Martin v. Cain ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 00-30318
(Summary Calendar)
_________________
WADE MARTIN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
BURL CAIN, Warden,
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC 98-CV-3666-J
February 5, 2001
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Wade Martin seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the grounds that the prosecution
withheld evidence that would have demonstrated that the confession that underlies his conviction for
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
murder was not voluntarily obtained. Because we agree with the state habeas court that Martin has
not demonstrated that the withheld evidence was material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
83 S.Ct. 1194, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), we deny Martin’s application for writ of habeas corpus.
Martin was convicted in a jury trial of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life in
prison. On direct appeal he argued, inter alia, that his confession was involuntary because of drug
abuse, diminished mental capacity, brain damage, lack of education, and an inability to read, write,
or understand, as well as the fact that he was taking prescription medication at the time of the
confession. The appellate court rejected these arguments, based on testimony that Martin spoke in
a clear fashion at the time of his confession, and testimony by a deputy that jail records did not reflect
that Mart in had been given any prescription medication. At some point subsequent to his direct
appeal, Martin uncovered jail medical records showing that he had been given deltasone and
thioridazine in the four days leading up to his confession.
Martin filed an application for post-conviction relief in state court. The state habeas court
held an evidentiary hearing with regard to his claims that (1) the prosecution suppressed jail medical
records that would have shown that he had been given medication prior to his confession; and (2) the
prosecution knowingly relied upon false testimony without regard to whether he had been
administered medication prior to his confession. The court denied relief, reasoning that even if it was
assumed that the deputy had falsely testified about the medication, Martin had not presented any
evidence showing that the medication was “mind altering” and impaired his ability to give a
confession. Martin then filed a § 2254 petition in the district court; that court dismissed the petition
but granted a COA on the sole issue of whether “a Brady violation occurred when prosecutors failed
to disclose medical records showing that petitioner was on psychiatric medication at the time he gave
-2-
his confession.”
Because the state habeas court adjudicated Martin’s habeas application on the merits, we
apply the deferential standard of review of § 2254(d). We may not grant habeas relief unless the state
court’s decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or “resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Alleged Brady violations are mixed questions of law and
fact that we review under the 2254(d) scheme on collateral review. See Brown v. Cain, 104 F.3d
744, 750 (5th Cir. 1997).
Martin argues that had the prosecution disclosed the medical records, his confession would
have been suppressed as involuntary.1 The state habeas court rejected this argument because Martin
failed to present any evidence that the medication affected the voluntariness of his confession.
Accordingly, we must decide if this requirement of the state habeas court was an unreasonable
application of the Brady jurisprudence. Under Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady,
373 U.S. at 87. The Brady standard is violated where (1) the prosecution withholds evidence (2) that
1
Martin presents a second issue of “whether the state offered into evidence false and/or
misleading testimony which could have been rebutted by the withheld evidence, and misled the court
based on false testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).” Although this is a
claim related to the alleged Brady violation, it is not the claim on which Martin was granted a COA.
In the absence of an explicit request to broaden the COA and approval of that request, we will not
consider this second issue. See United States v. Kimler, 150 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 1998).
-3-
is favorable to the defense, and (3) the evidence is material. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-
34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565-66, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 994 (5th
Cir. 1996). Martin argues for a standard of materiality of “whether the undisclosed medical evidence
could have substantially affected the efforts of defense counsel to impeach [the deputy]’s testimony,
thereby calling into question the fairness of the ultimate decision to suppress Martin’s confession.”
As the deputy testified that Martin was not given any medication, the records would directly
contradict that testimony, perhaps making it more likely that the confession would have been
suppressed as involuntary.
Mart in’s articulation does not quite capture the stringency of the Brady materiality
requirement, however. According to the Supreme Court, “evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375,
3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 682; see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. at 1566. The
state habeas court reasoned that because Martin did not present evidence relating to the effects of the
medication on his confession, this “reasonable probability” had not been shown.
The state habeas court’s holding is a reasonable application of the Brady materiality
requirement. Only if the medication affected the voluntariness of his confession is there a possibility
that the confession would have been suppressed, or that the discrediting of the deputy’s testimony
would have been consequential. There is no per se rule mandating that confessions made after the
ingestion of drugs are inadmissible; rather, the question is whether the defendant’s will was overborne
at the time he confessed. See Lynumn v. State of Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 920, 9
-4-
L.Ed.2d. 922 (1963); United States v. George, 450 F.2d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 1971). Here, the state
trial co urt, in reviewing an audio tape of Martin’s confession, found that Martin’s demeanor was
“clear as a bell” and that he “understood what he was doing.” All of the testimony in the record
confirms Martin’s lucidity at the time of the confession. In light of the fact that the record gives every
indication that Martin’s will was not overborne, it was incumbent on him to present something
beyond his own speculative allegations of the adverse effects of the medication.2
Martin has also failed to demonstrate how, given his own trial testimony, the jail medical
records are material in the sense that they cast doubt on the outcome of that trial. Martin has never
asserted his innocence of the murder; instead, his defense was that he was provoked into killing the
victim because the victim (his mother’s husband) was beating his mother. Indeed, in his cross-
examination at trial, Martin testified to many of the details of the murder in an attempt to explain the
provocation. We have consistently held that “[t]he materiality of Brady evidence depends almost
entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the State.” Smith v.
2
After being granted a COA, Martin has for the first time included the report of a
professor of pharmacology at the Tulane medical school, indicating that thioridazine had a negative
effect on the voluntariness of Martin’s confession. Martin has not, however, demonstrated that this
evidence is properly considered by us at this stage. See United States v. Flores, 887 F.2d 543, 546
(5th Cir. 1989) (“[w]e will not ordinarily enlarge the record on appeal to include material not before
the district court.”). Nor is Martin’s failure to present the medical testimony to the state habeas court
the type of default we might forgive under the cause and prejudice standard. See Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 761-62, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318, (1992) (excusing a defendant’s failure to present evidence
that the drug he was administered before he confessed was known as a “truth serum” because “the
medical experts’ failure to testify fully cannot be realistically regarded as Townsend’s inexcusable
default.”). Martin may have been able to meet the cause and prejudice standard if, for example, his
lack of access to the jail records made it impossible for him to know the name of the drug he had
administered. But Martin alleges no such excuse, such that we may not properly consider the report
in this appeal.
-5-
Black, 904 F.2d 950, 867 (5th Cir. 1990), judgment vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930 (1992).
“[W]hen the testimony of a witness who might have been impeached is strongly corroborated by
additional evidence supporting a guilty verdict, the undisclosed evidence is generally not found to be
material.” Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 1994). At best, had Martin had access to
the prison records and consequently succeeded in his attempt to suppress the confession, we would
still be left with his trial testimony and the possibility of a provocation defense. The jury could easily
have rejected the provocation defense based on the nature of the crime alone—that the last fight
between the victim and Martin’s mother occurred three days before the murder, that Martin conspired
with others to lure the victim into the woods, that Martin borrowed a gun with a scope and hid in the
woods waiting for the victim, and that Martin shot the victim in the back when the victim exited his
car to urinate. Given the weight of the additional evidence pointing to Martin’s guilt of second
degree murder, the jail records establishing that Martin was medicated when he confessed to the
crime are not material, and the prosecution committed no constitutional violation in withholding the
records.
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED; Martin’s request to allow attachment to his
brief as a supplement is DENIED.
-6-