Shuff v. Avior Shipping Inc ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-30098
Summary Calendar
CURTIS SHUFF; REBECCA SHUFF,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
AVIOR SHIPPING INC.; M/V MINI MERCHANT; SEACREST
TRANSPORT INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 98-CV-1388
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October 27, 1999
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellants, Curtis and Rebecca Shuff, appeal the district
court’s dismissal of their First Supplemental and Amending
Petition for failure to state a claim, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). We agree that the petition was sufficient to withstand
the liberal notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-30098
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Civil Procedure and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the
district court.
All parties agree that this matter is governed by § 905(b)
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which
allows a longshoreman to sue a vessel owner for negligence
attributable to the vessel. The vessel owner has a duty, inter
alia, to turn over the vessel in safe condition and may be liable
to a longshoreman for injuries caused by hazardous conditions
under the act or control of the vessel. See Helaire v. Mobil Oil
Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir. 1983).
In their Petition and First Supplemental and Amending
Petition, the Shuffs allege that Mr. Shuff was injured when a
cable snapped, causing a boom to fall. They further allege that
the cable was defective; that the defendants failed to inspect,
maintain, or replace the cable; that the defendants knew or
should have known of the defective nature of the cable; and that
the defendants breached their duty to provide safe working
conditions. The district court determined that these allegations
were insufficient to put the defendants on fair notice of the
nature and grounds of the plaintiffs’ claims.
A district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
subject to de novo review. See Barrientos v. Reliance Standard
Life Ins. Co., 911 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991). The district
court “must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true
and resolve any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency
No. 99-30098
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of the claim in favor of the plaintiff.” Jefferson v. Lead
Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997). A
12(b)(6) motion may be granted “only if it appears that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven
consistent with the allegations.” Barrientos, 911 F.2d at 1116.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody a concept of
“notice” pleading, requiring only that the plaintiff provide the
defendant with fair notice of his claim and the grounds on which
it rests. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The
Shuffs informed the defendants of the time and place of Mr.
Shuff’s injury and of its alleged cause - the snapped cable. The
Shuffs alleged that the injury occurred aboard a vessel owned
and/or operated by the defendants and that the cable’s failure
was the result of negligent maintenance, inspection, and repair
by the defendants. General allegations of negligence are
ordinarily sufficient to meet the requirements of notice
pleading. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Jones, 294 F.2d 495,
497 (5th Cir. 1961). The petition in this case meets the
standard set forth in Form 9 of the appendix to the Federal
Rules; those forms are generally sufficient under the rules.
FED. R. CIV. P. 84; Great Atlantic, 294 F.2d at 497.
Although the Shuffs do not expressly allege that the cable
was under the control of the vessel, such an allegation is
readily inferred from the petition as a whole. See Walker v.
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990).
No. 99-30098
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Thus, the failure to allege this specific element of the Shuffs’
claim is not fatal.
In sum, we cannot say that it appears beyond any doubt that
the Shuffs will be unable to prove any set of facts which would
entitle them to relief consistent with the allegations of their
petition. See Barrientos, 911 F.2d at 1116. Accordingly, we
REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.