Tillison v. Trinity Valley Electric Cooperative Inc. , 204 F. App'x 346 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT October 23, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-11332
Summary Calendar
NELDA J. TILLISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TRINITY VALLEY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC.;
TRINITY VALLEY SERVICES INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:03-CV-2480)
Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Nelda Tillison filed an action against her employer, Trinity
Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc., and Trinity Valley Services,
Inc. (collectively, Trinity), for, inter alia, sex-based
discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and age discrimination, in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Among other things, the district court held
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
these federal-law claims time-barred. Summary judgment was awarded
Trinity.
Tillison, an employee of Trinity and its predecessors since
1967, claimed her supervisors subjected her to a sexually hostile
and abusive work environment, under the direction of Trinity’s
General Manager and CEO. According to Tillison, because she would
not participate in workplace activities concerning the improper
sexually-related conduct by that individual, she was given extra
work and was not given assistance in completing it; and was accused
of taking too many personal telephone calls and revealing private
employee information. She was formally reprimanded on 11 January
2002. Following the written reprimand and being berated by a
supervisor, Tillison made an appointment with her doctor and was
admitted for treatment. She never returned to work at Trinity.
Tillison visited the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to file a complaint. She also filed an intake questionnaire
with the Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHR). The TCHR sent
Tillison a letter informing her that it could not draft a charge
because over 180 days had passed since the alleged discrimination.
Later, the EEOC sent her a letter dated 6 November 2002, containing
a charge of discrimination which required her signature. The
letter said the charge needed to be returned within ten days for it
to be accepted for investigation. It said nothing about a 300-day
administrative deadline (7 November) for filing claims with the
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EEOC. Tillison’s attorney hand-delivered the charge to the EEOC on
11 November.
After Tillison received a right to sue letter from the EEOC in
July 2003, she filed this action against Trinity in district court,
asserting federal and state-law claims. Trinity’s summary judgment
motion was granted on 2 September 2005. The district court held,
inter alia, that the federal-law claims were time-barred because
they were not timely filed.
Tillison claims: (1) the 300-day filing deadline should be
equitably tolled because her failure to file resulted from the
EEOC’s statements misleading her; and (2) her TCHR intake
questionnaire was sufficient to be considered a charge of
discrimination. Because her latter contention was not properly
raised in district court, we will not consider it.
We review a summary judgment grant de novo, applying the same
legal standard used by the district court and making reasonable
inferences in the non-movant’s favor. E.g., Ramirez v. City of San
Antonio, 312 F.3d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is
appropriate if there exists “no genuine issue as to any material
fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law”. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
Under both Title VII and the ADEA, a claimant must file a
charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged
discriminatory action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Title VII); 29
U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (ADEA). Under the equitable-tolling doctrine,
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failure to do so may be excused, particularly (although not
exclusively) in three circumstances: (1) a pending action between
the parties in the incorrect forum; (2) the claimant’s unawareness
of facts supporting her claim because the defendant intentionally
concealed them; and (3) the claimant’s being misled by the EEOC
about her rights. Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 880
(5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004). The
equitable-tolling doctrine is, however, “applied [only] sparingly”.
Ramirez, 312 F.3d at 183 (internal quotation omitted). Further,
the burden of demonstrating that it applies rests on the party
invoking it. Id.
As discussed, equitable tolling may be appropriate where the
plaintiff’s delayed filing “was caused by ‘the EEOC’s misleading
the plaintiff about the nature of her rights’”. Id. (quoting
Blumberg v. HCA Mgmt. Co., 848 F.2d 642, 644 (5th Cir. 1988)). “It
is not sufficient for [a claimant] to show that the EEOC failed to
give him some relevant information; he must demonstrate that the
EEOC gave him information that was affirmatively wrong.” Id. at
184. Further, a claimant’s “ignorance of the law ... cannot
justify tolling”. Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir.
2002).
Tillison’s failure to file within 300 days should not be
excused because she has not met her burden of demonstrating a basis
for equitable tolling. See Ramirez, 312 F.3d at 183. To support
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her claim that the EEOC misled her about her rights, she points to
the EEOC’s letter, which stated that “failure to sign and return
the enclosed charge within ten (10) days from the date of this
letter will result in the charge not being accepted for
investigation”. The 6 November 2002 letter, despite failing to
inform her of the fast-approaching 300-day deadline (7 November),
did not provide any erroneous information. That the letter could
mislead Tillison into believing she had another ten days to file
her charge is not sufficient for equitable tolling. See Ramirez,
312 F.3d at 184. Tillison’s ignorance of the law also does not
justify tolling. See Teemac, 298 F.3d at 457. In sum, Tillison
has failed to provide evidence needed to create a material fact
issue concerning whether the EEOC misled her.
AFFIRMED
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