Whitman v. Hogan ( 2002 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-20538
    Summary Calendar
    HARRY J. WHITMAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    WILLIAM HOGAN; MICHAEL P. LANE; DAVID WATKINS;
    ROBERT KLEMM; KRISTINA ANDERSON; RONALD SAFER;
    JANE DOE; GERALD SHUR; JOHN DOE; EUGENE L.
    COON, JR; GERALD BUNN; JOHN M. CLEVELAND; ERIC
    JOHNSON; JOE DOE; RICHARD I. FREDERICK; MCKASKLE;
    RICHARD ENGELE; C. DOE; D. DOE; WASHINGTON;
    RONALD G. THOMPSON; ERNEST V. CHANDLER; MIKE
    COOKSEY, Sued in their individual and official
    capacities; MICHAEL MCKINNEY; R. A. SMITH;
    LOFTIN, Sued in their individual capacities;
    WARDEN ALDER; ASSISTANT WARDEN OUTLAW,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. H-01-CV-541
    --------------------
    February 1, 2002
    Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    “A timely notice of appeal is necessary to the exercise
    of appellate jurisdiction.” United States v. Cooper, 
    135 F.3d 960
    ,
    961 (5th Cir. 1998).     Harry J. Whitman, federal inmate #23111-037,
    filed notice of appeal on May 14, 2001, to appeal the court’s order
    entered on May 7, 2001.          Whitman argues that this notice is
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 01-20538
    -2-
    effective for appealing the district court’s May 7 order, and he
    implies that the notice is a premature but effective notice for
    appealing the court’s May 25, 2001, final judgment.
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure “4(a)(2) permits a
    notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice of
    appeal from the final judgment only when a district court announces
    a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the
    entry of judgment.”      FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage
    Ins., 
    498 U.S. 269
    , 276 (1991).         “Although an appeal need not be
    from a final judgment, still it must be from a final decision.”
    Cooper, 
    135 F.3d at 962
    .            Whitman’s notice of appeal is not
    effective notice.    Whitman filed notice to appeal the May 7 order,
    and that order is not a final decision under Rule 4(a)(2).               See
    FirsTier Mortgage Co., 
    498 U.S. at 274-76
    .         Whitman’s ineffective
    notice neither conferred jurisdiction on this court nor divested
    the   district   court   of   its   jurisdiction   over   the    case.   See
    Resolution Trust Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 
    27 F.3d 122
    , 126 (5th Cir. 1994).
    The final decision in this case was the district court’s
    amended memorandum order entered May 25, which reflected the
    district court’s grant in part of Whitman’s motion that sought
    reconsideration of the May 7 order.       There was nothing left for the
    district court to do but enter final judgment.              Review of the
    documents filed either in the district court or in this court,
    filed after entry of final judgment, fails to reveal a document
    filed by Whitman within the relevant period for timely notice and
    which evinces a clear intent by Whitman to appeal.              See Mosley v.
    No. 01-20538
    -3-
    Cozby, 
    813 F.2d 659
    , 660 (5th Cir. 1987).   Consequently, we do not
    have jurisdiction over the appeal.
    APPEAL DISMISSED.