United States v. Ortiz ( 2002 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-20790
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    FRANCISCO ORTIZ
    Defendant - Appellant
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-00-CR-874-1
    --------------------
    September 4, 2002
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Francisco Ortiz appeals his sentence for aiding and abetting
    and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500
    grams of cocaine.    Ortiz argues that: 1) the logic of Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000) should be extended to Guidelines
    enhancements for drug quantity and firearm possession; 2) the
    district court erred by including an additional drug quantity
    calculated by converting seized cash into a drug equivalent;
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 01-20790
    -2-
    3) the district court miscalculated his criminal history score;
    and 4) Apprendi has rendered 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) unconstitutional.
    Ortiz argues that under Apprendi, the district court erred
    in applying certain sentencing enhancements where the facts
    underlying the enhancements were not charged in the indictment or
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt.   Ortiz acknowledges that he
    raises this issue to preserve it for further review, and concedes
    that this court’s precedent does not require that sentencing
    factors be charged in the indictment and determined by a
    factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt.      See United States v.
    Clinton, 
    256 F.3d 311
    , 314 (5th Cir.)(citation omitted), cert.
    denied, 
    122 S. Ct. 492
    (2001).   We are bound by our prior
    precedent on this point.    See Hogue v. Johnson, 
    131 F.3d 466
    , 491
    (5th Cir. 1997).
    Ortiz argues that the district court erred by converting
    seized cash into a drug equivalent and including that additional
    quantity of cocaine as relevant conduct.     He argues that before
    making such a conversion, a district court must find that there
    was no drug seizure or that the amount seized does not reflect
    the scale of the offense.    See § 2D1.1, comment. (n.12).   The
    district court satisfied the requirement that it make a finding
    on every controverted matter by rejecting the defendant’s
    objections and orally adopting the findings of the presentence
    report.    See United States v. Brown, 
    29 F.3d 953
    , 958 (5th Cir.
    1994).    We also conclude that there was an adequate evidentiary
    No. 01-20790
    -3-
    basis to find that the seized currency was drug-related; Ortiz
    presented no rebuttal evidence, so the district court was free to
    adopt the PSR’s findings without further inquiry.    See United
    States v. Huerta, 
    182 F.3d 361
    , 364 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Ortiz argues that courts have previously held that drug type
    and quantity are sentencing factors, but that under Apprendi,
    treating these as sentencing factors is unconstitutional.
    Because courts cannot rewrite a statute to correct
    unconstitutional provisions, he argues that the provisions of
    § 841 which determine the statutory maximum must be stricken as
    unconstitutional.   Ortiz acknowledges that he raises this issue
    only to preserve it for further review, and that this argument is
    foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Slaughter, 
    238 F.3d 580
    , 582 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 1045
    (2001).
    Ortiz argues that the presentence report improperly assigned
    two criminal history points for a prior sentence of imprisonment,
    and that this error resulted in a higher Guidelines range.    Prior
    sentences are not counted if they were imposed more than 10 years
    prior to the commencement of the instant offense.    See § 4A1.1,
    comment. (n. 2); see also § 4A1.2(e)(2), (3).   The Government
    concedes that the conviction should not have been included in
    Ortiz’s criminal history score.   If there was an erroneous
    application of the guidelines, the party supporting the sentence
    must demonstrate that the district court would have imposed the
    No. 01-20790
    -4-
    same sentence absent the error.     United States v. Tello, 
    9 F.3d 1119
    , 1129 (5th Cir. 1993).   However, the Government concedes
    that the record is unclear on this point.
    Therefore, we VACATE Ortiz’s sentence and REMAND this case
    to the district for resentencing.