punish the exercise of [the right
to appeal], by increasing the measure of jeopardy by bringing
additional or more severe charges, or where the judge assesses a
larger penalty upon subsequent conviction for the same offense
following an earlier reversal." United States v. Ward, 757 F.2d
616, 619–20 (5th Cir.1985).
No such circumstances exist here. The prosecutor did not
bring additional or more severe charges nor did the judge impose a
greater penalty for the same offense. In fact, after both trials
the judge imposed a sentence of 30 years.3 Consequently, we find
that because no prosecutorial vindictiveness existed Mrs. Chagra's
right to due process was not violated.
III. CONCLUSION
We find no clear error in the district court's factual finding
that the plea agreement was to benefit Mrs. Chagra only if her
conviction was affirmed by this court; therefore, the plea
agreement was not breached. Because no evidence of
unconstitutional prosecutorial vindictiveness exists, we conclude
that Mrs. Chagra's constitutional right of due process was not
violated. The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
3
When a convicted defendant is retried after a successful
appeal, "he ... run[s] the risk ... of receiving a sentence as
severe as that previously imposed[,] and ... he ... run[s] the
risk of being tried for a separate offense" without violation of
due process. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 731, 89 S.Ct. at 2091 (Douglas
joined by Marshall, separate concurring opinion) (citations
omitted).