Lengyel v. Everman Indep Sch ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-11383
Summary Calendar
SANDRA LENGYEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EVERMAN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; DAN POWELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern of Texas
No. 4-97-CV-1014-E
December 27, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sandra Lengyel appeals the dismissal of her civil rights
claims against her employer, Everman Independent School District,
and its Superintendent, Dan Powell. We AFFIRM.
Lengyel has been employed as a teacher in the Everman
Independent School district since 1984. On June 12, 1997, she sent
a letter to the school district claiming to terminate its authority
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
to withhold federal income tax payments from her paycheck.1 The
letter also stated that the school district was not to use her
social security number in reports to the Internal Revenue Service
and that she revoke her IRS Form W-4. Lengyel believes that she is
not required to pay federal income tax and that her social security
account number is associated with the "mark of the beast" described
in the Bible's book of Revelations. Her letter included a
"Statement of Citizenship" document stating that she was a citizen
of the United States and had no federal income tax liability in the
preceding or current tax year. On June 13, 1997, Superintendent
Dan Powell responded that the school district would not comply with
her demands. Lengyel replied June 19, 1997, reiterating her
demands. The IRS sent letters to the school district and Lengyel
that Lengyel's "Statement of Citizenship" was not a valid
substitute for a Form W-4 and that the district should withhold
federal tax payments from Lengyel's paycheck at the "single" rate
with no allowances until Lengyel submitted a Form W-4. Neither the
school district, Lengyel, nor the IRS changed positions over the
next two months, and when Lengyel received her first paycheck for
the 1997-1998 school year she discovered that the school district
had withheld federal income taxes. Lengyel filed criminal charges
against Superintendent Powell with the City of Everman Police
1
The School District does not withhold F.I.C.A. payments for
social security because Lengyel is a member of the Teacher
Retirement System of Texas.
2
Department in September 1997, claiming that the withholding
constituted theft.
Lengyel sued the School District and Powell for violation of
her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conspiracy to violate
her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. She sought an injunction
barring the School District and Powell from withholding from her
wage earnings for the federal income tax and from using her social
security number in reports to the IRS. The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment, and the court granted the defendants'
motion, dismissing Lengyel's claims.2
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See BMG Music
v. Martinez, 74 F.3d 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1996).
Lengyel claims that the School District's withholding from her
earnings for income tax deprived her of property without due
process of law. An employer paying wages to an employee must
withhold funds from the employee's wage earnings for the federal
income tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 3402(a)(1). An employer is not
required to withhold when the employee submits to the employer a
proper withholding exemption certificate "in such form and
containing such other information as the Secretary may prescribe"
2
The defendants counterclaimed for attorney's fees under Tex.
Education Code § 11.161, and the court district court in its order
granting their motion for summary judgment gave them until November
27, 1998, to file a proper motion for attorney's fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). The defendants' claim for attorney's fees is
being considered by this court in No. 99-10261.
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certifying that the employee incurred no liability for income tax
in the preceding tax year and anticipates none for the current
year. 26 U.S.C. § 3402(n). If no withholding exemption
certificate is in effect, the number of withholding exemptions
claimed "shall be considered to be zero." 26 U.S.C. § 3401(d).
The IRS informed the Lengyel and the School District that
Lengyel's "Statement of Citizenship" was not a valid withholding
exemption certificate. With no exemption certificate in effect,
the School District was required by law to withhold funds from
Lengyel's earnings with no exemptions. Lengyel did not present
evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether she had submitted a proper withholding exemption
certificate.
Lengyel argues that the defendants violated her asserted
"right" under 26 U.S.C. § 3402(n) that defendants forward her
"Statement of Citizenship" to the IRS pursuant to 26 C.F.R. §
1.1441-5(c). Lengyel's reliance on the proof of citizenship
described in § 1.1441-5(a) and its disposition in § 1.1441-5(c) is
misplaced. This regulation relates to the means of proof that one
is a United States citizen rather than a nonresident alien subject
to withholding at a rate of 30% for the types of income specified
in 26 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The regulation is unrelated to the
withholding exemption certificate referred to in 26 U.S.C. §
3402(n). Lengyel had no right that her employer forward her
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"Statement of Citizenship" to the IRS as a withholding exemption
certificate.
