Riley v. F A Richard & Assoc ( 2002 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 01-60337
    ________________
    JOE ELLIS RILEY
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    F A RICHARD & ASSOCIATES INC; INGALLS SHIPBUILDING;
    AND ALEXIS HYLAND, An Individual
    Defendants - Appellees
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    _________________________________________________________________
    August 1, 2002
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff–Appellant Joe Ellis Riley asserted various state
    law claims against Defendants–Appellees in Mississippi state
    court.   Defendants–Appellees removed the case to federal district
    court.   Riley filed a motion to remand the case, and
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
    47.5.4.
    Defendants–Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Riley’s claims.
    The district court granted Defendants–Appellees’ motion and
    dismissed all of Riley’s claims with prejudice.    The court denied
    Riley’s motion to remand as moot.     Riley appeals the dismissal of
    his claims.   Because we find no basis for federal removal
    jurisdiction, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Riley’s
    claims and REMAND the case to the district court with
    instructions to remand the case to state court.
    I.   Factual and Procedural History
    In October 1997, Plaintiff–Appellant Joe Ellis Riley
    sustained injuries to his left foot and ankle in an industrial
    accident while employed by Defendant–Appellee Ingalls
    Shipbuilding, Inc. (“Ingalls”).    Pursuant to the Longshore and
    Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901, et
    seq. (1994), Ingalls, as Riley’s employer, and Defendant–Appellee
    F.A. Richard & Associates, Inc. (“F.A. Richard”), as Ingalls’s
    self-insured administrator, provided some compensation and
    medical coverage for the injuries to Riley’s foot and ankle.    Dr.
    Chris E. Wiggins, a physician with the Mississippi Coast
    Orthopaedic Group, P.A. (the “Orthopaedic Group”), treated Riley
    for his injuries.    During the course of Riley’s treatment, Dr.
    Wiggins diagnosed Riley with congenital spondylolisthesis at the
    L-4 vertebrae of the lumbar spine.    In April 1999, Dr. Wiggins
    concluded that Riley’s increasing back pain was reasonably
    2
    related to the October 1997 industrial accident, rather than the
    congenital spondylolisthesis.
    Riley asserts that in June 1999, Alexis Hyland, an employee
    and agent of F.A. Richard, posed as Riley’s medical case manager,
    and that Hyland, while purporting to assist Riley in obtaining
    appropriate medical care, engaged in ex parte communications with
    Dr. Wiggins.     According to Riley, these communications caused Dr.
    Wiggins to reverse his opinion regarding the nature and causation
    of Riley’s back condition.    After contact with Hyland, Dr.
    Wiggins concluded that a natural progression of Riley’s
    congenital spondylolisthesis caused Riley’s back pain rather than
    the accident.1
    In June 2000, Riley filed suit in Mississippi state court
    against Ingalls, F.A. Richard, and Alexis Hyland in her capacity
    as an agent for F.A. Richard.    Riley alleged that Ingalls and
    F.A. Richard established a close working relationship with the
    Orthopaedic Group, where numerous injured Ingalls employees are
    sent for treatment.    According to Riley, this close relationship
    allows Ingalls and F.A. Richard to exert inappropriate influence
    over the Orthopaedic Group’s physicians so as to interfere with
    the medical treatment of injured Ingalls employees.
    1
    Riley asserts that Dr. Wiggins has since “re-reversed”
    his opinion regarding the causation of Riley’s back pain.
    However, as Riley correctly notes, evidence of this re-reversal
    is not part of the record in this action, and we need not
    consider it.
    3
    Specifically, Riley asserts the following nine state law claims:
    (1) intentional interference with contract, (2) breach of
    fiduciary duty, (3) intentional interference with prospective
    advantage, (4) medical malpractice (against Hyland, a registered
    nurse), (5) fraud and misrepresentation, (6) negligence,
    (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (8) intentional
    interference with medical care and/or breach of confidentiality
    of doctor/patient privilege, and (9) intentional interference
    with medical care by ex parte communication.   Riley’s complaint
    claims $82,673.18 in special damages in compensation for his
    claim for permanent disability under the LHWCA, $500,000 in total
    actual damages, and $25,000,000 in punitive damages.2
    In July 2000, Ingalls, F.A. Richard, and Hyland
    (collectively, the “Defendants”) removed the case to federal
    district court on the ground that Ingalls, the only non-diverse
    defendant, was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity
    jurisdiction.   Riley filed a motion to remand in August 2000.   In
    September 2000, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
    asserting that: (1) because the LHWCA provides the exclusive
    remedy for Riley’s claims, the Defendants are immune from suit in
    tort and Riley’s state law claims are preempted by the LHWCA; (2)
    Riley failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by
    2
    Riley has since indicated, both to this court and to the
    district court, that his claim for special damages has
    “evaporated” and that he is no longer pursuing those damages.
