Shook v. State of Mississippi ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 00-60436
____________________
PHILLIP SHOOK, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; ROBERT L. JOHNSON,
COMMISSIONER, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(2:93-CV-118-D-B)
____________________________________________________________
November 26, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge, and SCHELL,
District Judge1:
PER CURIAM:2
For this challenge to the denial of habeas relief, at issue
are: whether the record fairly supports the state trial court’s
finding that Phillip Shook, Jr., who was/is profoundly deaf, was
competent to stand trial; and whether the district court’s
identical competency finding, following two federal evidentiary
hearings, is clearly erroneous. Shook contends he was deprived of
1
United States District Judge of the Eastern District of
Texas, sitting by designation.
2
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
due process and his ability to communicate with counsel because of
his hearing impairment and the state trial court’s refusal to
continue the trial until he learned sign language. AFFIRMED.
I.
The state trial court, based on several hearings, ruled
Shook’s hearing impairment did not render him incompetent to be
tried. A jury convicted Shook in 1987 for aggravated assault and
firing a gun into an occupied dwelling; he was sentenced to 30
years imprisonment. Shook v. State of Mississippi, 552 So. 2d 841,
843 (Miss. 1989). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
During the habeas proceeding in district court, Shook had two more
competency hearings; one each before the magistrate judge and
district judge. Because, as discussed infra, the competency issue
at hand is a finding of fact, and in the light of the numerous
hearings on the issue, we must go into considerable detail in
describing the record.
A.
Shook has been profoundly deaf since birth. He did not know
sign language at time of trial. Instead, he had been trained in
lipreading, also known as speech-reading.
Shook began wearing a hearing aid when he was a year old. He
attended the Memphis Oral School for the Deaf for one year. That
school utilized the “oral” method of communication, involving
speech-reading rather than sign language. When he was in the
2
second grade, Shook’s parents enrolled him in Strider Academy, a
private school in his hometown of Charleston, Mississippi, where he
was educated with hearing children. Although he failed some
classes at Strider, he did not have to repeat any grades and
received a diploma. While at Strider, he played football.
Following graduation from high school, Shook attended
Northwest Mississippi Junior College (NMJC) for one semester (fall
1984), where he was on the football team. While at NMJC, he began
dating Cathy Thaggard; they became engaged to be married. Shook
transferred to the University of Mississippi for the 1985 spring
semester. Shook and Thaggard broke off their engagement that June.
In the early morning hours of 5 September 1985, 18 rounds from
a high-powered rifle were fired through the window of Thaggard’s
bedroom in her parents’ home, where she was sleeping. Shook, 552
So. 2d at 842-43. She was severely wounded; her left arm and leg
had to be amputated. Id. at 843.
Shook was questioned about the incident and consented to the
search of his dormitory room at the University and of his vehicle.
Id. at 843-44. He was arrested a week after the incident and
charged with aggravated assault and firing into an occupied
dwelling. Following his indictment that October, he remained free
on bail pending trial.
3
B.
In December 1985, Shook filed several pretrial motions based
on his hearing impairment. He sought: appointment of an oral
interpreter; a stay of the proceedings until a system could be
developed to communicate with him; and simultaneous stenographic
transcription of all proceedings (in addition to an oral
interpreter). At the hearing on those motions on 30 January and 7
February 1986, six witnesses testified on behalf of Shook.
University of Mississippi speech/language pathologist Dr.
Kellum testified: Shook could not hear speech; testing performed
when Shook enrolled at the University of Mississippi in 1985
revealed multiple articulation errors and significant difficulties
in language comprehension and use of verbal language; Shook
frequently answered questions inappropriately, which indicated he
did not speech-read successfully; Shook had very poor communicative
skills, and his chance for improvement was minimal, even with
language and speech therapy; Shook’s estimated ability to use
language was equivalent to that of an 11 or 12-year-old;
individuals who are taught to speech-read generally can understand
about one-third of what is being said; and a registered oral
interpreter for the deaf would best be able to communicate with
Shook.
Speech pathologist Gore testified: she evaluated Shook in
1981 and worked with him through December 1982; testing in 1981,
4
when Shook was 16 years old, revealed his overall linguistic
functional equivalent age was 10½ years, and his age-equivalent
score on a vocabulary test was 6½ years; Shook’s lipreading skills
were very poor; she worked with Shook on language functioning for
about one year, teaching him to use visual cues, but he stopped
attending sessions with her due to his involvement in other
activities; at the time of his discharge, Shook was able to speech-
read two-to-three-word phrases with repetition, but was unable to
understand longer phrases; she believed Shook would respond “yes”
and “no” without understanding what was being said to him; it was
difficult for Shook to grasp abstract concepts, such as
constitutional rights, while it was much easier for him to grasp
concrete ideas; it would be difficult for Shook to follow
conversation among various individuals in a courtroom; over time,
Shook could be assisted to understand such conversation through use
of a simple writing procedure and explanation; and a teacher of the
hearing-impaired or a speech pathologist who worked with the
hearing-impaired would be appropriate to assist Shook.
