United States v. Terry Brown , 558 F. App'x 386 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-60223      Document: 00512551826         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/06/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 13-60223                                 FILED
    March 6, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee
    v.
    TERRY THOMAS BROWN,
    Defendant – Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 1:11-CR-113-1
    Before KING, CLEMENT, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Terry Thomas Brown challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
    to suppress. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
    district court.
    I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Terry Thomas Brown, together with co-defendant Anthony D. Jones, was
    charged by indictment with four counts of aiding and abetting the passing of
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 13-60223
    counterfeit $100 bills. Brown moved to suppress evidence obtained as the
    result of an unlawful arrest.         Specifically, Brown seeks to suppress
    incriminating statements he made to a Secret Service special agent while he
    was in detention.
    The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Brown’s motion and a
    similar motion filed by Jones. At the hearing, Chip Benjamin, a police officer
    with the City of Tupelo, Mississippi, testified that on July 30, 2011, he received
    a dispatch call to a residence, where he spoke with Kasi Guyton about her
    receipt of a counterfeit $100 bill at her yard sale. Benjamin arrived at Guyton’s
    home within ten minutes of the call and possibly “less than five minutes” after
    the call. Guyton reported that a black male accompanied by a white male had
    given her the money, which she discovered was counterfeit when she went to a
    nearby store to try to get change. The employees at the store identified the bill
    as counterfeit by using a marker pen. Guyton told Officer Benjamin that the
    black male had given her the bill.
    Officer Benjamin testified that Guyton said the men were driving “a
    newer model silver Toyota four-door truck with Florida [license] plates.” She
    stated that the black male was wearing a green shirt and blue jeans. During
    the conversation, a truck matching Guyton’s description drove by. Officer
    Benjamin asked Guyton if the truck that drove by looked like the one the men
    were in, and she responded affirmatively.        Officer Benjamin immediately
    returned to his patrol car and followed the truck. Officer Benjamin could tell
    that the vehicle matched the make, model, and color of the truck described by
    Guyton, and when he caught up to it he saw that it had Florida license plates.
    Officer Benjamin observed the vehicle turn into a gas station, and he
    followed. When Officer Benjamin pulled into the gas station, the black male
    was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle and the white male was “standing outside
    the [passenger] door.” Officer Benjamin activated his patrol car’s blue lights
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    as he pulled into the station. The white male looked directly at Officer
    Benjamin’s patrol car and the flashing lights. 1 He then “hurriedly tr[ied] to
    get in the [convenience] store” located at the gas station. Officer Benjamin
    instructed him to “get back in the truck,” but the man did not heed the
    instruction. Officer Benjamin exited his vehicle, pulled his service weapon,
    and again ordered the man back to the truck, at which point he complied. 2
    Officer Benjamin testified that when the man returned to the vehicle, Officer
    Benjamin noticed open beer cans on the floorboard of the vehicle’s passenger
    side. 3 He ordered both men to place their hands on the dashboard.
    Officer Benjamin obtained both men’s driver’s licenses and told the
    driver the reason for the stop. In the courtroom, he identified Jones as the
    driver of the vehicle and Brown as the passenger. Officer Benjamin testified
    that when he spoke with Jones at the gas station, Jones was wearing clothing
    matching the description given by Guyton. Officer Benjamin informed Jones
    that he was suspected of passing counterfeit money, and asked Jones several
    questions about where he was coming from and why he was in Tupelo. Jones
    explained that he was driving from Alabama to Tennessee to pick up his
    daughter. Officer Benjamin testified that Jones’s story “didn’t make sense” to
    him.
    1   Our review of the patrol car’s video from the incident confirms this order of events.
    2The video indicates that Officer Benjamin ordered Brown to return to the vehicle
    four times before drawing his service weapon.
