Ramsey v. Henderson ( 2002 )

Revised May 20, 2002
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 01-30287
__________________________
SHIRLEY A. RAMSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILLIAM J. HENDERSON,
POSTMASTER GENERAL
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana
___________________________________________________
March 29, 2002
Before POLITZ, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:
Shirley Ramsey ("Ramsey") appeals an adverse summary judgment
in her claims against her employer, the United States Postal
Service ("USPS"), in which she asserts claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act for race discrimination and harassment. We
affirm the district court's determination that summary judgment was
appropriate.
I. Facts and Proceedings
Ramsey has been employed by the USPS since 1981. She
works at the General Mail Facility on Blue Bonnet Road in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. She claims that she has been harassed roughly
since the conception of her employment at the USPS. The source of
the harassment is Ramsey’s relationship with her African American
co-employees. Ramsey, a woman of white appearance but of multiple
ethnicities1, has suffered harassment at the hands of her African
American co-employees. The harassment increased after Ramsey began
dating an African American male. When Ramsey became an expedited
mail clerk in 1994 and began working under Lucile Porter, Porter
treated her more harshly than Ramsey’s African American
counterparts. Relations between Ramsey and Porter were amicable
for the first six months of her employment. Shortly after this,
their relationship deteriorated. Porter’s treatment of Ramsey was
erratic. For weeks at a time, Porter would be kind and then turn
hateful. Ramsey felt belittled and humiliated by Porter’s yelling
and sharp looks. Porter called her a liar and a disloyal employee
in front of co-workers and customers.
On May 8, 1998, Ramsey made a request for pre-complaint
counseling, as required by the Federal Regulations, based on
Porter’s harassment. The paperwork was sent to Ramsey for her to
fill out her complaint against Porter; however, Ramsey never
submitted the paperwork. She claims that she hoped that the
situation could be resolved without resorting to a formal
1
Ramsey states that she is of Spanish, Chinese, American
Indian, and Irish origin.
2
complaint. However, the situation was never resolved.
On December 16, 1998, Ramsey had an altercation with a co-
worker, Mr. Marioneaux. The altercation stemmed from a previous
order by Porter that Ramsey not get her mail but go straight to
her desk when she arrived at work. On December 16, Marioneaux
yelled at Ramsey for refusing to pick up her mail. He slapped a
stack of papers on Porter’s desk during the quarrel. At this
point, Porter entered the scene and told Marioneaux to stop yelling
at Ramsey. The altercation visibly upset Ramsey, making her cry
and shake. Although Porter ended the altercation between
Marioneaux and Ramsey, Ramsey claims that Porter enjoyed it and
smiled while Marioneaux was yelling at Ramsey. Ramsey subsequently
requested to meet with a union steward to which Porter allegedly
replied “this really got to you didn’t it, I can see it in your
eyes. You can call Linda Hayes (the union steward), but I don’t
think she’s in.” On December 17, 1998, Ramsey had difficulty
concentrating at work and filled out a request form for a leave of
absence. Porter refused to sign and asked Ramsey to talk to her
about the incident of the previous day. Ramsey indicated that she
did not want to talk about it but rather simply wanted to go home.
Ramsey left work alleging she was having a nervous breakdown and
never returned to the mail facility. She requested informal
counseling with the EEO office on January 29, 1999 and filed a
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formal complaint of discrimination on April 15, 1999.2
Ramsey filed her Complaint on December 10, 1999 alleging race
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The USPS
filed a motion to dismiss on May 31, 2000 alleging lack of
jurisdiction as to the retaliation claim as well as failure to
state a prima facie case of a hostile work environment. The
district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment and ordered additional briefing. On December 13,
2000, the district court dismissed Ramsey’s retaliation claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction3 and dismissed the
discrimination claim for failure to state a prima facie case.
Ramsey filed a motion to amend the judgment which was denied by the
district court. Ramsey timely filed a notice of appeal as to the
hostile work environment claim.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court's decision to grant summary
2
The agency identified the scope of the complaint as a claim
of “continuing harassment and a hostile work environment
culminating in your mail not being brought to your desk on
December 16, 1998, your supervisor refusing to sign your leave
slip on December 17, 1998, and your supervisor allowing a co-
worker to yell at you during a meeting on December 17, 1998.”
While Ramsey objected, requesting additional prior conduct be
included in the claim, the agency refused and Ramsey did not
appeal the decision to the EEOC.
3
The district court dismissed the retaliation claim for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This issue was not
raised on appeal.
4
judgment de novo. Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 624 (5th Cir.
2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing a
motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in its favor. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson,
224 F.3d 425, 440 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Lowrey v. Texas A &
M University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997).
B. Analysis
The district court denied Ramsey’s hostile work environment
claim based on its determination that all of her claims were time
barred except for those occurring on December 16-17, 1998. The
district court found that her claim could not be based on a
continuing violation theory because she was aware of the alleged
harassment yet chose to withstand it.4 As a result, the court
concluded that all but one incident was time barred for occurring
“outside the forty-five day period from the date of her initial
contact with the agency’s EEO office.” After a motion for a new
trial was filed by Ramsey, the court again dismissed her claim for
failure to allege conduct that was “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to be actionable” under Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
4
Ramsey requested the paperwork for informal counseling on
at least one occasion in 1998 but never filed the request.
5
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
Ramsey alleges it was error for the district court to dismiss
her claim under a continuing violation theory as her theory was
based not on a continuing violation but on a “severity” theory.
