James v. Collins ( 1993 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit
_____________________________________
No. 92-7676
Summary Calendar
_____________________________________
Johnny James,
Petitioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
James A. Collins, Director
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
______________________________________________________
March 25, 1993
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. Having exhausted both his direct appeals and state habeas
remedies, he now seeks federal relief. The district court denied
Petitioner's application for the writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Background
After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of capital
murder.1 During the later sentencing phase, the jury answered
affirmatively two special issues regarding (1) the deliberateness
of James's actions, and (2) the probability of his future
1
The details of James's crimes are set forth in James v. State,
772 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
dangerousness to society. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
37.071(b) (West 1981).2 James was sentenced to death. His
conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. James v. State, 772 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989).
The United States Supreme Court granted James's petition for
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
See James v. Texas, 493 U.S. 885 (1989). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals again affirmed Petitioner's conviction and
sentence. James v. State, 805 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2915 (1991).
James then commenced his habeas attacks upon his conviction
and sentence. The state trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied
relief on the basis of these findings and conclusions. The federal
district court likewise denied Petitioner's application. This
appeal followed.
Discussion
Petitioner raises four issues: First, he challenges the Texas
special issues statute on the ground that it does not adequately
perform the constitutionally required narrowing function,
circumscribing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.
2
The Texas Legislature amended the capital sentencing scheme in
1991. The amended statutes do not apply to crimes committed before
the effective date of the amendments. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 37.071 (West. Supp. 1992).
2
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269-70 (1976); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972). Second, it is urged that the Texas
sentencing scheme precludes the sentencing jury from giving full
effect to mitigating evidence presented, in violation of Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Third, James questions the
presumption of correctness which federal courts must give to state
court findings of fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254(d); he contends
the presumption is inapplicable here because of alleged improper
participation by the state prosecutor in drafting the findings of
fact. Finally, Petitioner argues that he was unconstitutionally
deprived of his right to the assistance of a mental health expert
during the sentencing proceedings, in contravention of the rule
announced in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). We address each
of these issues in turn.
I.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court
invalidated all then-existing capital punishment statutes. Justice
Douglas, in his concurring opinion, focused upon the "uncontrolled
discretion of judges or juries" in meting out the ultimate
sanction: "People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or
of 12." Id. at 253. The legislatures of the several states heeded
Furman's mandate and sought to formulate guidelines and standards
to alleviate such unfettered discretion.
The Texas Legislature's response was twofold. Initially, the
narrowing function required by Furman was to be performed at the
guilt-innocence phase of the capital proceeding. See Tex. Penal
3
Code § 19.03 (1974) (restricting application of death penalty to
intentional and knowing murders committed in five discrete
situations).
In Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 (West 1981), the
Texas Legislature bifurcated Texas capital proceedings, and
provided a further narrowing mechanism. After a jury determines
that a defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the same jury is
presented with "special issues" which act as guides in sentencing:
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence,
the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with
the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased
or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society[.]3
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 (West 1981).4 The state is
required to prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the jury may not answer "yes" to any issue unless it agrees
unanimously. Id. at 37.071(c) & (d)(1). If the jury answers "yes"
to each issue submitted, a sentence of death is imposed. Id. at
37.071(e).
The Supreme Court upheld the Texas capital sentencing scheme
in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Jurek Court
acknowledged that, "While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory
3
A third special issue, regarding killing in response to
provocation, is not at issue in the instant case.
4
Again, this scheme is no longer used in Texas. See supra note
2.
4
aggravating circumstances the existence of which can justify the
imposition of the death penalty ... its action in narrowing the
categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be
imposed serves much the same purpose." Id. at 270.
The jurisprudence on this issue is clear. The fact that the
Texas capital sentencing scheme performs the constitutionally
required narrowing function at the guilt-innocence phase of the
trial, with a further narrowing during the punishment phase, does
not render the scheme constitutionally defective. Petitioner's
arguments to the contrary are unavailing. See Graham v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 892, 898-99 (1993) (affirming prior Fifth Circuit's en
banc decision, 950 F.2d 1009 (1992)); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270;
Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1097 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985); see also Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) ("We see no reason why this narrowing
function may not be performed by jury findings at either the
sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase. Our opinion in
Jurek v. Texas ... establishes this point." (citation omitted)).