Dr. Willingham, a special education counselor and clinician
who taught Shook in 1969 and 1970, testified: abstract concepts
are very difficult to teach to the hearing-impaired; Shook would
attempt to appear normal in group situations, although he might not
understand what others were saying; he could understand to some
degree what another person was saying during a one-on-one
interaction; she believed an oral interpreter could help Shook over
5
time; and she spoke with Shook shortly before the hearing and
estimated that his language level was about where it had been in
1970, approximately 16 years earlier.
Shook’s mother testified: she and her husband used a
telephone amplifier to translate telephone conversation to Shook;
Shook called people on the telephone to convey information, but he
did not know whether the person called understood what he had said
and could not hear what that person said to him; he would dial a
number and begin speaking, not knowing whether the person called
had answered; Shook drove vehicles, hunted, went to movies, and
watched television; he had a tape player in his room, but she did
not know if he ever played it; she would have to go upstairs to get
Shook because he could not hear her call from downstairs; she had
to use repetition when communicating with Shook; she sometimes
communicated with Shook in writing but had to write in simple
sentences, using simple language; people who were around Shook long
enough learned how to communicate with him; she and other family
members helped Shook with written school assignments; Shook had no
interpreters while attending high school and NMJC; Shook and
Thaggard were able to communicate; and Shook did poorly with
adjectives and adverbs, best with nouns and pronouns, and knew
nothing about tenses.
Shook’s father testified: he was able to communicate with
Shook; Shook is unable to hear words but can hear close, low-
pitched sounds; when Shook was upstairs and the father wanted him
6
to come downstairs, the father switched on a light as a signal;
Shook did not speak in complete sentences and was unable to write
complete sentences without assistance; Shook’s sister helped draft
letters from Shook to Thaggard; he and Shook’s sister did Shook’s
schoolwork while Shook was in high school and at NMJC; when Shook
played football, he memorized plays and reacted to hand signals;
when the father spoke with Shook after Shook was arrested, and
asked whether he understood his rights, Shook responded that he had
a right to attend school and football games; Shook would not
understand that he had a right to an attorney and had difficulty
understanding discussions with defense counsel; he and other family
members would go over the discussions in writing with Shook after
his meetings with counsel; and, although Shook could read, Shook
did not understand what he read.
Shook took the witness stand, but failed to respond to many of
counsel’s questions and gave unintelligible answers to others; he
either did not understand or did not respond to counsel’s questions
about his arrest, his constitutional rights, and the search of his
room at the University.
Defense counsel did not testify, but stated: he had made
repeated, unsuccessful attempts to communicate to Shook the nature
of the proceedings and the basic concepts of his situation; he did
not believe Shook understood the charges against him; and he was
not sure an oral interpreter would be of much assistance.
7
The State called nine witnesses. Pierce, who worked in the
NMJC business office, testified: Shook visited her office on
numerous occasions, the first of which involved his request for her
assistance with a parking ticket he had received; Shook did not
have difficulty communicating his wishes to her, and also asked her
questions about her family and personal life; and she usually
understood what Shook was trying to say to her but sometimes asked
him to repeat himself.
Franklin, head football coach at NMJC, testified: he had some
difficulty understanding Shook but was able to communicate with
him, with the occasional assistance of Shook’s teammates; and he
never felt Shook did not understand him.
Fennell, Shook’s high school typing teacher, testified: she
faced Shook when giving directions to the class but otherwise made
no accommodations for him; and Shook followed directions, was able
to communicate with her and would let her know if he did not
understand her.
Bradshaw, headmaster and football coach at Strider, testified:
he was able to communicate with Shook with some extra effort; Shook
was able to understand and follow directions that were made clear
to him; Shook was able to understand and complete written tests
given in class; he had seen Shook dancing at school functions and
had observed Shook speak on the telephone; and, on occasion, he
thought Shook took advantage of a claimed lack of understanding.
8
Spence, who also coached and taught Shook at Strider,
testified: he was able to communicate with Shook, although he had
to repeat instructions and sometimes had difficulty understanding
Shook’s speech; Shook had to obtain notes from other students in
classes, because he was unable to take all of the notes himself;
and Shook was able to follow directions for tests administered in
class, without extra help or explanation.
Wolfe, Thaggard’s close friend and roommate at NMJC,
testified: Shook was able to communicate well with her, Thaggard,
and others; she observed Shook taking notes in a history class, and
they often got notes from each other for that class; Shook would
not begin to speak on the telephone with her or Thaggard until one
of them answered the telephone, and he could distinguish between
their voices on the telephone; Shook became upset whenever she or
Thaggard attempted to write notes to him or otherwise made obvious
attempts to accommodate his hearing impairment; and she had
observed Shook turn from the front seat of an automobile when his
name was called from the back seat.
Fillyaw, who had also dated Shook, testified: she had to face
Shook when speaking to him and repeat herself; and Shook called her
on the telephone and she was able to understand him, and he seemed
to understand her on some occasions, but not others.
Thaggard’s mother testified: Shook had been in her home 75-
100 times; Shook generally gave appropriate responses in
communicating with her and would let her know if he did not
9
understand something; when she and her husband visited Shook’s
home, she observed Shook respond when Shook’s father, who was
downstairs, called Shook, who was upstairs; she had spoken with
Shook on the telephone, was able to understand him, and he appeared
to have understood her; Shook was able to communicate with family
members; and Shook sometimes answered her without her facing him.
