Spruill v. Watson , 157 F. App'x 741 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 13, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-51284
BRIAN SCOTT SPRUILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RONNIE WATSON; JOHN DOE 1-5,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Before GARWOOD, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Brian Scott Spruill appeals from the district court's grant
of summary judgment, on the basis of qualified immunity, for
Ronnie Watson, an officer of the Texas Department of Public
Safety. Spruill had sued Watson asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 for false arrest and deprivation of liberty without due
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
process of law in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.1 After a de novo review of the record, we affirm.
Spruill’s complaint revolves around a federal arrest warrant
obtained by Watson.2 Watson had participated3 in a state arrest
of Spruill for carrying a handgun in violation of section 46.024
of the Texas Penal Code. Watson then filed a federal criminal
complaint alleging that Spruill’s possession of a handgun while
subject to a restraining order constituted a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8).5 After obtaining the federal warrant, Watson
1
Spruill also brought state law claims of gross negligence
and false imprisonment, which the district court dismissed based
on official immunity under Texas law. Because Spruill's appeal
only claims error in the district court's finding of qualified
immunity, we do not address the state law claims or the finding
of official immunity.
2
On appeal, Spruill provides the following description of
his original complaint: “The gravaman [sic] of Appellant’s case
against Watson was that Spruill was falsely charged with a
weapons offense. Said [charge] resulted in a criminal conviction
that was ultimately overturned by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.”
3
Watson, in an undercover role, attended an orchestrated
handgun swap between Spruill and a government informant. Watson
observed the swap and signaled to other state law enforcement
officers who then arrested Spruill.
4
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.02(a) (Vernon 1994) ("A
person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly carries on or about his person a handgun ...."); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 46.02(e) (Vernon 1994) (offense is class A
misdemeanor).
5
Section 922(g)(8) provides:
“(g) It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (8) who is
subject to a court order that--
2
served it on Spruill while he was in state custody pursuant to
the state arrest. Spruill ultimately pleaded guilty to violating
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person
received actual notice, and at which such person had an
opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or
threatening an intimate partner of such person or child
of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in
other conduct that would place an intimate partner in
reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or
child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate
partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against such intimate partner or child that would
reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury ...
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition;
or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”
18 U.S.C.A. § 922.
Watson’s federal criminal complaint provided:
“I, the undersigned complainant being duly sworn state the
following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge
and belief. On or about July 20, 1998, in Midland County,
in the Western District of Texas, defendant(s) did, possess
a firearm in and affecting interstate commerce, . . . even
though Defendant was a person subject to a court order
issued after a hearing of which he had notice and
opportunity to participate, and which (1) restrains him from
harassing, stalking and threatening an intimate partner and
a child of such intimate partner, and (2) by its terms
explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, and threatened
use of physical force against such intimate partner and
child, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section(s) 922(g)(8).”
3
section 922(g)(8) and was convicted. On appeal, this court found
that the restraining order in question had not been issued “after
a hearing of which Spruill received actual notice and accordingly
was not within the scope of section 922(g)(8).” United States v.
Spruill, 292 F.3d 207, 221 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations
omitted). Based on this finding, Spruill’s conviction was
vacated. On remand, the district court entered a judgment of
acquittal. Following the acquittal, Spruill brought this suit
against Watson.
The first step in the analysis of a qualified immunity claim
is to “consider whether the facts alleged, taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Price v.
Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Saucier v. Katz,
121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001)). To make out a constitutional
violation based on false arrest, Spruill must show that Watson
did not act with probable cause. Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185,
189 (5th Cir. 2001). Spruill failed to allege facts showing that
Watson acted without probable cause. It is uncontested that
Watson knew that Spruill had been in possession of a firearm
while Spruill was subject to a valid restraining order. The
restraining order itself recited facts indicating that it was
within the scope of section 922(g)(8), e.g., that the applicant
and Spruill each “appeared in person and announced ready,” and
4
that the court entered the order after “having . . . heard the
evidence and argument of counsel.” See Spruill, 292 F.3d at 209
n.1. While at Spruill’s subsequent trial it developed that these
recitals were incorrect, that does not mean that the recitals did
not give rise to probable cause to issue the earlier criminal
complaint. Spruill does not allege, nor has he offered any
evidence, that Watson knew that the restraining order in question
did not meet all of the requirements of section 922(g)(8). At
best, Spruill alleges, but fails to present any evidence, that
Watson was negligent in not discovering this flaw in the
underlying restraining order. Even if this allegation were
established, it does not rise to a constitutional violation.
Franks v. Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978) (“Allegations of
negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.”) Because
Spruill’s allegations and summary judgment evidence do not
suffice to establish the violation of a constitutional right,
Watson is entitled to qualified immunity.
The second step of the qualified-immunity analysis is to ask
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier,
121 S. Ct. at 2156. In this case, the only arguably questionable
conduct by Watson is his filing of a sworn criminal complaint
stating that Spruill was “subject to a court order issued after a
hearing of which he had notice and opportunity to participate.”
5
Although this court ultimately determined that the restraining
order had not been issued after a hearing that met the
requirements of section 922(g)(8), such a legal determination
would not then have been clear to all reasonable officers in the
situation confronting Watson.6 Therefore, even if Spruill had
made out a constitutional violation on Watson’s part, Watson is
entitled to qualified immunity.
For the foregoing reasons, Watson is entitled to qualified
immunity, and the district court’s summary judgment order
dismissing Spruill’s claims is
AFFIRMED.
6
Not only was it not clear to Watson, it was not clear
either to Spruill or to the district court hearing the criminal
cases against Spruill. Indeed, Spruill, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded guilty to violating section 922(g)(8) and the
district court accepted Spruill’s guilty plea even after noting
that a hearing had not been conducted in this case. United
States v. Spruill, 61 F. Supp. 2d 587, 588 (W.D.Tex. 1999)
(“Although . . . the Defendant never appeared before a judge, nor
was a hearing (at least as this Court would define one)
apparently ever held[,] . . . the Defendant did have the
opportunity to participate in a hearing, thus satisfying any
procedural due process concerns.”)
6