Jerald Dorsey v. Thomas Relf , 559 F. App'x 401 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-10356      Document: 00512583106         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/02/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-10356                                  April 2, 2014
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    JERALD JEROME DORSEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    THOMAS RELF, Correctional Officer; JORDAN BOONE, Correctional Officer;
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:12-CV-21
    Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Jerald Jerome Dorsey, federal prisoner # 58306-019, appeals the district
    court’s grant of defendants’ summary judgment motion on his civil rights
    claims, brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau
    of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971), and the dismissal of his negligent training
    claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Dorsey specifically
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-10356     Document: 00512583106     Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/02/2014
    No. 13-10356
    alleges that the district court erred in determining that Thomas Relf and
    Jordan Boone did not act with deliberate indifference when they failed to
    transport him to medical after he fell out of his wheelchair, that the court erred
    by sua sponte granting summary judgment on his negligence claims, and that
    the court erred by determining that his claim for negligent training was barred
    by the discretionary function exception in the FTCA. Dorsey had not briefed
    any additional claims; thus, he has abandoned, by failing to brief, any
    argument relative to the district court’s dismissal of the remaining claims
    raised in his complaint.    See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th
    Cir.1993); FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(6).
    First, Dorsey, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, argues that Relf and
    Boone acted with deliberate indifference because they did not transport him to
    medical after they discovered that he had fallen out of his wheelchair; Dorsey
    alleges that he informed Relf and Boone that he was in pain and that he
    thought that his leg was broken. This court reviews the grant of a motion for
    summary judgment de novo. Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 
    576 F.3d 221
    , 226 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Dorsey has not carried his burden of showing that Relf and Boone’s
    conduct was “reckless--without regard to the rights of others,” “causeless[],
    without restraint, and in reckless disregard of the rights of others.” Johnson
    v. Treen, 
    759 F.2d 1236
    , 1238 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 
    461 U.S. 30
    , 39 n.8 (1983), internal quotation marks omitted). It is undisputed that
    Dorsey fell out of his wheelchair during “count,” in which prison officials
    perform a count of each prisoner. According to Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy,
    count is not to be interrupted, and prisoners are not to be moved during count,
    absent an emergency, which includes a severe medical condition that warrants
    timely medical attention.     It is likewise undisputed that Relf and Boone
    2
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    No. 13-10356
    inspected Dorsey’s leg and discovered no swelling, blood, or protruding bone;
    Dorsey’s medical treatment was delayed, at most, by an hour and fifteen
    minutes. Based on the lack of evidence establishing that Relf and Boone knew
    that Dorsey’s leg was broken, the absence of obvious signs showing that his leg
    was broken, the fact that the incident occurred during count, and the length of
    the delay, Dorsey has failed to show that the district court erred in determining
    that Relf and Boone did not act with deliberate indifference. See Johnson v.
    Treen, 
    759 F.2d 1236
    , 1238 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Walker v. Butler, 
    967 F.2d 176
    , 178 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Second, Dorsey’s argument that the district court erred in sua sponte
    granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his negligence claims
    is belied by the record; he argues that he did not have an opportunity to provide
    evidence and argument supporting his negligence claims. Although Dorsey
    alleges that defendants did not move for summary judgment on these claims,
    the record reflects otherwise. See John Deere Co. v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 
    809 F.2d 1190
    , 1192 (5th Cir. 1987).
    Third, Dorsey has not established that the district court erred by
    determining that his negligent training claim was barred by the discretionary
    function exception to the FTCA.      The FTCA provides a limited waiver of
    sovereign immunity from suit for claims regarding “injury or loss of property,
    or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful
    act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
    scope of his office or employment.”        28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).    Under the
    discretionary function exception, the waiver of immunity does not apply to any
    claim “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
    perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
    employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
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    abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); see Guile v. United States, 
    422 F.3d 221
    , 229 (5th
    Cir. 2005). BOP policy regarding count provides that if a medical issue arises
    during count, correctional officers are required to assess the situation and
    determine whether the medical condition is sufficiently severe to justify the
    interruption of count. Because Relf and Boone exercised their judgment and
    discretion when deciding not to interrupt count by transporting Dorsey to
    medical, he has not shown that the district court erred in determining that the
    challenged act involved “an element of judgment or choice” and that Relf’s and
    Boone’s judgment was of “the kind that the discretionary function exception
    was designed to shield.” United States v. Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. 315
    , 322-23 (1991).
    AFFIRMED.
    4