Petitioner also argues that the Texas capital sentencing
scheme was impermissibly applied in his case because the court
refused to give the sentencing jury definitions for the terms
"deliberately," "probability," "criminal acts of violence," and
"continuing threat to society." James, citing Stringer v. Black,
112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992), characterizes these terms and phrases as
impermissibly vague aggravating factors which fail to adequately
channel the jury's sentencing discretion.
5
Texas, unlike Mississippi's sentencing procedure analyzed in
Stringer, is not a "weighing" jurisdiction; i.e., the sentencer is
not called upon to weigh mitigating evidence against a list of
aggravating circumstances which the state must plead and prove.
See id. at 1136. When a jury is permitted to consider a vague
aggravating factor, the weighing process runs the impermissible
risk of being skewed in favor of the application of the death
penalty. Id. at 1137.
Despite the fact that Texas is a "non-weighing" state,5 the
terms used in the special issues are not so vague as to require
clarifying instructions. When the Supreme Court upheld the Texas
sentencing statutes in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), Justice
White observed "[T]he issues posed in the sentencing proceeding
have a common-sense core of meaning that criminal juries should be
capable of understanding ...." Id. at 276 (White, J., concurring).
In Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985), we observed that Jurek answered the
question, "at least in the abstract," that the undefined words are
nevertheless capable of guiding the jury's sentencing discretion.
We agree with the reasoning of Milton, which took the issue out of
the realm of abstraction:
5
The relevance of this distinction is not unimportant. The Court
in Stringer observed this difference is "not one of semantics, ...
but of critical importance." Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. at 1137.
We need not explore the implications of these differences here. It
is sufficient for the instant decision that the terms used in the
Texas special issues are capable of being understood and applied
without the aid of additional instructions.
6
To the extent that the words strike distinct chords in
individual jurors, or play to differing philosophies and
attitudes, nothing more is at work than the jury system
.... The answer is that such words, often of great
consequence, do have a common understanding in the sense
that they ultimately mean what the jury says by their
verdict they mean.
Id. at 1096; accord Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 641 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 990 (1993); Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873
F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 970 (1989).
II.
Petitioner next argues that the Texas special issues prevented
the jury from giving full effect to mitigating evidence, in
violation of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). During the
punishment phase of his trial, James introduced evidence regarding
his alcohol abuse, including intoxication at the time of the
murder, and evidence that he suffered an abusive childhood. James
also presented "good character evidence," consisting of evidence
that he cooperated with police, showed signs of remorse over his
actions, and possessed redeeming character traits.
In Penry, the Supreme Court held that mitigating evidence of
the defendant's mental retardation and abusive childhood was not
given full effect through the conduits of the Texas special issues
statute. Absent a special instruction, Penry's sentencing jury was
unable to express its "reasoned moral response" to his mitigating
evidence. Id. at 328. We later construed Penry to indicate that
special jury instructions must accompany the Texas special issues
only when the "major mitigating thrust of the evidence is beyond
the scope of all the special issues." Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d
7
1009, 1027 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), aff'd 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
The Supreme Court, in affirming Graham, clearly demonstrated
that Penry does not paint with as wide a brush as Petitioner now
asserts:
We do not read Penry as effecting a sea change in
this Court's view of the constitutionality of the former
Texas death penalty statute; it does not broadly suggest
the invalidity of the special issues framework.... Graham
indisputably was able to place all of his evidence before
the jury and both of Graham's two defense lawyers
vigorously urged the jury to answer "no" to the special
issues based on this evidence. Most important, the jury
plainly could have done so consistent with its
instructions.
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 901-02 (1993) (emphasis in
original). Graham was arguing that evidence of his youth and
troubled familial background were not given full effect because of
the Texas capital sentencing practice. Petitioner advances a
similar argument with respect to his evidence of alcoholism,
intoxication, abusive childhood and redeeming traits. Like
Graham's contentions before him, the Texas statute did not stymie
James's efforts to convey the major mitigating thrust of his
evidence.
Petitioner presented testimony that he frequently abused
alcohol, and that he became a "fundamentally different person" when
he was inebriated. James concedes that this type of mitigating
evidence can be given expression via the first special issue, which
asks the jury to evaluate the deliberateness of the defendant's
actions. The second special issue, regarding future dangerousness,
is also animated by evidence of his alcohol problems -- but only in
an aggravating fashion, Petitioner contends. James posits that
8
evidence of his alcohol abuse is a "two-edged sword;" while the
jury could find that his moral culpability was diminished on
account of his intoxication, the jury could as easily have
concluded that James presented a continuing threat because of his
propensity to overindulge. Consequently it is urged that the major
mitigating thrust of this evidence is beyond the scope of the Texas
special issues, and an additional instruction should have been
given. James's arguments regarding evidence of his troubled
upbringing are of a similar tenor.