    3 By ordinance in the City of Tupelo, consuming or opening a container of beer is
    restricted to certain designated areas, and “[n]o beer shall be open or in the possession of any
    person in automobiles at any time on public property, streets or highways.” Tupelo, Miss.,
    Code of Ordinances § 5-18(a)(1) (2003). Violation of the ordinance is punishable by a fine not
    exceeding $1,000, imprisonment not exceeding ninety days, or both. 
    Id. § 1-8.
            Officer Benjamin’s police report did not mention the open containers. He testified at
    the hearing that “[t]he Tupelo detectives did not like us to mix felony and misdemeanor
    charges . . . so we charged [Jones and Brown] with the felony charge of counterfeiting.”
    3
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    Guyton then arrived at the scene. Officer Benjamin had not asked her
    to follow him; she came to the gas station on her own initiative. She identified
    Jones as “the guy” who gave her the counterfeit bill, and told Jones, “[y]ou gave
    me a fake hundred-dollar bill.” Jones responded that he did not know the bill
    was counterfeit and he would “make it right.” Officer Benjamin then removed
    Jones from the truck and had him place his hands on the vehicle. Officer
    Benjamin checked Jones’s pockets and found a counterfeit $100 bill, at which
    point Officer Benjamin handcuffed Jones and placed him under arrest. During
    a search of Jones’s vehicle, officers found another counterfeit bill in Jones’s
    wallet, which was on the driver’s seat; a large sum of counterfeit money in the
    passenger side door; and another large counterfeit sum in a book in the back
    seat. There was also a computer printout of yard sale locations in the Tupelo
    area. Legitimate money was found separate from the counterfeit bills, in the
    driver’s side door. Items that appeared to be from yard sales were in the bed
    of the truck. 4
    A second officer, Clay Hassell, arrived at the scene and took Brown into
    custody while Officer Benjamin spoke with Jones. Officer Hassell patted down
    Brown and did not find any counterfeit bills on him. When a third officer,
    Nathan Sheffield, arrived, he escorted Brown to Officer Benjamin’s vehicle.
    Officer Sheffield testified at the hearing that he noticed the smell of alcohol on
    Brown’s breath and person. Officer Sheffield also testified that he noticed open
    containers of alcohol on the floorboard of the vehicle’s passenger side.
    Officer Benjamin stated that Jones did not commit a traffic violation. He
    testified that Guyton did not provide any information about the clothing worn
    4  It is not clear whether Officer Benjamin saw the yard sale items before or after he
    placed Jones and Brown under arrest. At the hearing, he testified that he saw the items after
    arresting Jones and Brown. In the police report, he stated that he noted the items when he
    first spoke with Jones, before placing Jones under arrest.
    4
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    by the white male accompanying Jones, and she did not speak with Brown
    when she arrived at the gas station. Officer Benjamin had no information at
    the time of the stop that Brown was in possession of counterfeit money. Officer
    Benjamin stated that at the time Brown returned to the vehicle, he was being
    detained, and that “[t]he open containers and the smell of alcohol on him” were
    the reasons for his detention.
    The district court denied both defendants’ motions to suppress in an oral
    order three weeks after the hearing on the motion. It found that Guyton had
    described “the persons” that had paid her with the counterfeit bills, that Brown
    was the passenger in the truck, and that he had “almost immediately exited
    the truck and attempted to walk into the convenience store.” The court noted
    that when Guyton arrived at the scene, she said to “one or both defendants,
    ‘[y]ou gave me a fake 100-dollar bill.’” The court stated that Jones replied “that
    he did not know it was fake, ‘I will make it right,’” which was “indicative to the
    [c]ourt that Jones and the other occupant, Brown, were aware that the
    currency passed at the yard sale was counterfeit currency.” The court found
    that Officer Benjamin frisked both defendants and that “counterfeit money
    was found on their person,” as well as within the vehicle.
