Samford v. Stolle Corporation ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________________
No. 98-41219
Summary Calendar
______________________________________
RUSSELL SAMFORD; TERRY W. HOWARD;
WILLARD D. RAMEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
THE STOLLE CORPORATION, d/b/a
ALCOA BUILDING PRODUCTS,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(4:96-CV-164, 4:96-CV-346 & 4:96-CV-375)
_____________________________________________
May 17, 1999
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs-Appellants Russell Samford, Terry Howard, and
Willard Ramey appeal the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, dismissing their retaliatory discharge claims against
Defendant-Appellant The Stolle Corporation, d/b/a Alcoa Building
Products (“Stolle”). Concluding that Samford and Howard have not
presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact whether Stolle’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for
discharging them was pretextual, we affirm the district court’s
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
grant of summary judgment dismissing their claims. We conclude,
however, that Ramey has presented sufficient evidence to challenge
Stolle’s proffered explanation, creating a genuine issue of
material fact, and thus reverse and remand with regard to his claim
against Stolle.
I. Facts and Proceedings
Samford, Howard, and Ramey, who prior to their discharge each
worked in the Maintenance Department of Stolle’s Denison, Texas
plant, claim that they were fired as a result of their
participation in “protected activities” in violation of § 215 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and § 21.055 of the Texas
Labor Code. Specifically, they point to (1) a confidential letter
they and four other Stolle employees sent to Stolle’s parent
company, ALCOA, in December 1993, asking the company to investigate
a “series of situations” involving “sensitivity, inconsistences
[sic], confidentiality, undermining supervisory integrity,
partiality, intimidation, [and] attempted unfair trade practices”;
and (2) their participation in a June 1994 Department of Labor
(“DOL”) investigation of an overtime compensation complaint made by
another employee, Myron Grubowski, at the Denison plant.
Stolle discharged the Plaintiffs in November 1994. Stolle
asserts that (1) it fired the Plaintiffs as part of a
reorganization of the maintenance department designed to improve
the technological and engineering skills of the department; (2) the
process of reorganization began in August 1993, when Stolle
determined that it would hire a degreed engineer to manage the
2
department, before the Plaintiffs were engaged in any allegedly
protected conduct; and (3) it did not replace the Plaintiffs, who
were all Maintenance Supervisors, but rather created a new Plant
Engineer position, which it filled with an engineer with a college
degree, eliminating all Maintenance Supervisor positions
permanently.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.2
B. Applicable Law
Retaliatory discharge claims under the FLSA and the Texas
Labor Code are subject to the familiar burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglass v. Green.3 Under this framework, a plaintiff
establishes his prima facie case if he offers competent summary
judgment evidence that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected
activity; (2) he suffered an adverse action by his employer; and
(3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the
2
Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America, 114 F.3d
557, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1997).
3
411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Brock v. Casey Truck Sales,
Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 876 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying McDonnell Douglas
framework to FLSA retaliation claim); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d
121, 123 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); James v. Medical Control,
Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Adams v.
Valley Fed. Credit Union, 848 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. App. 1992)
(applying McDonnell Douglas framework to claim under Texas Labor
Code).
3
adverse action.4 Once the plaintiff has established his prima
facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason explaining the
adverse employment decision.5 If the defendant introduces evidence
which, if true, would permit the conclusion that the adverse
employment action was nondiscriminatory, the focus shifts to the
ultimate question of whether the defendant unlawfully retaliated
against the plaintiff, that is, whether the protected conduct was
a “but for” cause of the adverse employment decision.6
The district court did not address whether the Plaintiffs had
satisfied their initial burden of establishing their prima facie
case, but rather held that they had failed to offer sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
Stolle’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharging them.7
We agree with regard to Samford and Howard’s claims; however, we
conclude that Ramey has raised such a genuine issue of material
fact.
C. Merits
Stolle asserts that it fired the Plaintiffs as part of its
4
See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 336 (1997) (Title VII case).
5
Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304-05 (5th Cir.
1996).
6
Id.
7
See Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir.
1995) (affirming district court’s holding that plaintiff had failed
to provide sufficient evidence that defendant’s articulated
nondiscriminatory reason for firing plaintiff was pretext for sex
or age discrimination).
4
restructuring of its maintenance department. Specifically, Stolle
contends that it eliminated Samford, Howard, and Ramey’s
Maintenance Supervisor positions and replaced them with a single
Plant Engineer position, which it filled with an engineer with a
college degree.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Stolle reorganized its
maintenance department or that such a reorganization constitutes a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee.8
Rather, they assert that the timing of their discharge, the
favorable performance reviews they had received, and the alleged
termination of other employees who engaged in the putatively
protected activities, raise a genuine issue of material fact
whether Stolle’s nondiscriminatory reason for dismissing them was
pretextual.9 With one exception, which relates to Ramey only and
which we address below, none of the evidence offered by the
Plaintiffs supports the inference that Stolle’s proffered reason
for discharging them was a mere pretext.10
8
See EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1181 (5th
Cir. 1996) (“In the context of a reduction in force, which is
itself a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge . . .
.”)
9
In addition, Samford argues that he was not a Maintenance
Supervisor, but a “Tool and Die Engineer,” and thus Stolle’s
proffered nondiscriminatory reason does not apply to him. As the
district court found, “the summary judgment evidence shows that,
despite semantics, Samford was treated as and considered himself to
be the maintenance supervisor for the tool and die operations at
the plant.”