    4
    the LHWCA as required; and (3) the Defendants did not violate the
    patient/physician privilege because this case is governed by
    federal law, and federal common law does not recognize such a
    privilege.
    At a hearing before the district court on Riley’s motion to
    remand on March 21, 2001, the parties presented their arguments
    relating to the propriety of removal.      The district court
    ultimately concluded that “this suit shall be dismissed for lack
    of subject matter jurisdiction.”       The court appears to have based
    this conclusion on its belief that the LHWCA provides the
    exclusive remedy for Riley.   The district court then denied
    Riley’s motion to remand as moot.      Riley timely appealed the
    district court’s final judgment dismissing the case with
    prejudice.
    II.   Analysis
    A.   The District Court’s Ruling
    Riley’s primary argument on appeal is that the district
    court erred by failing to remand the case to state court.       We
    review de novo the district court’s denial of Riley’s motion to
    remand.   See Rodriguez v. Sabatino, 
    120 F.3d 589
    , 591 (5th Cir.
    1997).3
    3
    Generally, a district court’s denial of a motion to
    remand is not appealable because it is not a final order. Aaron
    v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 
    876 F.2d 1157
    , 1160 (5th
    Cir. 1989). However, when the denial of the motion to remand is
    coupled with a final order, we have jurisdiction to review the
    denial of remand. 
    Id. In this
    case, the district court
    5
    When faced with a motion to remand, a federal court must
    first determine whether it may properly exercise removal
    jurisdiction before ruling on a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
    complaint.     14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
    AND   PROCEDURE § 3739, at 419-23 (1998).     Defendants have a limited
    right, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994), to remove cases
    from state court to federal court as follows:
    Any civil action of which the district courts
    have original jurisdiction founded on a claim
    or right arising under the Constitution,
    treaties or laws of the United States shall
    be removable without regard to the
    citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
    other such action shall be removable only if
    none of the parties in interest properly
    joined and served as defendants is a citizen
    of the State in which such action is brought.
    Thus, removal jurisdiction can be premised on either the
    existence of a federal question or diversity of the parties.             The
    removing party bears the burden of establishing removal
    jurisdiction.     Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 
    951 F.2d 40
    , 42
    (5th Cir. 1992).      In this case, the Defendants’ notice of removal
    asserts diversity jurisdiction (based on the fraudulent joinder
    of Ingalls) and does not mention the existence of a federal
    question.     Riley argues that, even though the issue of federal
    question jurisdiction was never before the district court, the
    simultaneously denied Riley’s motion to remand and granted the
    Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because the dismissal constitutes
    a final order, we have jurisdiction to review the district
    court’s denial of remand. See 
    id. 6 court
    improperly considered federal question jurisdiction at the
    March 2001 hearing.
    Although the district court denied Riley’s motion to remand
    as moot, a review of the transcript of the March 2001 hearing
    suggests that the court may have concluded that it had removal
    jurisdiction before dismissing the case.4   However, the
    transcript does not reveal whether the district court based its
    exercise of removal jurisdiction on the presence of a federal
    question or on diversity of the properly joined parties.    We need
    not determine the basis of the district court’s ruling because we
    conclude that the district court lacked both federal question
    jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction over this case.    Thus,
    the district court erred in denying Riley’s motion to remand the
    case to state court.
    B.   Lack of Federal Question Jurisdiction
    A defendant may remove a case to federal court based on the
    presence of a federal question when a plaintiff asserts “a claim
    or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
    United States.”   28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).   Generally, we resolve
    issues of federal question jurisdiction by applying the “well-
    pleaded complaint rule.”   Hart v. Bayer Corp., 
    199 F.3d 239
    , 243
    4
    Even if the district court did not properly consider
    Riley’s motion to remand, for the purpose of this appeal, we give
    the district court the benefit of the doubt and assume that the
    court found a basis for removal jurisdiction before dismissing
    Riley’s claims.
