United States v. Garcia-Flores , 207 F. App'x 397 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                             United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                   November 28, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-20351
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RAFAEL GARCIA-FLORES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:04-CR-350-ALL
    --------------------
    Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Rafael Garcia-Flores (Garcia) pleaded guilty to count 5 of a
    superseding indictment, charging him with illegal re-entry after
    deportation, and was found guilty after a bench trial of counts 1,
    3,   and   4,   of   the   superseding   indictment   charging   him    with
    unlawfully transporting aliens for the purpose of financial gain
    resulting in the death of an alien and aiding and abetting, of
    being a felon in possession of a firearm, and of being an alien in
    possession of a firearm. Garcia was sentenced within the guideline
    imprisonment range to a 150-month term of imprisonment as to count
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 05-20351
    -2-
    1 and to concurrent 120-month terms of imprisonment as to counts 3,
    4, and 5 and was ordered to serve concurrent three-year periods of
    supervised release.
    At the bench trial, the Government introduced evidence showing
    that Garcia was transporting three illegal aliens from a house in
    Houston to a grocery-store parking lot.         One of the aliens was Jimy
    Lopez-Mejia Garcia.         His brother, Jose Santos Lopez-Mejia, was
    going to meet Garcia in the grocery-store parking lot and pay for
    Jimy’s release.    During the transaction, Jose and Garcia got into
    a knife fight.    Garcia drove away, with Jose Lopez hanging on the
    side of Garcia’s truck.       Garcia pulled a 9mm pistol and the other
    men in the truck struggled with Garcia.             The pistol discharged
    once.   The truck struck a telephone pole and two other vehicles.
    Jose Lopez was thrown to the pavement and was killed.
    In general, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A) makes it a crime to
    transport    illegal    aliens.          §     1324(a)(1)(A).      Section
    1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) and (iv) establishes increased maximum penalties
    if, during the commission of a violation of subsection (a)(1)(A),
    the defendant causes any person to suffer serious bodily injury or
    death   or   placed    in     jeopardy   the    life   of   “any   person.”
    § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) & (iv); United States v. Williams, 
    449 F.3d 635
    , 644–45 (5th Cir. 2006).      Garcia contends for the first time on
    appeal and without citation that the term “any person” refers only
    to undocumented aliens alleged to have been transported.               Our
    review is for plain error.       See United States v. Alfaro-Hernandez,
    No. 05-20351
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    453 F.3d 280
    , 281 (5th Cir. 2006).       Garcia has not identified and
    we have not found any case in which a court has interpreted the
    statute in the manner in which Garcia contends it should be
    interpreted.     Accordingly, the district court could not have
    committed a clear or obvious error in giving the term “any person”
    its ordinary and natural meaning.       See United States v. Hall, 
    110 F.3d 1155
    , 1161 (5th Cir. 1997).
    Garcia    contends   also   that   the   district    court   erred   by
    overruling his objection to an eight-level increase in his offense
    level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6) because of Lopez’s death.
    Garcia contends that the enhancement does not apply because Lopez
    was not one of the smuggled aliens.      Our review is for plain error.
    See United States v. Villegas, 
    404 F.3d 355
    , 358 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Under § 2L1.1(b)(6)(4), a defendant’s offense level is increased by
    eight levels “if any person died.”            United States v. Garcia-
    Guerrero, 
    313 F.3d 892
    , 898 (5th Cir. 2002).                In overruling
    Garcia’s objection, the district court found that Garcia’s relevant
    conduct proximately caused Jose’s death.            The district court
    explained, “Smuggling aliens illegally with a loaded firearm could
    reasonably lead the smuggler to foresee the result in this case;
    that is, death and serious bodily injury to third parties who
    negotiate for the release of the illegally smuggled aliens.”              The
    district court’s finding and its enhancement of the offense level
    under § 2L1.1(b)(6) was not plainly erroneous.           See Villegas, 
    404 F.3d at 358
    .
    No. 05-20351
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    Prior to the bench trial, the parties reached an agreement
    that Garcia would plead guilty to transporting an illegal alien for
    financial gain, a violation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii)
    (count 1), and § 1326 (count 5), but would proceed to a bench trial
    as to the sentencing enhancements of count 1 related to bodily
    injury and death ((B)(iii) & (iv)) and as to the firearms counts
    (counts 3 and 4), in exchange for which the Government would agree
    to dismissal of count 2 (kidnaping).
    Garcia contends that the district court erred in finding him
    guilty of § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) and (iv) because that finding “was
    not supported by the evidence and was contrary to the admonishments
    of the offense elements to which [he] entered his plea of guilty.”
    We review the district court’s acceptance of Garcia’s partial
    guilty plea to count 1 for plain error.         See United States v. Vonn,
    
    535 U.S. 55
    , 59 (2002).         We review the sufficiency of the evidence
    as to the bodily-injury-and-death enhancements in the light most
    favorable to the Government to determine “whether the finding of
    guilt   is    supported    by    substantial    evidence,   i.e.,   evidence
    sufficient to justify the trial judge, as the trier of fact, in
    concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.”