    The court performed a two-tiered reasonable suspicion analysis under
    Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968), as articulated in United States v. Grant, 
    349 F.3d 192
    , 196 (5th Cir. 2003). “[C]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,”
    it determined that Officer Benjamin’s actions in immediately following the
    truck were justified at their inception. The court concluded that the ensuing
    search or seizure was reasonably related in scope to the
    circumstances that justified the stop in the first place, considering
    the location of the yard sale items in the back of the truck and the
    acknowledgement of finding the counterfeit bills in the vehicle and
    on the persons of Jones and Brown, and also in light of the
    responses made by Jones, the driver of the truck, that he did not
    know that the bills were fake and that he would make them right.
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    “Considering the totality of all of the facts encountered or confronted by this
    officer,” it found that the motion to suppress should be denied. Although
    Brown’s motion to suppress was “predicated upon his arrest being without
    probable cause,” the district court did not expressly address probable cause.
    Following the denial of his motion, Brown entered a conditional guilty
    plea to one count of aiding and abetting the passing of a counterfeit bill,
    reserving his right to challenge the ruling on his motion to suppress. The
    district court sentenced Brown to twenty-four months’ imprisonment and a
    three-year term of supervised release. Brown was also ordered to pay $100 in
    restitution. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “To assess a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
    under the Fourth Amendment, we review its factual determinations for clear
    error and the ultimate Fourth Amendment conclusions de novo.” United States
    v. Brigham, 
    382 F.3d 500
    , 506 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing United States
    v. Gonzalez, 
    328 F.3d 755
    , 758 (5th Cir. 2003)). “Factual findings are clearly
    erroneous only if a review of the record leaves this Court with a definite and
    firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Hearn,
    
    563 F.3d 95
    , 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).   The district court’s ruling should be upheld “if there is any
    reasonable view of the evidence to support it,” United States v. Scroggins, 
    599 F.3d 433
    , 440 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 
    190 F.3d 668
    ,
    671 (5th Cir. 1999)), and the reviewing court “can affirm the lower court’s
    decision on any grounds supported by the record,” United States v. McSween,
    
    53 F.3d 684
    , 687 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).
    III.   APPLICABLE LAW
    Pursuant to Terry, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , “[p]olice officers may briefly detain
    individuals on the street, even though there is no probable cause to arrest
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    them, if they have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
    United States v. Michelletti, 
    13 F.3d 838
    , 840 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). To
    determine whether such an investigatory stop was legal, the court first
    examines “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and then
    inquires whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in
    scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” 
    Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506
    (citing 
    Terry, 392 U.S. at 19
    –20).         “Reasonable suspicion requires less
    information and certainty than the probable cause needed to make an arrest.”
    United States v. Vickers, 
    540 F.3d 356
    , 361 (5th Cir. 2008). “Whether an officer
    has reasonable suspicion to stop is answered from the facts known to the officer
    at the time.” 
    Id. Courts “must
    look at the totality of the circumstances of each
    case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective
    basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    ,
    273 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court “looks
    at all circumstances together to weigh not the individual layers, but the
    laminated total.” United States v. Olivares-Pacheco, 
    633 F.3d 399
    , 402 (5th
    Cir. 2011).
    “It is well established that under the Fourth Amendment a warrantless
    arrest must be based on probable cause.” Hogan v. Cunningham, 
    722 F.3d 725
    ,
    731 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Castro, 
    166 F.3d 728
    , 733 (5th
    Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam)). Probable cause for an arrest made without
    a warrant “exists when the totality of facts and circumstances within an
    officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable
    person to conclude that the suspect had committed an offense.” United States
    v. Hebert, 
    131 F.3d 514
    , 524 (5th Cir. 1997). The probable cause standard
    “requires substantially less evidence than that sufficient to support a
    conviction.” United States v. Ho, 
    94 F.3d 932
    , 936 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
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    Passing counterfeit currency with intent to defraud is a crime in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. 5 “Generally, probable cause to arrest for the
    offense of passing a counterfeit note is established by circumstances showing
    the passing of a counterfeit note coupled with an identification of the individual
    who passed the note.” United States v. Hernandez, 
    825 F.2d 846
    , 849 (5th Cir.