    7
    (5th Cir. 2000).   According to the well-pleaded complaint rule,
    if a plaintiff’s complaint raises no issue of federal law,
    federal question jurisdiction is lacking, and removal is
    improper.   
    Id. at 244.
      Thus, ordinarily, “[t]he fact that a
    federal defense may be raised to the plaintiff’s action – even if
    both sides concede that the only real question at issue is
    created by a federal defense – will not suffice to create federal
    question jurisdiction.”     Aaron v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of
    Pittsburgh, 
    876 F.2d 1157
    , 1161 (5th Cir. 1989).    However, there
    are exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule.    For example,
    in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 
    390 U.S. 557
    (1968), the
    Supreme Court held that, even if the plaintiff’s complaint
    asserts only state law claims, removal jurisdiction is proper if
    federal law “so completely preempt[s] a field of state law that
    the plaintiff’s complaint must be recharacterized as stating a
    federal cause of action.”     
    Aaron, 876 F.2d at 1161
    (discussing
    the Avco exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule).       Thus, a
    defense based on federal law creates federal question
    jurisdiction where the plaintiff’s state law claims are
    completely preempted by federal law.     See 
    id. In this
    case, the district court may have asserted removal
    jurisdiction based on the Defendants’ federal law defense that
    the LHWCA provides the exclusive remedy for Riley.    Riley
    correctly argues that the exercise of removal jurisdiction on
    8
    this basis is improper.   Section 905(a) of the LHWCA provides, in
    part, that:
    The liability of an employer prescribed in
    section 904 of [the LHWCA] shall be exclusive
    and in place of all other liability of such
    employer to the employee . . . at law or in
    admiralty on account of such injury or death
    . . . .
    33 U.S.C. § 905(a).    In Aaron, this court considered whether
    federal question jurisdiction may arise where a defendant asserts
    that § 905(a) of the LHWCA bars a plaintiff’s state law 
    claims. 876 F.2d at 1164-66
    .   After thorough analysis of Supreme Court
    precedent, this court concluded in Aaron that, because the LHWCA
    does not completely preempt state law claims, “[t]he LHWCA is, in
    this case, nothing more than a statutory defense to a state-court
    cause of action – the classic circumstance of non-removability.”
    
    Id. at 1166.
      Thus, according to the clear rule of Aaron, the
    Defendants’ LHWCA defense to Riley’s state law claims is
    insufficient to create federal question jurisdiction.     Id.; see
    also Garcia v. Amfels, Inc., 
    254 F.3d 585
    , 588 (5th Cir. 2001)
    (stating that “there is no question that the LHWCA does not
    create federal subject matter jurisdiction supporting removal”).
    Accordingly, the district court’s exercise of removal
    jurisdiction over this case was improper to the extent the court
    based its jurisdiction on the presence of a federal question.
    9
    C.   Lack of Diversity Jurisdiction
    A defendant may remove a case to federal court based on the
    diversity of the parties “only if none of the parties in interest
    properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
    State in which such action is brought.”    28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
    For the purposes of this jurisdictional inquiry, the citizenship
    of a fraudulently joined defendant must be disregarded.    Badon v.
    R.J.R. Nabisco Inc., 
    224 F.3d 382
    , 389 (5th Cir. 2000).    Thus, a
    plaintiff cannot keep the case in state court by fraudulently
    joining an in-state defendant.
    We assume, as the parties implicitly assume, that Hyland and
    F.A. Richard are not residents or citizens of Mississippi.5
    Ingalls, as a corporate resident of Mississippi, is the only in-
    state defendant, and Ingalls’s presence in this case destroys the
    diversity of the Defendants.   The Defendants argue that Riley
    fraudulently joined Ingalls and, thus, that the citizenship of
    Ingalls should be disregarded for jurisdictional purposes.    The
    Defendants maintain that the district court did not err in
    exercising diversity jurisdiction over this case.    Riley counters
    that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over this
    case because Ingalls is not fraudulently joined.