Consistent with his wife’s testimony, Thaggard’s father
testified about his observations of Shook’s communicative
abilities.
Shook called seven witnesses in rebuttal. Hearing-aid
dispenser Fortner, who had known Shook since 1970, when Shook was
five years old, testified: Shook tries to conceal his hearing-
impairment; the main benefit Shook received from a hearing aid was
knowledge of the presence of a sound or voice; Shook scored 40
percent on a word test when combining hearing aids with speech-
reading and watching facial expressions; and he had been unable to
make Shook recognize his voice on the telephone.
Audiologist Bagwell testified: objective audiological tests
conducted the day before the hearing indicated Shook had profound
hearing loss; without a hearing aid, Shook would not be able to
hear normal conversation; and she doubted Shook could hear normal
conversation with a hearing aid.
University of Mississippi audiologist Brooks testified: Shook
might be able to distinguish voices and hear vowel sounds, which
are carried by lower frequencies; although consonant information is
10
carried by higher frequencies, where Shook suffered the most
damage, consonant information is more visible on the lips than
vowel information; Shook was not a successful example of an oral
deaf person because of the unintelligibility of his speech and his
very low language level; Shook could not function using speech and
hearing in a way that would meet his needs; she did not believe a
speech-reading course would improve Shook’s abilities; Shook lacked
the language to understand abstract concepts such as constitutional
rights, alibis, plea bargaining, and pleading guilty or not guilty,
and would have difficulty communicating with his attorney; she
doubted that appointment of an oral interpreter would be of much
assistance to Shook, because such interpreters are most effective
for hearing-impaired persons who have good language, reading, and
writing skills, and the interpreter would not be able to make up
for Shook’s years of inability to understand the world around him
because of his hearing impairment, but appointment of an oral
interpreter would be better than doing nothing, because the
interpreter might be able to break down questions about specific
events in a way that Shook might understand; and she believed Shook
knew he was in trouble, understood he might go to jail, and
understood that some of the people in the courtroom wanted to put
him in jail, while others wanted to keep him out of jail.
Three members of the Charleston community, testified about the
difficulties they had experienced communicating with Shook.
11
Shook’s sister testified: she wrote papers for him while he
was in high school, and she and her father assisted Shook with his
other schoolwork; Shook could use a telephone only with assistance
and could hear pitches, tones, and sounds; she had attempted to
explain some of the proceedings to Shook but had been unable to
communicate to him the concepts of courts and the American justice
system.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Shook’s counsel requested
that Shook be examined by a clinical psychologist at the
Mississippi School for the Deaf, because independent psychiatric
counseling had been unsuccessful.
Later, in February 1986, the state trial court granted Shook’s
motion for appointment of an oral interpreter. That March, the
trial court conducted a conference with Shook, his counsel, counsel
for the State, and Griffin, a certified oral interpreter who
specialized in legal interpretation, in order to make a preliminary
determination, pursuant to Mississippi law, whether Griffin was
able to interpret accurately Shook’s statements and the proceedings
in which Shook would be involved. After Shook and his counsel met
privately with Griffin, Shook’s counsel stated he was satisfied
Griffin was qualified and should be appointed. In its order
appointing Griffin, the state trial court made a preliminary
determination, concurred in by Shook and his counsel, that Griffin
12
was able to interpret accurately the statements of Shook and the
proceedings in which he might be involved.
The day after the conference with Griffin, however, Shook
filed a motion asserting he was incompetent to stand trial and
requesting a psychological and educational evaluation by a
psychologist with expertise in evaluating deaf persons. That May,
he moved for a continuance until he could learn sign language.
That September, the trial court conducted a hearing on those two
motions. Shook called two witnesses; the State, none.
Dr. Vernon, a psychologist who specialized in deafness,
testified: he met with Shook for three to five hours, met with
members of Shook’s family, and reviewed reports of tests performed
on Shook; Shook cannot hear speech well enough to understand it,
with or without hearing aids; he was unable to evaluate Shook
psychologically because of Shook’s inability to communicate; Shook
needed a thorough psychological evaluation, but it could not be
performed until Shook learned sign language; even with an excellent
interpreter, such as Griffin, Shook would probably understand, at
best, five percent of what was going on; a deaf person who does not
understand sign language would only understand two to three percent
of what was going on at trial; deaf persons habitually smile and
indicate they understand what is being said to them, rather than
admitting otherwise; Shook could not assist counsel in the
preparation of his defense; the method of educating Shook had been
wrong and had caused irreversible damage; the only way Shook could
13
acquire a reasonable understanding of the proceedings would be for
him to learn sign language; if Shook were totally immersed in a
deaf community, such as Gallaudet College in Washington, D.C., he
was 95 percent certain Shook would learn sign language proficiently
to stand trial in one year, but he did not know whether Shook would
be admitted to Gallaudet; Shook understood he was charged with a
crime and had a “very vague” concept of the nature and consequences
of the charges, but he did not understand the concept of punishment
if convicted; the indictment was written at a language level well
beyond Shook’s capability; Shook’s IQ was 106 or 108, slightly
higher than average; he saw no evidence of mental illness in the
tests he performed on Shook; he did not believe Shook could testify
at trial, even with the oral interpreter’s assistance; and he
believed Shook could differentiate right from wrong but believed
Shook could not understand abstract legal concepts. In response to
questioning by the trial court, Dr. Vernon conceded that, even if
Shook were taught sign language, he could not promise Shook would
be able to assist counsel and understand the proceedings.