We have visited these arguments before, and precedent
undercuts Petitioner's position. In Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d
167, 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 959 (1992), we held
that "[E]vidence of voluntary intoxication can be given full effect
by the jury in deciding whether the defendant acted deliberately."
Accord Kelly v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 1126, 1133 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989). Furthermore, James presented expert
testimony that treatment plans are available for those who wish to
stop abusing alcohol.6 The sentencing jury could have reasonably
6
Petitioner correctly points out that alcoholism has independent
mitigating weight apart from intoxication at the time of a crime.
However, James argument that he is an "alcoholic" is unfounded.
There is testimony to the effect that James engaged in frequent
bouts of heavy drinking; however, no expert diagnosis was presented
that James in fact suffered from the disease of alcoholism. See
Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 990 (1993), where the Court discounted
petitioner's attempts to characterize his propensity to overindulge
as alcoholism:
Nor are we convinced by Barnard's efforts to characterize
the record as raising an issue of an addictive disorder.
The scattered testimony recounting Barnard's evidently
frequent episodes of heavy alcohol consumption, alcohol
9
taken this into consideration when evaluating whether or not James
would continue to be a threat to civilized society.
Likewise, no special instruction is necessary to effectuate
evidence presented on Petitioner's impoverished and abusive family
history. James presented evidence that he and his siblings were
abused by their alcoholic father, and occasionally deprived of
food. Later, after the death of his mother, James went to live
with his father, who apparently was less than a desirable role
model for his teenage son. Such evidence can be given effect by
the Texas statutory sentencing scheme even without resorting to
additional instructions. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 902
(1993); Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 990 (1993).
Finally, the evidence that James possessed some redeeming
character traits is also adequately addressed by the use of the
Texas sentencing scheme. There was testimony that Petitioner
showed signs of remorse for his actions, that he cooperated with
the police investigation, and that he had developed positive
familial ties despite his own troubled upbringing. We are
unpersuaded that the major mitigating thrust of this evidence went
beyond the special issues. Such positive character evidence is
directly related to whether or not James would continue to present
a threat to society, and an additional instruction to that effect
is not required. See Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 902; Barnard, 958 F.2d
intoxication and marijuana use does not demonstrate that
the episodes were attributable to a permanent handicap.
10
at 638-39; Wilkerson v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1061-62 (5th Cir.
1992).
III.
Petitioner next argues that the district court erred in
affording the statutory presumption of correctness to the findings
of fact by the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977). It is
argued that the findings resulted from an ex parte collaboration
between the state trial court and the state prosecutor.
Accordingly, James continues, these findings were developed in
contravention of basic principals of due process.
Section 2254(d) requires that a federal district court accept
as correct the findings of a state court which are "evidenced by a
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate
written indicia" and issued "after a hearing on the merits of a
factual issue." Id. A full-blown trial type hearing is not
necessary to satisfy § 2254. In May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 310
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1925 (1992), we held that
findings entered after a "paper hearing" in the state court were
entitled to § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness.7 This
presumption is further strengthened if the same judge that issues
7
See also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981), where the
Court commented on the application of § 2254(d):
Nor does it specify any procedural requirements that must
be satisfied for there to be a 'hearing on the merits of
a factual issue,' other than that the habeas applicant
and the State or its agent be parties to the state
proceeding and the state-court determination be evidenced
by a 'written finding, written opinion, or other reliable
and adequate written indicia.'
11
the written findings also presided at Petitioner's trial. Id. at
314; Buxton v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1032 (1990). Such was the case here, where the
state judge before whom James's trial was conducted also heard his
application for habeas relief.
While Petitioner argues at length that the fact finding
process was inherently biased because of the state's participation,
he does not seriously contest the correctness of the majority of
the findings. James points out that the district court adopted the
state court's finding that he was not a "chronic alcoholic," and
argues that this determination was the product of the inadequate
fact-finding process of the state court. We disagree. There was
never any medical testimony that James in fact was an alcoholic,
chronic or otherwise. Petitioner presented testimony from Dr. Fred
Lanier Fason, a psychiatrist with experience in treating
alcoholism. Fason testified on the impact that alcohol consumption
has on a person's ability to reason and deliberate. See R. vol.