    5
    Hyland is a citizen and resident of Alabama. The
    Defendants assert that F.A. Richard is a corporate resident of
    Louisiana. Although Riley argued before the district court that
    F.A. Richard was a non-diverse party because of its “very
    substantial business activity in Mississippi,” Riley does not
    raise this argument on appeal, and it is, therefore, abandoned.
    10
    “The burden of persuasion placed upon those who cry
    ‘fraudulent joinder’ is indeed a heavy one.”    
    Hart, 199 F.3d at 246
    (internal citations and quotations omitted).   To establish
    fraudulent joinder of a non-diverse defendant, the removing party
    must show that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would
    be able to establish a claim against the non-diverse defendant in
    state court.   In re Rodriguez, 
    79 F.3d 467
    , 469 (5th Cir. 1996).6
    In making this determination, a court must resolve all disputed
    questions of fact and all ambiguities in the law in favor of the
    non-removing party.   
    Id. “In essence,
    the district court, or
    this court on review, should conclude there is no federal
    jurisdiction and remand the case to the state court if either
    federal court cannot predict with absolute certainty that [the
    state] court would summarily dismiss the causes of action
    asserted against [the] defendant . . . .”    
    Id. (second alteration
    in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted).    In
    order to avoid “pretrying a case to determine removal
    jurisdiction,” fraudulent joinder claims are generally resolved
    by “piercing the pleadings and considering summary judgment-type
    evidence such as affidavits and deposition testimony.”     
    Hart, 199 F.3d at 246
    -47 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
    However, because the record in this case does not include such
    6
    An allegation of fraudulent joinder may also be based
    on outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional
    facts. In re 
    Rodriguez, 79 F.3d at 469
    . The Defendants do not
    assert this ground for fraudulent joinder.
    11
    evidence, we are limited to a review of the allegations in the
    complaint in determining whether any possibility exists for Riley
    to establish a claim against Ingalls in state court.     
    Id. at 247.
    As noted above, § 905(a) of the LHWCA provides that:
    The liability of an employer prescribed in
    section 904 of [the LHWCA] shall be exclusive
    and in place of all other liability of such
    employer to the employee . . . at law or in
    admiralty on account of such injury or death
    . . . .
    33 U.S.C. § 905(a).   Pointing to the language of § 905(a), the
    Defendants argue that, because the LHWCA provides the exclusive
    remedy for Riley’s claims against Ingalls, there is no
    possibility that Riley could establish a claim against Ingalls in
    state court.   In support of their argument, the Defendants rely
    heavily on this court’s decision in Atkinson v. Gates, McDonald &
    Co., 
    838 F.2d 808
    (5th Cir. 1988).   In Atkinson, this court
    affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s state law
    claims asserted against her previous employer for that employer’s
    termination of the plaintiff’s LHWCA-based benefits.     
    Id. at 815.
    This court stated that “the LHWCA is plainly preemptive of any
    state law claim for intentional or bad faith wrongful refusal to
    pay benefits due under the [LHWCA], and this is true even in the
    absence of any expressly preemptive language.”   
    Id. at 812.
      Even
    though the plaintiff in that case was no longer employed by the
    defendant, the Atkinson court noted that the plaintiff’s claim
    “necessarily presupposes an obligation to pay LHWCA benefits, and
    12
    hence necessarily arises out of her on-the-job injury.”      
    Id. at 811.
    The plaintiff in Atkinson argued that an LHWCA-exclusivity
    rationale “is defective because it inevitably leads to the
    conclusion that there could be no common-law tort claim against
    an insurance company if, for example, its employee, in the course
    of investigating the plaintiff’s claim for LHWCA compensation
    benefits, were to illegally enter plaintiff’s residence to get
    needed evidence.”     
    Id. at 814.
      This court rejected this argument
    by explaining the scope of the LHWCA’s preemption:
    [T]he obvious difference between the
    example[] posed by [plaintiff] . . ., and the
    case of bad faith refusal to pay compensation
    benefits, is that in the former class of case
    plaintiff’s entitlement to recover in the
    tort action is in no way dependent on [her]
    having been entitled to compensation benefits
    or to the defendant’s having violated the
    compensation statute. By contrast, in order
    to recover for bad faith or malicious failure
    to pay compensation benefits[,] there must
    have been an entitlement to such benefits or
    a violation of the compensation statute in
    the failure to pay them.