The court-appointed oral interpreter, Griffin, testified:
sign language communication with a deaf individual is much quicker
than oral communication; she did not know if Shook would comprehend
more of the proceedings and communicate better if he signed; she
did not believe Shook understood everything that she was
interpreting for him, even when he indicated he did; Shook
frequently responded to her inappropriately, indicating a lack of
14
understanding; and Shook occasionally wanted to comment to her and
his attorney about testimony, but his attorney had made it clear he
did not want to be interrupted during the proceedings.
Shook’s counsel submitted an affidavit in support of the
motions, stating: it was impossible for him to determine the
nature and extent of what Shook was capable of understanding or
whether Shook was mentally capable of assisting in his defense;
therefore, a psychological evaluation was essential to evaluate
Shook’s competence to stand trial.
At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court granted the
motion to the extent of ordering Shook to submit to a psychological
evaluation at the Mississippi State Hospital to determine both his
competency to stand trial and his criminal responsibility (sanity
at time of offense). The court stated Griffin, the interpreter,
was to be present during Shook’s evaluation.
The subsequent written order, however, did not include the
directive about Griffin; she did not accompany Shook. Shook was
admitted to the Mississippi State Hospital on 8 October 1986, and
discharged approximately a month later.
By letter dated 10 November 1986, Mississippi State Hospital
psychologist Dr. Robertson and neurologist Dr. Lancaster reported
to the trial court the unanimous opinion of the hospital staff:
Shook understood his legal situation; could cooperate with his
attorney; and was competent to stand trial. The letter explained:
Shook initially answered questions regarding why he was in jail and
15
what kind of trouble he was in, and he had no impairment in
recognizing the victim’s name and answering other questions; in
later interviews, Shook acted as if he did not understand anything,
responding, “I don’t know”, or “I don’t understand”, regardless of
the question asked, except for his age, and refused to write any
answers to questions, stating he could not read, write, or speech-
read; during his hospitalization, Shook socialized well with other
patients, played cards and basketball, served as a basketball
referee, read newspapers and magazines, and watched television; and
the hospital staff indicated Shook could understand and communicate
as long as staff members spoke slowly. Drs. Robertson and
Lancaster diagnosed Shook as malingering regarding his presented
problems of an inability to read, write, or understand anything
said. They concluded that, because Shook’s main communicative
problem was that he needed a speaker to speak slowly enough for him
to speech-read, the only requirement for trial would be that it
proceed sufficiently slowly to allow Shook to speech-read.
On 18 November, approximately a week after the date of the
report, the trial court denied Shook’s continuance and incompetency
motions.
On 5 January 1987, Shook moved to exclude the Mississippi
State Hospital report and for the court to reconsider delaying
trial until he could learn sign language. At a hearing that day,
the court denied that motion, as well as Shook’s motion that he not
be tried until an adequate communication system could be developed.
16
Shook’s counsel withdrew his motion for simultaneous transcription
and instead requested daily transcription.
Jury selection commenced two weeks later, on 19 January.
During voir dire, Shook renewed his motion for a stay until he
could learn sign language. The following morning, at a conference
in the judge’s chambers, Shook’s counsel again moved for a
continuance on that basis. At that conference, Griffin, the oral
interpreter, testified regarding problems communicating with Shook.
At the conclusion of that conference, the court denied the
motion. The court quoted extensively from the Mississippi State
Hospital report, and stated:
I had the opportunity yesterday to observe
[Shook] in open court at counsel table along
with his attorney and with the oral
interpreter, Ms. Griffin.... I even permitted
[Shook]’s father ... and ... sister ... to be
at counsel table. But I observed at least on
a couple of occasions [Shook] simply looking
away from Ms. Griffin. There’s got to be
cooperation on the part of everyone including
[Shook].
....
So I recognize the problems indicated by
[Shook’s counsel] in communicating. Through
my months now of observation, I think some of
the problems are [Shook]’s unwillingness to
cooperate.
I’ve done everything I feel like within
my power and authority to assure [Shook] ... a
constitutionally fair trial. Taking into
consideration his hearing impairment, I
appointed an oral interpreter at [Shook]’s
request. She’s here assisting. And I think
and truly believe that she can be of valuable
17
assistance to this Court and especially to
[Shook] if [Shook] will let her.
Certainly, from the standpoint of
understanding legal terminology, it’s been the
experience of this Court that well-educated
people who have no hearing impairment or any
problems at all come into court without an
understanding of the proceedings or how court
is conducted and have problems. So I don’t
think it’s anything unusual about having
problems with legal terminology.
... I was satisfied and I am still
satisfied it would be of no benefit to delay
the trial for a year or longer to attempt to
teach [Shook] to sign, and even not knowing
then what the situation would be.
Again, I feel strongly that [Shook] is
being afforded a constitutionally fair trial.
