George v. The Home Depot Inc ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30026
Summary Calendar
TERESA N GEORGE
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
THE HOME DEPOT INCORPORATED
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 00-CV-2616-C
September 27, 2002
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Teresa George appeals the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee
The Home Depot Inc. on its defense to her claim of religious
discrimination. George also appeals the denial of her motion for
summary judgment on her religious discrimination claim. For the
following reasons, we AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
No. 02-30026
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Teresa George ("George") was employed by The Home Depot,
Inc. ("Home Depot") off and on from October 1996 to August 1999.
She worked at a Home Depot in Atlanta, Georgia, then moved to New
Orleans and began work at the Harahan, Louisiana store. George
started at the Harahan store as a cashier and then became a
greeter in the kitchen and bath department.
George was the only greeter in the kitchen and bath
department. The function of the greeter was to greet customers
visiting the department, to suggest the customers meet with
designers, and to schedule appointments with designers. The
designers in the department would then meet with customers
individually to discuss their home improvement projects.
George is a devout Catholic. She attends mass daily and
frequently participates in prayer vigils and religious service.
In August or September of 1997, George determined that her
religious beliefs preclude her from working at all on Sundays.
George's job at Home Depot required that she often work on
Sundays.1 The Harahan store was open twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week, and it was particularly busy on weekends.
1
George held a variety of positions at Home Depot, some
of which required her to work on Sundays. At the Atlanta store,
George worked as a greeter in the kitchen cabinet department,
which required Sunday work, then became a project manager in the
paint department, which apparently did not. At the Harahan
store, George worked as a cashier and a greeter; both positions
required her to work on Sundays.
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George testifies that she told managers at Home Depot on
several occasions that she could not work on Sundays. She says
that she told Brian Starkes and Les Strieb, her direct
supervisors at the Atlanta and Harahan stores, as well as Harahan
store co-manager Dave Emmel, assistant store manager Steve Burns,
and kitchen and bath department manager Gregory Braxton. Home
Depot contends George agreed to work Sundays as part of her
transfer to the kitchen and bath department. Further, Starkes
and Burns specifically dispute George's claim that she told them
she could not work on Sundays, and Bordelon states that the first
time she learned George could not work on Sundays due to her
religious beliefs was on George's last day.
Prior to the change in her beliefs in August 1997, George
did work at Home Depot on Sundays. After August 1997, George did
work on some Sundays. George contends that she only worked
Sundays as a cashier on an emergency basis. George did not work
on any Sundays after her transfer to the kitchen and bath
department. She was not scheduled to work on Sundays for her
first several weeks as a greeter. After she was scheduled on
Sundays, George took one Sunday off to go out of town, then
called in sick the next Sunday.
George's employment at Home Depot ended on August 7, 1999.
On that day, George decided to work Saturday instead of Sunday
because of her beliefs. Store co-manager Sharon Bordelon met
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with George to discuss her refusal to work Sundays. Bordelon
suggested that George work before or after attending mass on
Sundays. George replied that she could not work on Sundays at
all. George claims that Bordelon then terminated her employment;
Home Depot contends that George resigned.
George filed suit in federal district court, alleging that
her discharge by Home Depot violates Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000), and the
Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:301-314, :332-333 (West 1998). On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court denied George's motion for summary
judgment on her claim of religious discrimination. The district
court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether George
had a bona fide religious belief, whether she informed Home Depot
of that belief, and whether she was discharged because she failed
to comply with an employment requirement conflicting with the
belief. The district court then granted Home Depot's motion for
summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to
Home Depot's defenses. The court determined that Home Depot
offered George a reasonable accommodation and, in the
alternative, that accommodation would subject Home Depot to undue
hardship.2 George appeals the denial of her motion for summary
2
The amici argue that the district court should not have
addressed whether any accommodation would impose an undue
hardship because it found that Home Depot provided a reasonable
No. 02-30026
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judgment and the grant of Home Depot's motion for summary
judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a grant or denial of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Daniels
v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
122 S. Ct. 347 (2001). Summary judgment should be granted if
there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
In determining if there is a genuine issue of material fact,
the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Daniels, 246 F.3d at 502. The court gives
weight to evidence favoring the non-moving party and evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and
unimpeached. See Daniels, 246 F.3d at 502; see also Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
III. DISCUSSION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an
employer from discriminating on the basis of religion. See 42
accommodation. The two arguments made by Home Depot are
alternative defenses in a Title VII religious discrimination
action. See Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Svcs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495,
499-500 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 348 (2001). Thus,
the amici's contention is without merit.
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U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). The Louisiana Employment
Discrimination Law parallels Title VII. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:301-314, :332-333 (West 1998). Since the Louisiana employment
discrimination statute is substantively similar to Title VII,
Louisiana courts routinely interpret the Louisiana statute using
federal law. See, e.g., Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563,
566 (5th Cir. 1998); Hicks v. Cent. La. Elec. Co., 712 So. 2d
656, 658 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
A. George's Motion for Summary Judgment
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination,
George must show that: (1) she has a bona fide religious belief
that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) the employer
was informed of that belief; and (3) she was discharged for
failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.
Daniels, 246 F.3d at 506; Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Svcs., Inc.,
244 F.3d 495, 499 n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 348
(2001). In this case, Home Depot has demonstrated a genuine
issue of material fact on each of the three elements.
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
George has a bona fide religious belief that precludes her from
working on Sundays. George has testified that she believes being
a devout Catholic means that she cannot work on Sunday. George
has also provided testimony of two Catholic priests to this
effect. Home Depot disputes that George's belief is bona fide,
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citing her decision to work on some Sundays and testimony that
some Catholics do not believe they cannot work on Sundays. Home
Depot also cites evidence that George's belief arose in response
to her learning of a lawsuit between Home Depot and another
individual whose religious belief precluded him from working on
Sundays.