    
    Id. In the
    instant case, Riley argues that, because his state
    law claims are not dependent on his entitlement to compensation
    benefits, they fall within the former category described by the
    Atkinson court and are not preempted by the LHWCA.     Riley does
    not allege that the Defendants violated the LHWCA or failed to
    pay LHWCA benefits.    Rather, the essence of Riley’s complaint is
    13
    that the close relationship between the Defendants and the
    Orthopaedic Group, along with the Defendants’ ex parte
    communications with Riley’s physician, improperly interfered with
    Riley’s medical treatment.     According to Riley, the fact that his
    claims are asserted against his employer and his employer’s self-
    insured administrator is a mere coincidence.7    Thus, Riley argues
    that he, like the injured person in the Atkinson plaintiff’s
    hypothetical, has an “entitlement to recover in the tort action”
    that is “in no way dependent on his having been entitled to
    compensation benefits or to the defendant’s having violated the
    compensation statute.”   
    Id. This court
    has never determined whether state law claims
    alleging tortious conduct arguably unconnected with an
    entitlement to LHWCA benefits fall within the scope of LHWCA
    preemption, and we need not do so here.    In the context of the
    fraudulent joinder inquiry, “[w]e do not decide whether the
    plaintiff will actually or even probably prevail on the merits,
    but look only for a possibility that he may do so.”     
    Dodson, 951 F.2d at 42-43
    .   Moreover, we resolve all factual and legal
    ambiguities in favor of the non-removing party.     
    Id. at 42.
    7
    In his brief to this court, Riley states that his claim
    “is not for wages and it is not for compensation benefits; it is
    not for bad faith refusal to pay benefits as in Atkinson; it is
    for damages that are completely independent of the
    employer/employee relationship.”
    14
    As our opinion in Atkinson makes clear, certain claims
    brought by an employee against his or her employer independent
    from the employee’s entitlement to LHWCA benefits and not based
    on an alleged violation of the LHWCA by the employer are not
    preempted by the 
    LHWCA. 838 F.2d at 814
    .8   Riley’s state law
    claims are based on the Defendants’ close relationship with the
    Orthopaedic Group and the Defendants’ alleged interference with
    Riley’s medical treatment.    At least one of those claims, which
    we discuss below, appears to be independent from Riley’s
    entitlement to LHWCA benefits.   Thus, our opinion in Atkinson
    suggests some possibility that at least one of Riley’s claims is
    not preempted by the LHWCA.
    As an example, we consider Riley’s state law claim for
    intentional interference with contract.   In support of this
    claim, Riley’s petition asserts that “he had a contract for
    8
    The First Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Travelers
    Insurance Co., 
    497 F.2d 329
    (1st Cir. 1974), is consistent with
    our reasoning in Atkinson. In Martin, the plaintiff received
    compensation, in the form of three drafts, from the insurer of
    his former employer pursuant to the LHWCA. 
    Id. at 330.
    Two
    weeks after the drafts were deposited and substantially drawn
    upon by the plaintiff, the insurer stopped payment on the drafts.
    
    Id. The plaintiff
    sued the insurer for infliction of mental and
    emotional suffering because of his “financial embarrassment due
    to the fact that he had written checks which had become
    worthless.” 
    Id. at 330,
    331 n.1. The Martin court held that the
    plaintiff was not precluded under the LHWCA from pursuing his
    state law claim because the plaintiff’s complaint was not based
    on the insurer’s failure to pay LHWCA benefits. 
    Id. at 330.
    Rather, the court emphasized that “the crux of the complaint here
    is the insurer’s callous stopping of payment without warning when
    it should have realized that acute harm might follow.” 
    Id. at 331.
    15
    provision of medical care services with [Dr. Wiggins] and that
    the actions of the [Defendants] constituted an intentional
    interference with his contract for receipt of medical attention
    and are therefore actionable.”   Under Mississippi law, “[a]n
    action for tortious interference with contract ordinarily lies
    when a party maliciously interferes with a valid and enforceable
    contract, causing one party not to perform and resulting in
    injury to the other contracting party.”   Hollywood Cemetery Ass’n
    v. Bd. of Mayor and Selectmen of the City of McComb City, 
    760 So. 2d
    715, 719 (Miss. 2000).   To establish this tort, Riley must
    show: (1) that the actions of the Defendants were intentional and
    willful, (2) that the actions were calculated to cause injury to
    Riley, (3) that the actions were without right or justifiable
    cause on the part of the Defendants, and (4) that Riley suffered
    actual injury or loss.   