    1987); see also United States v. Burbridge, 
    252 F.3d 775
    , 778 (5th Cir. 2001)
    (“An ordinary citizen’s eyewitness account of criminal activity and
    identification of a perpetrator is normally sufficient to supply probable cause
    to stop the suspect.”).
    “[R]easonable suspicion may ‘ripen’ or ‘develop’ into probable cause for
    an arrest if a Terry stop reveals further evidence of criminal conduct.”
    
    Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 441
    . “Of particular significance in those cases in which
    the available description is alone sufficient for a stopping for investigation, is
    the possibility that it may develop into probable cause for arrest as a
    consequence of what the police see or hear during the detention.” WAYNE R.
    LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(c) (5th ed. 2012).
    IV.    MOTION TO SUPPRESS
    This case requires us to determine, first, whether a police officer had
    reasonable suspicion to perform an investigatory stop and, second, whether his
    reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause during the course of the stop.
    We find in the affirmative on both questions. Accordingly, we affirm the
    district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress.
    5   Section 472 provides:
    Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts
    to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States
    or keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or
    altered obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined under
    this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
    18 U.S.C. § 472 (2013).
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    A. Terry Analysis
    Officer Benjamin’s investigatory stop was justified at its inception
    because he had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred. See
    
    Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 840
    . The record shows that police received a phone call
    from Guyton regarding counterfeit money she received at a yard sale, and
    Guyton informed Officer Benjamin that a store clerk had identified the bill as
    counterfeit.   Officer Benjamin had a particularized and objective basis to
    believe that the individuals in the vehicle he followed were involved in the
    crime. See 
    Vickers, 540 F.3d at 361
    . Guyton described the physical appearance
    of the man who gave her the bill, and said he was accompanied by a white
    male. She described the vehicle in which they were riding. When a truck
    matching Guyton’s description drove by, Guyton identified it as “look[ing] just
    like” the truck the men were in. When Officer Benjamin followed the truck, he
    determined that it matched the make, model, and color of the vehicle described
    by Guyton, and had Florida license plates.
    Brown suggests that because “[t]he truck was not in operation, and
    [Brown] was not in the truck at the time he was detained,” there was no
    reasonable suspicion to stop him, as opposed to his co-defendant, Jones. We
    disagree. Officer Benjamin knew that a white male accompanied the male who
    passed the counterfeit bill. The testimony reveals that Brown was “standing
    outside the [passenger] door” when Officer Benjamin pulled in behind the
    pickup truck, and that he “hurriedly tr[ied] to get in the [convenience] store.”
    The police video shows Brown standing outside the truck’s passenger side, with
    the door open, and closing the door as Officer Benjamin pulls up behind the
    truck. This record is sufficient for us to conclude that Officer Benjamin had
    reasonable suspicion to include Brown in the scope of his investigatory stop.
    Under the second prong of the Terry analysis, the question is whether
    Officer Benjamin’s actions “were reasonably related to the circumstances that
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    justified the stop, or to dispelling his reasonable suspicion developed during
    the stop.” 
    Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507
    . We conclude that they were.
    Brown argues that Officer Benjamin’s “show of force and authority,” in
    drawing his service weapon, “left [Brown] no choice but compliance” and
    therefore constituted “a de facto warrantless arrest of a citizen without
    probable cause.” We construe this argument to suggest that Officer Benjamin’s
    actions exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop.        The government
    contends that Officer Benjamin’s “actions of ordering Brown back into the
    truck were reasonable in the course of an investigative detention, and did not
    amount to a full blown arrest.” The government explains that the actions
    “were clearly reasonably related to the circumstance[s] that justified the stop.”
