Cherry v. Hinson ( 1996 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    For the Fifth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 95-60085
    Summary Calendar
    ___________________________
    FORESTTEN G. CHERRY,
    Petitioner,
    VERSUS
    NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD and
    FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
    Respondents.
    ___________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States of America National
    Transportation Safety Board
    (NTSB EA-13279)
    ____________________________________________________
    January 9, 1996
    Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Pursuant    to   49   U.S.C.   §§   44709(f)     and    46110(a)   (1994),1
    appellant    seeks    review   of   an   order   of    the    NTSB   suspending
    respondent's private pilot certificate for 30 days.               We affirm.
    Cherry's primary challenge on appeal is that the NTSB acted
    arbitrarily and capriciously in reversing the ALJ's findings based
    on a credibility determination.           This Court will set aside an
    action by the NTSB if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."                5 U.S.C. §
    *
    Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
    1
    Formerly 49 U.S.C. §§ 1429(a) and 1486(a).
    706(2)(A); Miranda v. N.T.S.B., 
    866 F.2d 805
    (5th Cir. 1989).                      The
    Board has plenary review of an ALJ's ruling and is the ultimate
    finder of fact, even as to credibility.                 Chirino v. NTSB, 
    849 F.2d 1525
    , 1532 (D.C.Cir. 1988)            But, the Board's own policies dictate
    that an ALJ's credibility determination will not be disturbed
    unless the ALJ acted arbitrarily and capriciously, there exists a
    compelling reason to overturn or a clear error, the testimony is
    inherently incredible, or the decision is not supported by the
    weight of the evidence.          See Chirino, at 1530.
    In this case, the Board found that the ALJ's decision was
    "fatally flawed" by an error of fact that two flights had occurred.
    The two flights in the original complaint referred to the flight to
    the farm and the flight from the farm -- not two separate flights
    to   the       farm.    The   determination        of     this    case   rested   on   a
    credibility determination of two witnesses, Ms. Cherry and Mr.
    Davis,         the   caretaker   of   the       horses,     of    the    circumstances
    surrounding the takeoff of the helicopter.                       The ALJ essentially
    rejected Mr. Davis' testimony on the basis that Ms. Cherry would
    have not flown back a second time if his version were correct.2
    2
    After hearing all the testimony, the ALJ believed Ms.
    Cherry's version and reasoned:
    Sort of as a factor that turns this around for me and not
    really turns it around, the Administrator has the burden of
    establishing these allegations by [a] preponderance of the
    evidence. And preponderance of the evidence means . . . that
    evidence which seems more probably true than not true. And if
    Mr. Davis had advised these folks that they had injured some
    horses with the noise of the helicopter, that there was a
    continuing problem, that they shouldn't takeoff or that they
    had better go talk to the owners, because they are responsible
    for it, they wouldn't have flown back that day. Like I said,
    there hasn't been any testimony except an admission that they
    did come back a second time. And you know, I am convinced
    2
    Thus the Board made a reasonable conclusion based on the
    record and found a compelling reason, a clear error, to overturn
    the ALJ's credibility ruling.         The Board did not act arbitrarily
    and capriciously or outside its own policy.           We affirm its action.
    Ms. Cherry also contends that the NTSB erred in finding that
    the takeoff of the helicopter was in violation of FAR 91.13(a).
    "As long as the findings of fact of the Board are supported by
    substantial evidence, they must be affirmed." Woolsey v. NTSB, 
    993 F.2d 516
    , 521 n.16 (5th Cir. 1993); King v. NTSB, 
    766 F.2d 200
    , 203
    (5th Cir. 1985).   However, when the Board has rejected credibility
    determinations   of   the   ALJ,    the    Court   subjects   the   record    to
    particular   scrutiny.      "Review       is   heightened   not   because    the
    standard differs but because evidence supporting a conclusion is
    likely to be less substantial when the ALJ's conclusion differs
    from that of the agency."          Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 
    789 F.2d 1128
    ,
    1135 (5th Cir. 1986); Ward v. NLRB, 
    462 F.2d 8
    , 12 (5th Cir. 1972).
    In this case, even though the Board found from the ALJ's oral
    decision that he credited Ms. Cherry's testimony over Mr. Davis
    because he believed she had flown back a second time, the Board's
    that there was [not] a problem, or they wouldn't come back that
    second time. So, I don't find that there was careless or reckless
    operation when the aircraft took off.
    Also, later the ALJ stated that the Administrator had not
    established carelessness and recklessness by a preponderance of the
    evidence and dismissed the suspension, and again reasoned:
    But I believe that if that problem [the injured horse], even
    after it was identified, had not been solved, these folks
    would not have flown back over there that day. And so I think
    the Administrator's evidence has not established by a
    preponderance of the evidence, reckless and careless
    operation.
    3
    own credibility assessment must be supported by evidence in the
    record.
    The Board found that Ms. Cherry was, or should have been, on
    notice after the landing that there were horses in the area, horses
    had been injured upon her landing, and horses could be spooked by
    helicopter operations.    The Board concluded that Ms. Cherry should
    have investigated before takeoff.        The Board believed Mr. Davis'
    testimony,   finding    his   actions    more   reasonable    under   the
    circumstances and his testimony corroborated by others. Ms. Kurtz,
    an independent bystander, reported that the horses were spooked by
    the landing of the helicopter.         The injuries to the horses were
    corroborated by the horse owner and vet bills.          Ms. Cherry had
    testified to knowing of at least one injured horse.            Given Ms.
    Cherry's part in injuring the horses, the Board found unlikely Ms.
    Cherry's testimony that Mr. Davis would cheerfully invite her to
    return and tell her it was fine for her to leave.            The Board's
    finding is supported by substantial record evidence.         The order of
    the NTSB is therefore
    AFFIRMED.
    4