28, at 5961-67. Fason never conducted an individual examination of
James, and never testified that James was an alcoholic. We agree
with the reasoning of the Court in Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 990 (1993), that
"scattered testimony recounting [Petitioner's] evidently frequent
episodes of heavy alcohol consumption [and] alcohol intoxication
... does not demonstrate that the episodes were attributable to a
12
permanent handicap." Id. at 639.8
During his state court habeas proceedings, James submitted a
lengthy, detailed application for relief. The state court twice
extended its own deadline for rendering a decision. We agree with
the observation of the district court that "it can be assumed that
the judge reviewed the submissions of both parties, reviewed the
record of the underlying trial, and reflected upon his own
impressions and firsthand knowledge of the events that took place
at trial." R. vol. 1, at 564-65 (unpublished opinion of district
court).
In the federal district court, James moved the district court
to reject the state court's findings. The district court noted
that this motion was "exhaustive," and fully supported by
memorandum and "supplemented by numerous affidavits from
accomplished law professors." The district court carefully
evaluated James's motion before reaching the merits of his habeas
claims, and concluded that there was no evidence of prosecutorial
8
Petitioner also cites as error the district court's verbatim
adoption of five state court findings of fact. These factual
conclusions all dealt with jury selection. This is clearly an area
where the state court judge, before whom the actual trial was
conducted, "was in a different and better position to make
determinations regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding
that trial than other courts on direct or collateral review."
Buxton v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
497 U.S. 1032 (1990). Again, while James contests the procedures
used to develop the state court's findings of fact, he does not
argue that they are, in the aggregate, incorrect. We are
unpersuaded that § 2254(d)'s presumption is inapplicable. Cf.
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (§ 2254(d) accords a
"high measure of deference" to state court's findings of fact, and
they "may be set aside only if they lack even fair support in the
record." (internal citations omitted)).
13
misconduct.
Petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to participate in
the development of the fact findings, and we cannot say that any of
the statutory exceptions to § 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness
are applicable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(8). The district
court properly deferred to the findings of the state court. See
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.
539, 546-47 (1981); May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1925 (1992); Buxton v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d
140, 146 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032 (1990).9
IV.
In his final point of error, James argues that he was
unconstitutionally compelled to surrender his right to assistance
from a mental health expert. As a result of being forced to forego
the development of this type of evidence, Petitioner claims he was
also deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner cites Tex. Crim. Code Proc. Ann. art. 46.03 § 3
(West 1988), for the proposition that had he requested that the
court appoint a psychiatrist to assist him in the punishment phase
of his trial, any report prepared by the examining psychiatrist
would have been discoverable by the state. James argues that such
a result violated his constitutional rights in two ways: (1)
9
Additionally, with the possible exception of his Penry claim
regarding "chronic alcoholism," Petitioner's habeas claims are all
without legal support, and do not depend on the facts as developed
by the state court. With respect to James' contention that he was
a chronic alcoholic, our review of the record reveals that he
offered no testimony which would support this fact.
14
Compelling a defendant to choose between constitutional rights is
itself unlawful;10 and, (2) by requiring that the results of his
mental examination be turned over to the State, the Texas Criminal
Code inhibited James's counsel from fully evaluating all relevant
evidence.
We need not reach the ineffective assistance of counsel issue
because James's initial reliance on Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
46.03 § 3 is misplaced. This provision addresses situations where
a defendant has raised an insanity defense at the guilt-innocence
phase of the trial, and does not speak to appointment of expert
assistance for the punishment phase of the proceedings.11 We will
not engage in speculation about what may have transpired if such a
request had been made. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the
district court on this issue.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order denying
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED, and James's
request that we stay his sentence of execution is DENIED.
10
The competing rights James alleges he was forced to chose
between were 5th Amendment protections against self-incrimination,
and the right to have court-appointed psychiatric assistance for an
indigent defendant, per Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
11
Likewise, Petitioner's citation of Granviel v. Lynaugh, 881 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963 (1990), is also
misplaced. Granviel involved the defendant's raising his sanity as
an issue at the guilt-innocence stage of trial. Id. at 190-91.
15