    Even assuming there was no probable cause to arrest Brown when
    Officer Benjamin drew his service weapon, his actions did not exceed the scope
    of the stop under Terry. Officer Benjamin had reasonable suspicion to believe
    that Brown had been involved in criminal activity. Brown disobeyed Officer
    Benjamin’s order, delivered four times, to return to the vehicle. Given these
    circumstances, Officer Benjamin’s actions in drawing his service weapon were
    reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. See, e.g., United
    States v. Abdo, 
    733 F.3d 562
    , 566 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that stop “was a
    proper investigatory detention” where officer drew his weapon, ordered
    defendant to halt, and placed defendant in handcuffs inside a patrol car);
    United States v. Sanders, 
    994 F.2d 200
    , 206 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[U]sing some force
    on a suspect, pointing a weapon at a suspect, ordering a suspect to lie on the
    ground, and handcuffing a suspect—whether singly or in combination—do not
    automatically convert an investigative detention into an arrest requiring
    probable cause.”). “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who
    lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to
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    simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.”
    
    Vickers, 540 F.3d at 361
    (quoting Adams v. Williams, 
    407 U.S. 143
    , 145 (1972)).
    In sum, reasonable suspicion existed to believe that Brown was involved
    in a recently completed crime of passing of counterfeit money, which gave
    Officer Benjamin the right to stop him. Officer Benjamin did not exceed the
    permissible scope of the stop when he drew his service weapon.
    B. Probable Cause
    We conclude that the laminated total of the evidence was more than
    sufficient to cause Officer Benjamin’s reasonable suspicion to ripen into
    probable cause during the course of the investigatory stop. See United States
    v. Harlan, 
    35 F.3d 176
    , 179 (5th Cir. 1994); 
    Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 441
    .
    Officer Benjamin knew that counterfeit bills had been passed.           He
    followed a vehicle identified by Guyton, and the vehicle matched the make,
    model, and color of the truck described by Guyton, and had Florida license
    plates. Brown walked away from Officer Benjamin, despite seeing that the
    patrol car’s lights were activated, and despite Officer Benjamin’s multiple
    orders to return to the truck.    Finally, Officer Benjamin testified at the
    suppression hearing that he saw open beer cans on the floorboard of the
    passenger side of the vehicle when Brown returned to the vehicle.            The
    presence of an open beer container in a vehicle is a violation of Tupelo city
    ordinances, see Tupelo, Miss., Code of Ordinances § 5-18, which Officer
    Benjamin testified is an arrestable offense. While none of these factors alone
    may have been sufficient to create probable cause, the laminated total was
    more than sufficient. See 
    Olivares-Pacheco, 633 F.3d at 402
    .
    The fact pattern here is analogous to that in United States v. Rice, 
    652 F.2d 521
    (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). In Rice, the court also found probable
    cause to arrest an individual who did not actively participate in passing a
    counterfeit bill, but was with someone who did, when that individual took
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    independent actions that led the police officer to believe the individual “might
    be involved [with] or at least ha[ve] some knowledge of [his associate’s] illegal
    activity.” 
    Id. at 525.
    In Rice, defendants Rice and Williford, accompanied by
    a third individual who was never identified, entered a drug store in a mall,
    where Rice paid the sales clerk using a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill, while
    Williford stood at the magazine rack. 
    Id. at 523.
    After the men left, the clerk
    concluded the bill was counterfeit, notified the manager, and called the police.
    
    Id. at 523–24.
    The clerk and the manager went into the mall to see if they
    could identify the suspects. 
    Id. at 524.
    The clerk was able to indicate Rice and
    Williford to the manager, after which she returned to the store. 
    Id. When a
    police officer arrived, the manager identified Rice and Williford to him. 
    Id. The officer
    approached the men and asked them for identification; they were
    evasive, and their answers raised the officer’s suspicions. 
    Id. After the
    officer
    obtained identification from the men, the store manager again “pointed out
    Rice as the man who had passed the bill to the clerk.” 
    Id. The officer
    arrested
    both men. 
    Id. While Williford
    was being handcuffed, he dropped his wallet,
    which the officer retrieved. 
