United States v. Barker ( 2000 )


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  •                    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-50250
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    VERSUS
    TOMMY WARD BARKER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. W-97-CV-137
    USDC No. W-88-CR-130-17
    - - - - - - - - - -
    May 17, 2000
    Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Tommy Ward Barker appeals the district court’s denial of his
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel
    at sentencing for (1) failing to raise the “parolable” nature of
    Barker’s offense, and (2) failing to request a decreased sentence
    on   the   basis    of   the   type   of   methamphetamine   involved.   The
    Sentencing Guidelines abolished parole. See Golon-Peretz v. United
    States, 
    498 U.S. 395
    , 399, 401 n.4, 410 (1991); Lightsey v.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 98-50250
    -2-
    Kastner, 
    846 F.2d 329
    , 331-32 (5th Cir. 1988)(the Sentencing Reform
    Act abolishes parole); United States v. White, 
    869 F.2d 822
    , 826
    (5th Cir. 1989)(sentencing guidelines apply to any offense committed
    after October 31, 1987, including a conspiracy which began prior to
    that date but continued after that date).          This court determined on
    direct appeal that the guidelines were applicable to this case.
    See United States v. Devine, 
    934 F.2d 1325
    , 1332-35 (5th Cir. 1990).
    This issue is therefore without merit.
    Barker argues that because the methamphetamine at issue was
    d,l-methamphetamine, and not “pure” d-methamphetamine, he should
    not   have   been    sentenced    as    if   the   entire        amount   were    d-
    methamphetamine, and counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
    this issue at sentencing.        There is no precedent in this circuit,
    however, for using the l-methamphetamine calculation when d,l-
    methamphetamine is the substance at issue. On the contrary, expert
    testimony    in     other     cases    has   resulted       in     scoring       d,l-
    methamphetamine as if it were a mixture of 50% d-methamphetamine
    and 50% l-methamphetamine.        See e.g., United States v. Allison, 
    63 F.3d 350
    , 353 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Acklen, 
    97 F.3d 750
    ,
    751 (5th Cir. 1996).        Barker has not established that his sentence
    would have been significantly less harsh if counsel had raised this
    then-novel sentencing issue. See United States v. Seyfert, 
    67 F.3d 544
    , 548-49 (5th Cir. 1995).           The district court did not err in
    refusing to grant § 2255 relief on this claim.
    AFFIRMED.