Throughout trial, Shook’s father and sister were allowed to
remain at counsel table with Shook, his interpreter, and his
attorney. Several of the witnesses called by the State testified
consistently with their pretrial testimony regarding Shook’s
communicative abilities. In addition, the victim testified that
communication with Shook was difficult when he wanted it to be. At
one point, during the testimony of a witness, defense counsel asked
for a pause so that the interpreter could explain the testimony to
Shook; the trial court allowed it upon being advised by the
interpreter that she needed some time. The transcript reflects no
other requests by Shook’s counsel or the interpreter for breaks in
the testimony to facilitate communication with Shook.
18
At the close of the State’s case in chief, Shook renewed his
previous motions based on his hearing impairment. The trial court
denied them, stating:
Lay witnesses in pretrial hearings and
... during ... trial have stated clearly and
unequivocally that they could communicate with
[Shook]; that they could communicate to
[Shook] what they were trying to communicate
and that he in turn could communicate to them
what he was trying to communicate. The
witnesses have testified ... that in essence
he could understand when he wanted to and he
could make it difficult when he did not want
to understand....
I’m satisfied, again, that this court is
making every effort and is, indeed affording
to [Shook] every constitutional right
available to him; that he is receiving a
constitutionally fair trial.
The court has permitted ... members of
[Shook]’s family to be with counsel and ...
[Shook] at counsel table to assist in
communication....
This court is doing everything that it
can conceivably think of to make sure that
[Shook] is receiving a fair trial and is
understanding the proceedings.... I’m
satisfied all of this is being done. I’m
satisfied he can certainly understand and
appreciate the nature of the proceedings.
... I’m satisfied that if he will
cooperate with his family[,] ... oral
interpreter[,] and ... his attorney that the
communication channels are open and that
[Shook] is being afforded all his
constitutional rights.
Shook presented the testimony of several witnesses who
testified consistently with their testimony in pretrial hearings
regarding his hearing impairment and communicative problems. Dr.
19
Vernon’s testimony included his opinion, tendered at the pretrial
hearing, that Shook was incompetent to stand trial and would remain
so until he was taught sign language, and he added: the
Mississippi State Hospital malingering diagnosis was not accurate;
and anyone who would assume responsibility for psychologically
evaluating a person with whom they could not communicate and who
had a problem with which they had no experience would be guilty of
the “grossest malpractice”. Shook also called Dr. Haws, a licensed
psychologist, who testified: it would be impossible for her to
examine Shook because she could not communicate with him; and she
would question the ethical standards of any psychologist or
psychiatrist who attempted to examine him, given the degree of his
hearing impairment and lack of verbal skills.
In rebuttal, the State called witnesses who testified
consistently with their pretrial testimony regarding Shook’s
communicative abilities, as well as another of Shook’s high school
teachers, who testified she was able to communicate with Shook and
that he was able to read, write, and take written tests in class.
In addition, the State called as witnesses Drs. Lancaster and
Robertson, who had conducted the court-ordered competency
evaluation of Shook at the Mississippi State Hospital. They
testified consistently with their report to the court regarding
Shook’s competency and sanity at the time of the offense, including
details about Shook’s evaluation; and each also testified Shook was
competent to stand trial and knew the difference between right and
20
wrong at the time of the offense. In explaining the malingering
diagnosis, Dr. Lancaster testified Shook was exaggerating his
communication problem, not his speaking or hearing problems.
Post-verdict, Shook moved for a new trial, asserting, inter
alia: he was denied due process because of his hearing impairment;
and the trial court erred by allowing the experts from the
Mississippi State Hospital to testify, because they had no
expertise in evaluating hearing-impaired persons and did not have
an interpreter present when they evaluated him. The motion was
denied.
C.
On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected
Shook’s claim that the trial court should have delayed the trial
until he could be taught sign language, stating:
The [trial] court had no way of ascertaining
whether [Shook] would learn [sign] language
nor the degree to which it could improve his
real ability to understand and communicate.
[Shook] could read, and the record shows that
the interpreter kept him well informed as the
trial progressed. We can appreciate that it
was not easy for counsel to discuss the
defense with him, but, clearly it could be
done. A trial should not be postponed
indefinitely if any reasonable alternative
exists. Additional time before the trial and
breaks during the trial should be allowed, if
good cause is shown, to permit counsel and the
defendant to effectively communicate. No
complaint on that score was made here. This
record shows, beyond doubt, that the trial
judge reasonably concluded that [Shook] could
communicate with those around him sufficiently
to permit him to function in a reasonably
21
normal fashion. He was not illiterate nor
blind. He is a high school graduate and was a
college student. During the trial he was kept
advised of what was being argued and what the
testimony was.
Shook, 552 So. 2d at 844-45 (emphasis added).
The court also rejected, as “totally refuted by the facts”,
Shook’s related claim he was physically, and perhaps mentally,
incompetent to stand trial. Id. at 845. After quoting at length
from the trial court’s findings, the State Supreme Court stated:
The trial judge, on the scene and observing
the defendant and the witnesses, must be
allowed considerable discretion, and where it
is apparent that the judge has demonstrated an
awareness of the issues involved and concern
for the protection of the rights of the
defendant, as here, his judgment must be
accorded great weight and respect....
Id.
D.
Shook, pro se, applied for federal habeas relief in 1993,
asserting, inter alia, that the trial court: violated his
constitutional rights by failing to delay trial until he could be
taught sign language; and denied him due process by forcing him to
trial when he was physically, and perhaps mentally, incompetent.