    United States v. Turner, 
    319 F.3d 716
    , 720–21 (5th Cir. 2003)
    (quotation marks omitted).
    Garcia     admitted    at    the   rearraignment   that   he   violated
    § 1324(a)(1)(A) by transporting illegal aliens for financial gain.
    Under § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) and (iv), the maximum penalty for such
    No. 05-20351
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    violation is increased (to 20 years and death or life imprisonment,
    respectively) if, “during and in relation to” the violation, the
    defendant “causes serious bodily injury . . . to, or places in
    jeopardy the life of, any person” or if such violation results “in
    the death of any person.”        § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii) & (iv); see
    Williams, 
    449 F.3d at
    644–45.    The evidence, viewed in the light
    most favorable to the Government, showed that, while Garcia was
    transporting illegal aliens in violation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii),
    Jose Lopez became involved in an argument with Garcia regarding one
    of the aliens and that Lopez was killed when he was thrown to the
    pavement as Garcia attempted to leave the scene in his vehicle.
    The district court’s finding of guilt is supported by substantial
    evidence.    See Turner, 
    319 F.3d at
    720–21.     Garcia’s substantial
    rights were not affected by any error in accepting Garcia’s partial
    guilty plea as to count 1.     See United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734–35 (1993).
    Garcia also contends that his guilty plea was involuntary
    because the district court failed to comply with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
    We review this issue for plain error.       See Vonn, 
    535 U.S. at 59
    .
    As to count 1, Garcia contends specifically that the district court
    erred in admonishing him about the maximum punishment. The maximum
    term of imprisonment for transporting illegal aliens for financial
    gain or for engaging in a conspiracy to transport illegal aliens is
    ten years.    See § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) & (v)(I) and (B)(i).     If the
    defendant merely transports illegal aliens or aids and abets the
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    offense of transporting illegal aliens, the maximum penalty is five
    years.     See § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) & (v)(II) and (B)(ii).             The
    district court admonished Garcia that he faced a maximum sentence
    of 10 years for count 1.     Garcia argues that the maximum sentence
    was five years because the evidence introduced at the bench trial
    showed that he was guilty of aiding and abetting only and so should
    have been convicted and sentenced pursuant to § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii).
    Garcia admitted at the rearraignment that he had transported
    illegal aliens for financial gain. Therefore, the maximum sentence
    to which he was exposed as a consequence of his guilty plea was 10
    years, under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(i).        There was no error,
    plain or otherwise.
    The district court admonished Garcia that he faced a maximum
    sentence   of   20   years   for   count   5   (illegal   reentry   after
    deportation). Under § 1326(b)(2), an alien who reenters the United
    States following deportation, in violation of § 1326(a), who was
    convicted of an aggravated felony prior to deportation, faces a
    maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years.         Garcia admitted that,
    prior to deportation, he was convicted of an aggravated felony,
    that is, a drug trafficking offense.           Garcia contends that the
    prior felony involved marijuana possession for which he served a
    six-month sentence and that the district court erred in admonishing
    him that he faced a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years.
    Because he received only a six-month sentence for the marijuana-
    possession conviction, Garcia argues, he was not subject to the 16-
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    level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(1)(A)(I) and the district
    court’s     admonition   to     the    contrary      and   failure    to    define
    “aggravated felony” made his guilty plea involuntary.                       Garcia
    contends also that the error led to an incorrect application of the
    Guidelines.    These arguments are without merit.
    Under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235
    (1998), the Court upheld the treatment of prior convictions as
    sentencing factors.      Despite repeated attack, this court has held
    that Almendarez-Torres remains binding, despite the holding in
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000).                  Accordingly, any
    failure on the part of the district court to admonish Garcia
    adequately regarding the impact of § 1326(b)(2) on his sentencing
    range could not have affected the voluntariness of Garcia’s guilty
    plea to a violation of § 1326(a) and was not plainly erroneous.
    Garcia    admitted,      in    response    to   questioning     by    his   own
    attorney,    that   he   was       deported    following    conviction     for    an
    aggravated felony.       Instead of a 16-level increase in offense
    level, Garcia received a 12-level increase in offense level because
    of the prior felony.           That increase impacted group II of the
    guideline calculation (count 5) but did not impact group I (counts
    1, 3, and 4).       Garcia did not object to the 12-level increase.
    Accordingly, our review is for plain error.                See United States v.
    Vargas-Garcia, 
    434 F.3d 345
    , 347 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 1894
     (2006).        Because the offense level for group I was
    higher, Garcia was sentenced pursuant to group I and the 12-level
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    enhancement had no effect on the total offense level and Garcia’s
    substantial rights were not affected.
    Garcia contends that the district court erred in overruling
    his objection to the lack of an adjustment in offense level for
    acceptance of responsibility.    The reduction for acceptance of
    responsibility “‘is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts
    the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the
    essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then
    admits guilt and expresses remorse.’”     United States v. Sanchez-
    Ruedas, 
    452 F.3d 409
    , 414–15 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S.S.G.
    § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2)), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 315
     (2006).   The
    judgment is
    AFFIRMED.