After reviewing the record, it is not clear from Ramsey’s documents
on what theory her claim was based. What is clear is that the
actionable period included only one incident. Ramsey argues that
the time barred events cited in her Complaint and subsequent motion
were relevant background information to determine the severity of
the harassing conduct. We agree. The question remains whether,
after reviewing the previous discriminatory conduct, Ramsey has
made a prima facie case of harassment based on a hostile work
environment. We conclude that she has not.
A plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation based on race
discrimination creating a hostile work environment. In order to
establish a hostile working environment claim, Ramsey must prove:
(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on
race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition,
or privilege of employment; (5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt
remedial action. Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d
343, 353(5th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714,
719-720 (5th Cir. 1986). For harassment on the basis of race to
affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, as required
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to support a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, it
must be “‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.’” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, quoting, Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
In determining whether a workplace constitutes a hostile work
environment, courts must consider the following circumstances: "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance." Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615,625
(5th Cir. 2000),quoting, Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
We agree with the district court that the conduct to which
Ramsey objects does not rise to the level of race discrimination
based on a hostile work environment; however, the district court
should have considered the prior relevant conduct alleged by Ramsey
in making its determination. As the Supreme Court has recently
stated, “workplace conduct is not measured in isolation.” Clark
County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). For
a hostile working environment to be deemed sufficiently hostile,
all of the circumstances must be taken into consideration.
Discriminatory incidents outside of the filing period may be
relevant background information to current discriminatory acts.
United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977); See also
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Rutherford v. Harris County, 197 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Hebert
v. Monsanto Co., 682 F.2d 1111 (5 th Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Reno,
190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 1999). Viewing the facts in a light
most favorable to Ramsey, and, after considering the prior alleged
acts of harassment, we conclude that Ramsey failed to state a prima
facie case of a hostile working environment.
As an initial matter, we distinguish between the harassing
conduct occurring within the actionable period and that which can
only be viewed as relevant background conduct. As a federal
employee, the Federal Regulations require Ramsey to follow certain
procedures before filing a Title VII suit. The first step in
filing an EEOC complaint is that an aggrieved employee must contact
an agency EEO counselor within 45 days of the alleged
discriminatory conduct requesting informal counseling.5 Ramsey
filed her informal counseling request on January 26, 1999.
Accordingly, the actionable period was from December 12 through
December 17, 1998. The only actionable incidents which occurred
during this time were on December 16 and again on December 17, 1998
when Ramsey ultimately left the USPS. All other alleged conduct by
5
29 C.F.R. §1614.105 provides: Aggrieved persons who believe
they have been discriminated against on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap must consult a
Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to try to
informally resolve the matter. An aggrieved person must initiate
contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter
alleged to be discriminatory.
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Ramsey can only be considered as relevant background conduct to
determine whether the harassment was sufficiently severe so as to
cause an abusive work environment.
The December 16, 1998 incident arose between Ramsey and her
co-worker Mr. Marioneaux. Prior to this incident there were no
allegations by Ramsey that Marioneaux harassed her because of her
race nor is there any allegation that the December 16, 1998
incident was racially motivated. The conduct to which Ramsey
complains involves Marioneaux refusing to bring her mail to her.
In doing so, he slapped his hands down on Porter’s desk and yelled
at Ramsey. During the course of this exchange, Porter reprimanded
Marioneaux and ordered him to stop yelling at Ramsey. However,
prior to ending the tirade, Porter smiled which Ramsey perceived as
her enjoyment of the abuse projected on her. Ramsey was visibly
shaken by the incident and requested that Porter sign a leave form
for her the next day. Porter did not sign the form, asking Ramsey
to stay so that they could discuss the incident of the previous
day. Ramsey left the office and never returned to work. While
workplace conduct cannot be measured in isolation, we conclude that
this incident does not amount to discriminatory employment.
The record is rife with vague assertions of racial animus
dating back to Ramsey’s initial employment at the USPS. However,
other than assertions that her supervisor, Lucile Porter,
discriminated against her for dating an African American male,
there are no specific allegations of racial discrimination against
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any other employees. Ramsey alleges that she “suffered ongoing
racial harassment from black females,” but points to no concrete
examples. Ramsey explains that the harassment increased when she
began dating an African American and subsequently had a child with
him but again gives no concrete examples beyond mere conclusory
assertions. While claiming that the racial harassment became
extreme after beginning work under Porter, the only example she
cites is reference to a remark where Porter made a derogatory
comment about Ramsey. However, this statement was not heard by
Ramsey nor does Ramsey establish to whom the remark was made. This
Court has cautioned that “conclusory allegations, speculation, and
unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy” the
nonmovant’s burden in a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v.
United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996).
While the record clearly indicates that Porter did not approve
of Ramsey’s relationships with African American men, Ramsey’s
allegations fall far short of setting forth the requisite elements
of a prima facie claim of a hostile working environment. The prior
incidents of racial harassment falling outside of the actionable
period are not so severe or pervasive as to cause an abusive
working environment when taken in conjunction with the incident
occurring within the actionable period. The incident between
Ramsey and Marioneaux occurring on December 16, 1998 in no way
involved racial harassment. Additionally, Porter’s intervention
10
in the scene shows that immediate remedial action was taken. The
prior conduct of the USPS may have included discriminatory acts;
however, this conduct is not actionable under Title VII. Such
prior conduct “may constitute relevant background evidence in a
proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue,
but separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in
history which has no present legal consequences.” Evans, 431 U.S.
at 558. The incident occurring within the actionable time period
in no way involves racial discrimination, and her sporadic
allegations of race discrimination cannot be the basis of a Title
VII claim.
III. Conclusion
While it was error for the district court not to consider acts
of discrimination falling outside of the actionable period as
relevant background information, its determination that Ramsey
failed to establish a prima facie case of a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII was correct.
AFFIRMED.
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