1.
The magistrate judge appointed counsel for Shook and set an
evidentiary hearing. The State moved to rescind the hearing order,
contending the evidence regarding Shook’s competence to stand trial
22
had been developed fully in state court. The motion was denied.
(In his post-hearing report and recommendation, the magistrate
judge took the position that the presumption of correctness
ordinarily accorded state fact-findings should not apply because,
in his opinion, Shook was denied due process in the state court
proceedings.)
At the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate judge,
Shook’s father and sister testified consistently with their
pretrial testimony regarding Shook’s communicative problems. His
father testified further that: Shook passed him a note at trial
stating he did not understand Griffin, the oral interpreter; at a
conference in the trial judge’s chambers, Griffin had told Shook’s
counsel that Shook was understanding only about five percent of the
proceedings; and he did not believe the court proceedings could
have been slowed sufficiently for Shook to be able to lipread
testimony. Shook’s sister testified: Griffin tried to communicate
orally with Shook at trial, but Shook could not understand; Shook
could not communicate with his counsel; and Shook did not
understand the nature of the trial proceedings.
Shook’s trial counsel testified: Shook was functionally
illiterate; he did not think Shook would have understood the
testimony even if the trial had proceeded more slowly or more
breaks had been taken; he did not believe Shook understood enough
of the proceedings to receive due process; he could not communicate
with Shook, except in the most primitive fashion, and it was
23
impossible to explain to Shook legal concepts, evidentiary issues,
plea bargaining, and court proceedings, including whether Shook
should testify; he did not think Shook had a factual or rational
understanding of the proceedings; and, in the light of Shook’s
hearing impairment, counsel had substantial doubt about whether
Shook was physically competent to stand trial.
Shook presented the affidavits of Drs. Kellum, Bagwell, and
Vernon, each of whom had testified pretrial and at trial. In
addition to repeating much of the substance of her previous
testimony, Kellum’s affidavit stated: Shook’s language skills in
1986 were so poor that he could not effectively understand
communication even with the aid of a qualified interpreter; Shook
lacked the communication skills necessary to consult with his
attorney at trial; Shook had no factual or rational understanding
of the proceedings; and a malingering diagnosis for Shook would not
be valid unless the person evaluating him had extensive experience
and training with the deaf and had an interpreter present during
the evaluation.
Bagwell’s affidavit repeated the substance of her previous
testimony and added: a psychologist without adequate training in
communicating with the hearing-impaired would not be able to
determine whether a person was malingering concerning a hearing
impairment; when she evaluated Shook in 1986, he did not have
sufficient ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable
24
degree of rational understanding and did not have a rational or
factual understanding of the proceedings.
Dr. Vernon’s affidavit repeated much of the substance of his
previous testimony, including his opinion that, until Shook learned
sign language, he was incompetent to stand trial, and his criticism
of the competency evaluation performed at the Mississippi State
Hospital. He added that the trial’s pace could not have been
slowed sufficiently for Shook to have understood the testimony.
The State presented two expert witnesses. Dr. Stringer, the
Executive Director of the Mississippi Association of the Deaf,
testified: when a deaf person has been educated orally, as had
Shook, that is their language and signing is not done; a hearing-
impaired adult who had been trained orally would need about two or
three years to be trained in sign language; and he had no
complaints about the assistance given Shook at trial.
Neely, the Director of Deaf Services for the Mississippi
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, testified: appointment of
an oral interpreter was appropriate; he was “not certain” he would
agree trial should have been delayed until Shook could learn sign
language; and it would take two to three years for a person such as
Shook, who had been orally educated, to learn sign language.
In a videotaped deposition submitted by Shook post-hearing,
Griffin testified: Shook was a poor to fair lipreader and could
follow the gist of communication if he knew the context of it and
was familiar with the speaker; at trial, she communicated with
25
Shook by writing the substance of the testimony, but her sentences
often had to be restructured or rephrased to accommodate his
limited vocabulary, and she was often still writing about a
previous witness after the next witness had begun testifying; Shook
had about a third-grade reading/comprehension level; if Shook had
known sign language, interpretation would have been much simpler;
considering Shook’s limited command of the English language and
limited speech-reading abilities, she could think of nothing more
that could have been done to make the proceedings clearer to him,
short of extending the trial for several weeks; and she believed
that, if Shook were totally immersed in a signing environment, he
could learn sign language proficiently within a year. When asked
whether Shook had the ability to communicate with defense counsel
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, Griffin
responded that Shook could not have done so during the trial
itself, because of the logistics. When asked whether Shook
understood the nature of the proceedings, she testified he
understood the charges against him and knew there were potential
negative consequences he wished to avoid.
The magistrate judge recommended granting habeas relief based
on incompetence to stand trial, stating: while it was obvious the
trial court took extraordinary care in handling the matter, it
erred in its competency ruling by relying on the testimony of lay
persons and Mississippi State Hospital physicians who had no
expertise in working with deaf persons. According to the
26
magistrate judge, the only experts worthy of the name, Drs. Vernon
and Griffin, testified to Shook’s “complete inability to comprehend
the proceedings against him and to communicate with his attorney”.