    Id. Assuming that
    Riley can demonstrate that he had an
    enforceable contract with Dr. Wiggins for medical care, we can
    imagine facts which, if proven, would establish tortious
    interference with a contract in this case.   Riley may be able to
    show that the Defendants intentionally and willfully interfered
    with Riley’s medical treatment in order to cause injury to Riley
    without right or justifiable cause.   Furthermore, such an
    interference raises the possibility of actual damages which are
    independent from Riley’s entitlement to LHWCA benefits.    For
    example, a mis-diagnosis caused by tortious interference could
    16
    lead to inadequate medical care.         Inadequate care may precipitate
    additional injuries, both physical and mental, which are
    unrelated to the original injury suffered on the job.         A mis-
    diagnosis also may potentially cause a patient to suffer more
    pain than is necessary and to expend extra time and resources in
    seeking additional medical care.         Moreover, if Riley can
    establish a claim for tortious interference, he may be entitled
    to punitive damages in addition to the actual damages caused by
    the interference.      In this way, Riley’s claim for tortious
    interference with a contract raises the possibility of damages
    that are independent from his entitlement to LHWCA benefits and
    thus raises the possibility that at least one of Riley’s claims
    is not preempted by the LHWCA.9
    Additionally, we cannot find any provisions of the LHWCA
    which appear to penalize the kind of conduct alleged here.         As
    the Defendants correctly note, § 914 of the LHWCA provides the
    exclusive remedy for bad faith wrongful refusal to pay benefits
    due under the LHWCA.       See 33 U.S.C. § 914; 
    Atkinson, 838 F.2d at 812
    .       However, at least one of Riley’s claims may not be based on
    Ingalls’s refusal to pay LHWCA benefits.         The LHWCA also provides
    a remedy for employees when an employer knowingly and willfully
    makes a false statement or misrepresentation for the purpose of
    9
    We recognize that some of Riley’s other claims may be
    preempted, but we need not consider them. The possibility that
    one claim is not preempted by the LHWCA is enough to establish a
    chance of recovery against Ingalls in state court.
    17
    reducing, denying, or terminating compensation benefits.      See 33
    U.S.C. § 931(c); Atkinson, 838 at 811.     Like § 914, this
    provision encompassing false statements and misrepresentations
    does not clearly cover the conduct which forms the basis of
    Riley’s claims.   Because at least one of Riley’s claims may be
    unconnected with compensation benefits, we cannot say that no
    possibility exists for Riley to show that any such claim is not
    preempted by these LHWCA provisions.
    For these reasons, taking all allegations set forth in
    Riley’s complaint as true and resolving all legal ambiguities in
    Riley’s favor, we conclude that Riley’s complaint raises the
    possibility that Riley could succeed in establishing at least one
    claim against Ingalls in state court.    Thus, there is no
    fraudulent joinder, and we cannot disregard Ingalls’s citizenship
    for the purposes of our jurisdictional inquiry.10    Accordingly,
    the district court’s exercise of removal jurisdiction over this
    case was improper to the extent the court based its jurisdiction
    on the diversity of the parties.     This conclusion, coupled with
    our conclusion that federal question jurisdiction is lacking,
    leaves no possible basis for removal jurisdiction in this case.
    10
    This conclusion is consistent with our holding in Aaron
    that the LHWCA does not create federal question jurisdiction
    supporting removal. If the Defendants’ LHWCA defense is
    insufficient to raise federal question jurisdiction, such a
    defense should not be sufficient to raise diversity jurisdiction
    by way of fraudulent joinder. We will not allow the Defendants
    to make an end run around the clear rule of Aaron.
    18
    Thus, the district court erred by not remanding the case to state
    court.11
    III.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we find no basis for removal
    jurisdiction in this case.     Accordingly, we VACATE the district
    court’s dismissal of Riley’s claims and REMAND the case to the
    district court with instructions to remand the case to state
    court.     Costs shall be borne by the Defendants.
    11
    Because we find in Riley’s favor on this issue, we need
    not address Riley’s additional claims that the district court
    deprived Riley of due process at the March 2001 hearing and that
    there was a defect in the removal procedure.
    19