    Id. The officer
    found two counterfeit bills in the
    wallet. 
    Id. Rice and
    Williford challenged the validity of their arrests for lack of
    probable cause. The court concluded that there was sufficient probable cause
    to support the arrest of both men, even though Williford “did not actively
    participate in passing the bill[.]” 
    Id. at 525.
    The court explained:
    When viewed in totality, not a vacuum, we find the officer had before
    him information that (i) three men had passed a counterfeit bill at
    Skillern’s Drug Store, (ii) Williford was with Rice, (iii) they both
    were reluctant to identify themselves on the officer’s request,
    initially only giving their first names, (iv) both denied possessing
    any identification, (v) it was only on his specific notice of the wallet
    in Williford’s pocket and repeated request for identification that
    Williford produced the driver’s license which bore another name and
    picture, and (vi) the bill Rice was charged with passing was indeed
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    counterfeit. . . . Williford’s action in seeking to (i) hide his true
    identity, (ii) evade giving even his last name, and (iii) avoid giving
    identification until the officer spotted his wallet, when combined
    with the other factors, establish the officer had probable cause to
    arrest him.
    
    Id. Here, Brown
    took independent actions, like Williford in Rice, that
    suggested he was more than a mere bystander to a co-defendant’s criminal
    actions. A review of the police surveillance video of the stop reveals that Brown
    walked away from Officer Benjamin, despite the fact that Officer Benjamin
    had activated the blue lights on his patrol car immediately after pulling in
    behind Brown and Jones’s truck. Moreover, Brown continued walking towards
    the convenience store despite multiple orders from Officer Benjamin to return
    to the truck. In Rice, Williford hid his true identity, evaded giving his last
    name, and avoided giving identification to the police officer. 
    Id. The court
    said
    that those actions could reasonably lead the officer to believe that Williford
    “might be involved [with] or at least ha[ve] some knowledge of [his associate’s]
    illegal activity.” 
    Id. Similarly, Brown’s
    actions in avoiding Officer Benjamin
    reasonably suggested that he might be involved with the crime of passing
    counterfeit money or have some knowledge of the crime. Other courts have
    found probable cause in similar situations. 6
    6See 
    Hernandez, 825 F.2d at 849
    (finding probable cause to arrest two men where
    carnival vendor had described both men, only one of whom had tried to pass a counterfeit
    bill, and police officers had subsequently found the defendant and his co-defendant a short
    time later at the carnival and the men matched the vendor’s description); see also United
    States v. Nash, 
    946 F.2d 679
    , 681 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding probable cause where store clerk
    called police to report a man fitting the description of a robber broadcast over the radio, and
    when police approached the cab in which the man was sitting, “he exited the cab and
    attempted to leave the scene,” but “was stopped by police, who determined that he matched
    the description given with the exception of clothing color”); United States v. Hill, 
    340 F. Supp. 344
    , 348 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding probable cause to arrest passengers in rear seat of car, when
    only the individual in the front seat appeared to have engaged in an illegal transaction,
    explaining that the fact that the passengers “left the rear seat” and “started to walk away,”
    when “taken with the surrounding facts indicates enough guilty knowledge of the transaction
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    Brown argues that Rice is distinguishable because Williford was evasive
    about his identity whereas Brown was not. This argument is unpersuasive.
    The relevance of Rice is that a defendant’s actions raised suspicion that he was
    more than a bystander to his co-defendant’s illegal activity, i.e., that he was
    involved with or knew of the illegal activity. Brown’s actions in ignoring the
    patrol car’s flashing lights and disobeying Officer Benjamin’s orders did
    precisely that.