The magistrate judge concluded: Shook’s request to delay trial for
a year in order to learn sign language was not unreasonable and
should have been granted; and the failure to do so violated Shook’s
due process rights, by requiring him to stand trial while
incompetent.
2.
The district court ruled that the record was incomplete and
that another evidentiary hearing was necessary to address Shook’s
ability at trial to comprehend the English language in written
form, inasmuch as that was the method of communication primarily
used by the interpreter and others assisting Shook at trial. See
Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1109 & n.3, 1110 (5th Cir. 1980)
(in resolving “credibility questions involved in the determination
of critical fact issues affecting a [criminal defendant’s]
constitutional rights”, a district judge may either accept the
magistrate’s determination or “reject[] the magistrate’s decision
and com[e] to an independent decision after hearing the testimony
and viewing the witnesses” (emphasis added)).
At that second federal evidentiary hearing, Drs. Kellum and
Gore testified regarding Shook’s inability to communicate in
written language and his lack of comprehension of the trial
27
proceedings. His trial counsel testified, repeating the substance
of his testimony in the first federal evidentiary hearing, and
adding: Griffin’s method of communicating with Shook at trial, by
taking notes during the proceedings, was not an effective method;
Griffin testified at an in-chambers hearing during trial, and
likewise told him repeatedly throughout trial, that Shook was not
grasping what she was attempting to tell him; and he did not ask
for trial recesses because it would not have made a significant
difference in communicating with Shook.
Two of Shook’s high school teachers testified for the State
that, based on his performance in classes they taught, Shook could
understand the written language. In addition to submitting written
statements by two other teachers, each of whom stated Shook was
able to read and comprehend written material in their classes, the
State submitted Shook’s academic records from Strider and NMJC, and
his college entrance certificate.
Wolfe testified, consistently with her pretrial and trial
testimony, regarding Shook’s ability to communicate in writing.
The Mississippi Highway Patrol officer who administered a written
commercial driver’s license examination to Shook testified about
Shook’s scores on that examination. The victim testified she
understood the letters Shook wrote to her during their courtship.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted
Shook’s request to take the telephonic depositions of Griffin and
Dr. Vernon, after they had reviewed the notes Griffin took during
28
trial. The depositions, taken the following month, focused on
Shook’s ability to understand written language.
Dr. Vernon repeated his opinion that Shook was incompetent to
stand trial until he learned sign language and testified further:
Shook read at a third-to-fifth grade level; Griffin’s notes were
written at a level in excess of Shook’s abilities, and he would not
have understood enough of it to adequately participate in his
defense; and Shook was incompetent to stand trial based on his
ability to comprehend the English language in written form. Dr.
Vernon acknowledged, however, that sign language vocabulary is very
limited and that there are no signs for almost all legal terms; and
that, even if Shook were trained in sign language, questions would
have remained regarding his ability to understand abstract legal
terms.
In her telephonic deposition, Griffin testified: she
communicated with Shook using a combination of writing and allowing
him to speech-read, along with visual cues, gestures, and diagrams;
she attempted to reword and restructure language to make it more
comprehensible to him; Shook’s reading comprehension level was very
elementary, so she tried to write for him on a third-grade level;
Shook was a very poor speech-reader and relied on written
communication much more than speech-reading; she was able to
communicate to Shook the gist of all of the testimony and even some
of the procedural matters but not all of the detail; considering
Shook’s abilities and the available technology, she did not know
29
what else could have been done for him short of delaying trial so
he could learn sign language; and Shook understood the charges
against him and knew the proceedings could result in serious
consequences. When asked whether she had the impression Shook
understood the testimony while it was presented, she responded:
I think that he did. And if he didn’t, he
usually let me know. And he seemed to be able
to tell which people were testifying — saying
things that were favorable to his case,
because he would nod and smile and seemed glad
about some testimony. There was other
testimony given where he would shake his head
and even want to refute the testimony maybe in
writing to me.
The district court disagreed with the magistrate judge’s
finding that Griffin and Vernon both testified to Shook’s “complete
inability to comprehend the proceedings against him”. Shook v.
State of Mississippi, No. 2:93-CV-118-D-B, 2000 WL 877008, at *4
(N.D. Miss. 8 June 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Although the district court did not question Dr.
Vernon’s expertise or credibility, it found more persuasive the
totality of the testimony of all others who testified, especially
Griffin’s. Id. The district court noted that Dr. Vernon had spent
less than half a day with Shook 14 years earlier and had reviewed
the test evaluations made by others. Id. at *6. It found his
testimony was “more of a generalization from studies conducted,
rather than any specific observation”. Id.
30
The district court found: Shook could communicate
sufficiently with those around him to permit him to function in a
reasonably normal fashion; Griffin kept Shook well informed as the
trial progressed; and the trial court recognized Shook’s deafness
and took the appropriate steps to protect his rights by appointing
an oral interpreter to aid him in the only language he had ever
known. Id. at *5. It found Griffin’s testimony “convincing as
evidence of [Shook’s] comprehension and his present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a sufficient degree of rational
understanding”. Id. The district court concluded: the state
trial court “took all reasonable measures which adequately
safeguarded [Shook]’s constitutional rights”; and the trial court’s
finding that, with Griffin’s assistance, Shook was competent,
“reflects the fair-minded consideration given the facts of this
case and shall be accorded absolute deference.” Id. at *6.