10
Seizing on a single sentence in the district court’s order
granting Stolle’s summary judgment motion, the Plaintiffs
additionally argue that the district court imposed the incorrect
burden of proof on the Plaintiffs, requiring them to “prove” their
5
First, the Plaintiffs argue that their discharge followed the
protected activity in which they engaged so closely in time as to
justify an inference of retaliatory motive. Although the timing of
a plaintiff’s discharge is relevant to our inquiry, that factor
alone in the absence of other relevant evidence of retaliatory
motive is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact
in this case.11 Stolle fired the Plaintiffs 11 months after they
sent the confidential letter to ALCOA’s management and 5 months
after they were interviewed in connection with Grubowski’s overtime
compensation complaint. The evidence, however, is undisputed that
Stolle set in motion the wheels of its effort to reorganize the
maintenance department in August 1993, several months before the
Plaintiffs engaged in any allegedly protected conduct. Without
more, the timing of their discharge does not cast doubt on Stolle’s
proffered reason for terminating the Plaintiffs’ employment.
Second, the Plaintiffs argue that they were well qualified for
their positions, as evidenced by the facts that they consistently
received favorable performance reviews and that Stolle has failed
to point to any specific deficiencies in the Plaintiffs’ technical
case prior to trial. As the district court clearly indicated its
order denying the Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the court
applied the proper standard, requiring the Plaintiffs to show that
there is a “conflict in substantial evidence” sufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
11
See Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th
Cir. 1995) (“The timing of the adverse employment action can be
significant, although not necessarily determinative, factor.”);
Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992)
(same).
6
or engineering abilities. Even setting aside the Plaintiffs’
questionable characterization of the evidence, they do not dispute
that Stolle began its restructuring effort before they engaged in
any protected activity or that Stolle never hired individual
replacements for dismissed Maintenance Supervisors. Neither do
they contend that their technological and engineering capabilities
were on par with the Plant Engineer Stolle did hire. In short, the
Plaintiffs’ assertion that they were qualified to do the jobs that
they had been doing prior to the reorganization simply does not
rebut Stolle’s explanation that it was restructuring the
maintenance department to emphasize skills the Plaintiffs do not
possess.12
Third, the Plaintiffs assert that the facts that Myron
Grubowski was fired the day after he met with the DOL
representative who was investigating his overtime compensation
complaint and that “each employee who complained and gave a
statement to the United States Department of Labor was quickly
discharged” support an inference that the Plaintiffs were fired in
retaliation for their participation in the DOL investigation. In
addition, the Plaintiffs point to an August 1994 hand-written
memorandum from Bobby Thomas, Plaintiffs’ immediate supervisor, to
Gale Powell, Stolle’s Human Resources Manager, stating that he
(Thomas) had learned that Ramey had told another employee that, if
12
Cf. Texas Instruments, 100 F.3d at 1181 (“In the context of
a reduction in force, which is itself a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, the fact that an employee
is qualified for his job is less relevant —— some employees may
have to be let go despite competent performance.”).
7
Grubowski sued the company, he (Ramey) would testify on Grubowski’s
behalf.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Mr. Grubowski’s discharge in and of
itself is misplaced. Grubowski’s claim is not before us and,
without more, the fact that Stolle impermissibly fired another
employee, which we will assume to be true for purposes of summary
judgment,13 does not bear on the Plaintiffs claims. The “more” to
which the Plaintiffs point, without citation to the record, is
their assertion that all of the employees who met with the DOL
regarding Grubowski’s claim were fired. The Plaintiffs relatedly
argue that all but two of the Stolle employees who signed the
December 1993 letter to ALCOA were fired.
The record does not support the Plaintiffs’ assertions. To
the contrary, as the district judge noted, at least one employee,
Ray Hobbs, who met with the DOL representative was not terminated.
Moreover, consistent with Stolle’s proffered explanation, Hobbs is
an electronics technician in the Maintenance Department, not a
Maintenance Supervisor and thus not similarly situated. Likewise,
the two employees who signed the letter to ALCOA but were not
terminated are not Maintenance Supervisors. The Plaintiffs, in
fact, provide no evidence that any employee who met with the DOL
representative or signed the December 1993 letter and who was not
a Maintenance Supervisor was fired. Indeed, the only evidence they
offer that Stolle might have been aware that any of the Plaintiffs
13
The DOL representative who investigated Grubowski’s claim
concluded that “his termination was effected by his contact with
the Department of Labor.”
8
met with the DOL representative was the observation that the DOL
representative interviewed Samford at the Denison plant.14 In sum,
the Plaintiffs’ unsupported allegations regarding those who
participated in DOL’s investigation of Grubowski’s overtime
compensation complaint simply do not buttress their claim that they
were fired in retaliation for their participation in the DOL
investigation.
The memorandum from Thomas to Powell, however, is another
matter. Thomas was Ramey’s direct supervisor. According to his
own affidavit, he was the person who recommended that Stolle
eliminate the Maintenance Supervisor position in favor of a Project
Engineer. Moreover, he made this recommendation in “approximately
August 1994,” the same month in which he wrote to the Human
Resources Manager that Ramey had stated that he would testify
against Stolle if Grubowski sued the company. In short, this
letter is the one piece of evidence that closely links the
termination of one of the Plaintiffs and his allegedly protected
activity. It is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
fact whether Stolle fired Ramey because he had engaged in allegedly
protected activities. Accordingly, Ramey’s claim against Stolle
survives summary judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment with regard to Samford and Howard’s
14
The DOL representative interviewed Howard and Ramey at their
homes by telephone.
9
claims; and reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion with regard to Ramey’s claim.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
10