Hunt v. Texas Mtl Ins Co ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-50569
Summary Calendar
WILLIS G. HUNT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
TEXAS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas,
Austin Division
A-01-CA-324 JN
December 13, 2002
Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.*
PER CURIAM:
Willis G. Hunt (“Hunt”) appeals the district court’s
summary judgment dismissing his claims of racially discriminatory
firing under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e et seq. Hunt argues that the district court abused its
discretion in (1) striking pages 19 to 27 of Hunt’s response to
Texas Mutual Insurance Company’s (“TMI”) motion for summary
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
judgement and (2) striking two unsigned and unsworn “affidavits.”
For the following reasons, this court affirms.
This court reviews district court enforcement of the
local rules for abuse of discretion. Macklin v. City of New
Orleans, 293 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 2002). The abuse of
discretion standard also applies to district court’s application of
local rules in disposing of motions. Victor F. v. Pasadena Indep.
School Dist., 793 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1986). “Local rules for
the conduct of trial courts are desirable and necessary, and such
rules should not be ignored or declared invalid except for
impelling reasons.” Wirtz v. Hopper-Holmes Bureau, Inc., 327 F.2d
939, 943 (5th Cir. 1964).
On March 1, 2002, Hunt filed a 27-page response to TMI’s
motion for summary judgment. This filing was, as Hunt admits, one
day too late, see W.D. Tex. Local R. CV-7(d), and 17 pages too
long, see id. at (f). In spite of Hunt’s failure to abide by both
of these rules, Judge Nowlin accepted Hunt’s filing, striking,
though, the final eight pages of Hunt’s brief. Truncated to 19
pages, this brief then equaled in length TMI’s motion. Hunt now
argues that this abbreviation is tantamount to dismissal.
This argument is devoid of merit. Instead of rejecting
the filing altogether — as the court might have done — the district
court generously accepted the brief and imposed a remedy. Judge
Nowlin did not abuse his discretion, and he ruled on the merits of
Hunt’s case.
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Hunt also attached to his response brief two supporting
exhibits, respectively presented as the “affidavits” of Isodor C.
Leon, Jr., and Mark G. Vidas. Neither document was signed or
notarized. On the signature line on each of these documents, there
was merely a hand-written statement indicating that they would be
subsequently supplemented with a signature. Ten days later, Hunt
submitted a motion to substitute “signature pages” for both of
these “affidavits.” The district court refused this motion. Hunt
argues that Judge Nowlin thereby abused his discretion.
This argument is also without merit. Hunt concedes that
these “affidavits” failed to comply with Rule 56(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The most that he can argue is that the
district court could have applied this rule “with a spirit of
liberality”; he therefore asks this court to reverse Judge Nowlin’s
“abuse of discretion.” While it might be within the trial court’s
ability to accept late and unconventional affidavit filings, the
trial court is under absolutely no obligation to do so. A trial
court’s expectation that litigants abide by court rules can in no
way be characterized as an abuse of discretion. It would, rather,
have been Judge Nowlin’s acceptance of Hunt’s unorthodox and
improper submission of “signature pages,” that would give rise to
a charge of abuse.
To mitigate the prejudicial consequences to litigants of
their counsels’ incompetence, trial judges occasionally avert their
glance when the application of clear rules might otherwise prevent
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adjudication upon the merits of a client’s case. Hunt himself has
been the beneficiary of such judicial liberality. With regard to
most of Hunt’s blunders, Judge Nowlin was lenient, allowing
adjudication on the merits of a case that he could have easily
dismissed out of hand. To the same extent that Hunt has benefitted
from Judge Nowlin’s discretion, he cannot now claim its abuse.
The district court’s judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.
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