There is also a genuine factual issue as to whether George
informed Home Depot of her religious belief. George testifies
that she told store co-manager Emmel that she could not work on
Sundays when she began her employment at the Harahan store.
After her transfer to the kitchen and bath department, George
contends that she told her immediate supervisor, the kitchen and
bath department manager, and the assistant store manager that she
could not work on Sundays. Home Depot contends that it first
learned of George's religious belief during George's meeting with
Bordelon on August 7, 1999. In support, Home Depot cites several
employees' denials that George told them of her beliefs and
evidence that George agreed to work Sundays as part of her
transfer to the kitchen and bath department.
Finally, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether George was discharged because of her failure to work on
Sundays. As a result of the August 7 meeting, George contends
that Bordelon terminated her employment; Home Depot contends that
George resigned.
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Thus, the district court properly denied George's motion for
summary judgment.
B. Home Depot's Motion for Summary Judgment
Home Depot argues that summary judgment in its favor is
appropriate because even if George makes out her prima facie
case, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its
defenses. Home Depot will have a valid defense if it shows
either: (1) that it offered George a reasonable accommodation or
(2) that accommodating George's beliefs would subject Home Depot
to undue hardship. Bruff, 244 F.3d at 500; see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) (2000) (providing a defense if an "employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business"). Home
Depot has shown that accommodating George's request would present
an undue hardship; George has not provided sufficient evidence in
rebuttal to create a genuine factual dispute on this issue. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986) (noting that a genuine issue of material fact
exists when there is evidence sufficient for a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e) (non-moving party must come forward with "specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial"). Because we
affirm the district court's judgment on the grounds that
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accommodation would result in an undue hardship, we need not
address whether Home Depot offered George a reasonable
accommodation.
An undue hardship exists when an employer incurs anything
more than a de minimus cost to accommodate an employee's beliefs.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977);
see also Bruff, 244 F.3d at 500. While the determination of what
constitutes an undue hardship is case-specific, numerous cases
provide guidance. In Hardison, for example, the Supreme Court
held that requiring an employer to accommodate an employee's
request not to work on his Sabbath constituted an undue burden
because it would either leave the employer short-staffed on
weekends or require it to hire additional employees to fill in.
See 432 U.S. at 84-85. The Hardison Court noted that even if
accommodating one employee would not be a significant burden, the
likelihood that other employees would request similar
accommodation could result in undue hardship. See id. at 84
n.15.
The Fifth Circuit has similarly found that a religious
accommodation that requires other employees to take on additional
duties or change their schedules presents an undue hardship.
See, e.g., Bruff, 244 F.3d at 501 (finding that accommodation
would result in undue hardship because it would require other
employees to assume a disproportionate workload); Weber v.
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Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The
mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers . . . is
sufficient to constitute an undue hardship."); Eversley v. MBank
Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1988) (determining it would
be an undue hardship on an employer to require employees to
switch shifts). The Fifth Circuit has further noted that an
employer need not actually incur costs before claiming that an
accommodation would result in costs that are more than de
minimus. Bruff, 244 F.3d at 501.
Home Depot presents ample evidence that allowing George
every Sunday off would result in an undue hardship. The kitchen
and bath department was particularly busy on weekends and the
greeter position was specifically created to provide more
customer contact and take pressure off the designers during peak
times. George was the only greeter in that department.
Accommodating George would require Home Depot to either do
without a greeter on Sundays or hire an additional employee to
fill George's position on Sundays; both options would impose an
undue hardship on Home Depot. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84-85
(finding that the options of either leaving TWA short-staffed or
requiring TWA to hire additional employees both presented an
undue hardship). Not having a greeter during peak times would
place additional burdens on the designers, hampering their
efficiency. See Howard v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 615 F.2d 203,
No. 02-30026
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206 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring other employees to perform
plaintiff's job was an undue hardship). Finally, Home Depot
notes that many other employees in its large workforce could
request similar accommodation, thus amplifying the hardship that
accommodating George would impose on it. This argument parallels
the concern in Hardison, where the Court found that the
likelihood that TWA would have to give other employees Saturdays
or Sundays off for religious observance if it accommodated
Hardison added to TWA's hardship. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84
n.15.
George contends that the kitchen and bath department could
function without a greeter on Sundays, as it did before the
Harahan Home Depot created the greeter position. George suggests
that she did not need to work Sundays because other employees at
the Harahan store did not work Sundays. Home Depot provided
evidence that the greeter position was created to ensure customer
contact at peak times, which included weekends. Home Depot's
evidence that having a greeter on weekends is important to its
business is sufficient to show that going without a greeter would
constitute an undue hardship. See Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr.
Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting a
pharmacist's suggestion that a hospital could do without him on
Saturdays without facing an undue hardship).
George also suggests that another employee might be able to
No. 02-30026
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work in her place on weekends. George claims that some of the
designers could function as greeters on Sundays. Home Depot
contends that the greeter position was created to free designers
to consult with customers on their projects; not having a greeter
on Sundays would thwart the purpose of the position. Further,
requiring the designers to take on additional duties demonstrates
an undue burden. See Bruff, 244 F.3d at 501 (requiring another
employee "to assume a disproportionate workload [to accommodate
the plaintiff] . . . is an undue hardship as a matter of law").
Finally, George has not shown that any employees other than the
designers could or would have traded shifts to fill her position
on Sundays. Even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to her, George has not created a genuine issue of
material fact suggesting that Home Depot could accommodate her
request without incurring significant costs.
Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of Home Depot on its claim of undue hardship.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and its denial of
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment are AFFIRMED.