Lengyel argues that her employer's withholding income tax
deprived her of property without due process of law because she was
not liable for any tax. Summary administrative procedures by the
federal government to collect revenue do not offend rights to
procedural due process. See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S.
589, 610 (1931). A taxpayer who wishes to contest her tax
liability is provided by statute with two procedures for doing so:
pay the amount imposed and file suit in federal district court for
a refund, or pay nothing and petition the tax court to redetermine
the deficiency amount. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145,
175-77 (1960). These procedures provide an adequate opportunity to
be heard and to contest an income tax assessment by the IRS. See
Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1990).
Lengyel did not avail herself of the procedures available to her
under federal law. She did not present evidence to create an issue
for trial as to whether the defendants deprived her of any federal
right by fulfilling their legal obligation to withhold income tax
from her wage earnings. The district court properly dismissed this
claim.3
3
We agree with the district court that a claim for injunctive
relief against the collection of a tax is barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).
5
Lengyel argued before the district court and in her original
brief to this court that she is not subject to withholding for
social security because she believes it is a voluntary program.
This argument is meritless.4 Lengyel concedes in her reply brief
that she is exempt from contributing to social security because she
participates in the Texas Teachers' Retirement System. The source
of the arguments Lengyel pressed before the district court and this
court about the compulsory nature of the social security system
appears to lie in the social security account number, which she
believes is associated with the "mark of the beast." Lengyel does
not want the School District to use her social security account
number in reports to the IRS.
Any employee subject to withholding for the federal income tax
must obtain a social security number, which is used as a tax
identification number. An employer must include the employee's tax
identification number on statements or other documents the employer
must make for tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 6109(a). The
employee's social security number is the proper tax identification
4
Lengyel relies on Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co.,
295 U.S. 330, 345 (1935), which invalidated the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1934 because the statute exceeded Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce. Soon after Alton, the Supreme Court
upheld the unemployment and old age benefits provisions of the
Social Security Act as a legitimate exercise of Congress' tax and
spending powers. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548(1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). Payment of the
taxes imposed under the Act is mandatory for those who are not
exempt from payment. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-
59 (1982).
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number. See id. An employee who is subject to payment of income
tax must obtain a social security account number to be used as a
tax identification number. See 26 C.F.R. § 31.6011(b)-2(a)(1).
Lengyel objects to the numbering of persons, believing this to
be associated with the “mark of the beast.” She argues that her
employer violated her right to the free exercise of her religion by
identifying her in reports to the IRS by her social security
account number and by failing to accommodate her request to be
identified by some other means. Her arguments in this appeal are
directed toward her employer and not toward the IRS, which is not
a party to the dispute.
The district court properly found that the School District
could not be liable under § 1983 for observing the tax laws and
using Lengyel’s social security number in reports to the IRS. An
individual will not be exempted from obeying a neutral law of
general applicability on Free Exercise Clause grounds, even though
the law burdens the exercise of his religion. See Employment Div.,
Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990);
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531 (1993). Lengyel presented no evidence showing that the
School District’s refusal to seek an exemption from the use of her
social security number was directed toward burdening her religious
practice or that using the social security number for IRS reporting
is not generally applied by the School District. The district
7
court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on Lengyel’s § 1983 claim, because the School District did not
violate any right of Lengyel’s by obeying the tax laws in its use
of her social security number.
A § 1985 plaintiff must show that two or more persons
conspired to deprive her of equal protection of the laws or the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship. Lengyel
presented no evidence of any planned or completed violation of her
civil rights. The district court properly granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on Lengyel’s § 1985(3) claim.
Lengyel’s motion for leave to include record excerpts is
rendered MOOT by the disposition of this appeal.
AFFIRMED.
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