    Likewise, Brown’s argument that “a person’s presence at the scene of an
    offense and association with persons connected to an offense are insufficient to
    establish probable cause” is unavailing. We do not find probable cause solely
    because of Brown’s presence, although that is one layer we consider in the
    laminated total. See 
    Olivares-Pacheco, 633 F.3d at 402
    ; 
    Harlan, 35 F.3d at 179
    . Brown engaged in independent actions that reasonably raised Officer
    Benjamin’s suspicions, and Officer Benjamin saw open beer containers on
    Brown’s side of the vehicle, in violation of local law. Taken together, these
    factors establish probable cause.
    For these reasons, we conclude that Officer Benjamin’s reasonable
    suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest Brown.
    V.     ERRORS IN DISTRICT COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS
    Brown contends that the district court’s ruling contained several factual
    errors that constitute clear error, and therefore warrant reversal. Specifically,
    to overcome any presumption that they were merely innocent passengers, and in the Court’s
    opinion established probable cause for their arrest likewise”); Matter of E.G., 
    482 A.2d 1243
    ,
    1247 (D.C. 1984) (finding probable cause where suspect matched complainant’s description
    and refused officer’s order to halt; the court explained that “the strong correlation between
    appellant’s appearance and the description possessed by [the officer], together with
    appellant’s proximity to the crime scene and his behavior when confronted with a police order
    to halt, tips the scales here in favor of probable cause”); LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.4(c)
    (explaining that “if the officer attempts a lawful stop but the suspect ‘refused to stop when
    initially ordered to do so,’ this may also be taken into account” in the probable cause analysis).
    14
    Case: 13-60223     Document: 00512551826     Page: 15    Date Filed: 03/06/2014
    No. 13-60223
    he challenges the district court’s findings that: (1) counterfeit money was found
    “in the vehicle and on the persons of Jones and Brown”; (2) Guyton “provided
    a description of the persons that were offering the counterfeit bills”; (3) Brown
    was a passenger in the truck and “almost immediately exited the truck and
    attempted to walk into the convenience store”; (4) and Guyton told “one or both
    or both defendants, ‘You gave me a fake 100-dollar bill.’” Brown also argues
    that the district court committed clear error when it stated that Jones’s
    response to Guyton, that he “will make it right,” was “indicative to the [c]ourt
    that Jones and the other occupant, Brown, were aware that the currency
    passed at the yard sale was counterfeit currency.”
    We conclude that the district court’s first finding constitutes clear error,
    since there was no testimony that counterfeit money was found on Brown’s
    person. However, the district court’s erroneous finding does not alter our Terry
    or probable cause analyses, since there was sufficient evidence to reach our
    conclusions absent the error. Therefore, the court’s finding does not affect
    Brown’s substantial rights, and is harmless error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; see
    United States v. Hughes, 
    726 F.3d 656
    , 668 (5th Cir. 2013).
    The district court’s other findings are not clearly erroneous. Guyton
    provided a description of both Jones and Brown, and their vehicle, that was
    sufficient for Officer Benjamin to identify them.       The fact that Guyton’s
    description of Brown was less specific than her description of Jones is not
    material; Brown was found accompanying Jones and in the vehicle that Guyton
    described. The court’s finding that Brown was a passenger in the vehicle and
    attempted to enter the convenience store is supported by the record and the
    patrol car’s video. The court’s finding that Guyton informed “one or both
    defendants” of the counterfeit bill is likewise not erroneous, since the record
    reveals that she made her statement to Jones.
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    Case: 13-60223     Document: 00512551826      Page: 16   Date Filed: 03/06/2014
    No. 13-60223
    Finally, the court did not commit clear error when it suggested that
    Jones’s statement was indicative of Brown’s guilt. Since Guyton’s information
    implicated both defendants, and Brown’s independent actions reasonably
    raised Officer Benjamin’s suspicions, there is a “reasonable view of the
    evidence [] support[ing]” the district court’s statement. See 
    Scroggins, 599 F.3d at 440
    . Moreover, even if the court’s statement were clearly erroneous, it would
    not change our Terry or probable cause analyses, since there was sufficient
    evidence to reach our conclusions without consideration of Jones’s statement.
    VI.    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
    16