II.
Trial of an incompetent criminal defendant violates due
process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). The standard
for competency to stand trial is whether the defendant “has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
Shook maintains he falls below this standard, on the basis that his
31
deafness rendered him unable to understand the proceedings against
him and prevented him from consulting with, or assisting, his
attorney in preparing his defense.
A criminal defendant’s competency vel non to stand trial is a
question of fact. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983).
The petitioner must present facts sufficient “to positively,
unequivocally and clearly generate a real, substantial and
legitimate doubt as to [his] mental capacity ... to meaningfully
participate and cooperate with counsel”. United States v.
Williams, 819 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1017 (1988).
Because Shook filed his federal habeas petition prior to the
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), AEDPA does not apply for review of the district
court’s denial of habeas relief. E.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 478 (2000); Magouirk v. Warden, Winn Corr. Ctr., 237 F.3d 549,
552 (5th Cir. 2001); Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 699 (5th
Cir. 2000). The AEDPA provision conditioning the ability to appeal
the denial, 28 U.S.C. § 2253, does apply however. Slack, 529 U.S.
at 478. In this regard, the district court granted Shook a
certificate of appealability on the basis that “there is a close
factual issue as to [Shook’s] ability to comprehend and cooperate
with his attorney”.
32
Under pre-AEDPA law, state findings of fact are entitled to a
presumption of correctness, unless they are either not “fairly
support[ed]” by the record, former 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8), or one
of the other statutory exceptions applies. See Magouirk, 237 F.3d
at 552; Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1204 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 996 (1993).
As discussed, because the state trial court’s competency
determination is a question of fact, the presumption of correctness
applies unless Shook satisfies an exception. See Maggio, 462 U.S.
at 117. Although the district court accorded the presumption to
the state trial court’s competency determination, Shook, 2000 WL
877008, at *6, it also conducted its own evidentiary hearing, in
addition to the one conducted by the magistrate judge, and, based
on the additional evidence adduced at those hearings, made its own
factual finding that Shook was competent to stand trial. Id. at
*5. Accordingly, the district court’s independent determination
that Shook was competent to stand trial must be upheld unless it is
clearly erroneous. See Self, 973 F.2d at 1203. A finding of fact
“is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
33
The Supreme Court has commented on the similarity between the
clearly erroneous standard of review for a district court’s
findings of fact and the habeas presumption of correctness accorded
state court findings of fact. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S.
422, 434-35 (1983) (“We greatly doubt that Congress, when [, in
former § 2254(d)(8),] it used the language ‘fairly supported by the
record’ considered ‘as a whole’ intended to authorize broader
federal review of state court credibility determinations than are
authorized in appeals within the federal system itself.”). “Both
[standards] reflect a proper deference on the part of the reviewer
to a prior fact-based determination.” United States v. Hogan, 986
F.2d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 1993).
As noted, the magistrate judge recommended that the
presumption of correctness was inapplicable because, in his opinion
and pursuant to former § 2254(d)(7), Shook “was otherwise denied
due process of law in the state court proceeding”. That exception
to the presumption of correctness applies, however, only if “the
state court denied the petitioner a fair opportunity to press his
claim”. Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 788 n.6 (11th Cir. 1991).
Shook was not denied due process in the state court proceedings;
far from it. As amply demonstrated, supra, by the summary of those
proceedings, the state trial court conducted fair and complete
hearings on the issue of Shook’s communicative abilities and his
concomitant competence to stand trial. Therefore, the state
34
finding that Shook was competent is entitled to a presumption of
correctness unless, pursuant to former 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the
finding is either “not fairly supported by the record” or Shook
establishes “by convincing evidence” it is erroneous.
The state court record supports the trial court’s finding that
Shook was competent to stand trial. Although Shook’s experts, who
had experience with deaf individuals, testified he was not
competent, the staff at the Mississippi State Hospital, where Shook
was evaluated, unanimously concluded he was. The trial judge was
not required to accept the opinion of Shook’s experts and to reject
the opinion expressed by the Mississippi State Hospital staff,
merely because the latter lacked experience in conducting
competency evaluations of hearing-impaired individuals. In making
a competency determination, a trial court is, of course, entitled
to rely on its observations of the defendant and to judge the
credibility of witnesses; and it is not required to credit the
statements and ultimate conclusions of the defendant’s expert, even
if the expert is unimpeached and the State presents no evidence to
rebut the expert’s opinion. See Maggio, 462 U.S. at 113-18; cf.
United States v. Mota, 598 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Expert
testimony, even when uncontradicted, is not conclusive on the issue
of sanity ... and the jury may find such testimony adequately
rebutted by the observations of mere laymen.”), cert. denied, 444
35
U.S. 1084 (1980); United States v. Hall, 583 F.2d 1288, 1293-94
(5th Cir. 1978) (same).
For similar reasons, the district court’s independent finding
that Shook was competent to stand trial, based on all of the
evidence, including that introduced at the two federal evidentiary
hearings, is not clearly erroneous. The district court considered
Dr. Vernon’s expert opinion that Shook was incompetent to stand
trial but found “the totality of testimony of all others who
testified, especially Ms. Griffin, more persuasive”. Shook, 2000
WL 877008, at *4. “Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of habeas relief is
AFFIRMED.
36