Ghassan v. I.N.S. ( 1992 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 91-4664
No. 92-4177
_______________
IBRAHIM FEZ GHASSAN,
Petitioner,
VERSUS
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
_________________________
Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
_________________________
(September 8, 1992)
Before WISDOM, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Ibrahim Fez Ghassan, a native and citizen of Lebanon who was
a permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of
conspiracy to import and distribute heroin. After he was released
from prison, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
began deportation proceedings. An immigration judge ("IJ") denied
his application for waiver of deportation, and the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed that denial and denied
Ghassan's motions to reconsider or reopen. Ghassan petitions for
review of the BIA's decisions. Finding that the decisions were
within the BIA's discretion, we deny the petitions.
I.
Ghassan first came to the United States in 1978 at the age of
seventeen to attend college in Minnesota. In 1980 he began dating
Donna Owings, a United States citizen and resident of Minnesota.
This relationship ended in 1982 when Owings moved to North Carolina
with her parents.
In 1981 Ghassan gained permanent resident alien status. In
1983 he and several other Lebanese citizens, including his brother,
began a scheme to import and distribute heroin. The following
year, Ghassan pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with
conspiracy to import and distribute heroin; he was sentenced to
eight years in prison and a $25,000 fine.
While Ghassan served his sentence, Owings contacted him and
they began corresponding. She was married and had a son but was
separated from her husband because he had abused her. Ghassan was
released from prison in 1989 into the custody of the INS, which
initiated deportation proceedings in Louisiana in March 1989,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11).1 Ghassan and Owings, who had
divorced her first husband, were married in September 1989, at
which time Owings knew that Ghassan was liable to be deported.
Ghassan was charged with deportability because of his heroin
conspiracy conviction. He admitted the conviction, and the IJ
1
Now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i).
2
found him to be deportable. Ghassan declared that he would apply
for a waiver of deportation and for asylum; the application for
asylum later was withdrawn.
In March 1990, the IJ held a hearing on the merits of the
waiver application and then denied the application. Ghassan
appealed this decision to the BIA, which received briefs and heard
oral argument. The BIA denied the waiver application on July 12,
1991. Ghassan then filed a petition for review with this court.
While that petition was pending, Ghassan filed with the BIA a
motion to reopen the deportation proceedings and a motion to
reconsider its decision. The BIA denied both motions. Ghassan
then sought our review of the denial of those motions. The
petitions have been consolidated in this case.
II.
Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act2
allows the Attorney General to waive deportation of eligible
permanent resident aliens, including those convicted of controlled
substances offenses. To be eligible for waiver, an alien must have
been in legal permanent residence for at least seven years. The
2
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). By its terms the statute seems to apply only to
aliens who temporarily left the country voluntarily, but the Second Circuit has
held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids distinguishing between aliens who
briefly left and reentered the country and are facing deportation proceedings and
those who have not left and are being deported. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d
268, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1976). The BIA applies the Second Circuit's ruling
nationwide. See Ashby v. INS, 961 F.2d 555, 557 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992); Mantell v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 798 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1986).
3
INS does not dispute that Ghassan was eligible to apply for the
waiver.
We recently explained the BIA's balancing test for considering
applications under section 212(c):
The immigration judge must balance the adverse factors
evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident
with the social and humane considerations presented in his
behalf to determine whether the granting of section 212(c)
relief appears in the best interests of this country . . . .
Among the factors deemed adverse to a respondent's application
have been the nature and underlying circumstances of the
exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional signifi-
cant violations of this country's immigration laws, the
existence of a criminal record, and if so, its nature,
recency, and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence
indicative of a respondent's bad character or undesirability
as a permanent resident of this country . . . . Favorable
considerations have been found to include such factors as
family ties within the United States, residence of long
duration in this country (particularly when the inception of
residence occurred while the respondent was of young age),
evidence of hardship to the respondent and family if deporta-
tion occurs, service in this country's armed forces, a history
of employment, the existence of property or business ties,
evidence of value and service to the community, proof of a
genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other
evidence attesting to a respondent's good character.
Diaz-Resendez v. INS, 960 F.2d 493, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting
In re Marin, 16 I & N Dec. 581, 584 (BIA 1978)). We also stated
that "[a]pplicants for discretionary relief who have been convicted
of serious drug offenses must show `unusual or outstanding
equities'" and that "an applicant with a criminal record will
ordinarily be required to make a showing of rehabilitation." Id.
at 496.
The IJ found that Ghassan had established rehabilitation but
that the hardship Ghassan's wife faced was diminished because she
had entered into the marriage with knowledge that he might be
4
deported. The IJ also reasoned that Ghassan's length of residence
was undercut by the fact that he had been a permanent resident
alien for only one year more than the minimum required for
eligibility under section 212(c). Finally, the IJ found it
significant that he had served four and one-half years of his
prison sentence, stating that such a duration was two years longer
than normal.
On administrative appeal, the BIA ruled that the IJ had erred
in attributing any significance to the length of Ghassan's
incarceration. The BIA then considered the factors weighing in
favor of granting waiver to Ghassan, most notably the extent to
which his wife and her son depended upon him and the hardship they
would suffer if he were deported, which would be exacerbated by the
fact that United States law would prevent them from traveling to
Lebanon with him. The BIA agreed with the IJ, however, that the
wife's hardship was lessened by her prior knowledge of possible
deportation.
The BIA also disagreed with the IJ's conclusion regarding
rehabilitation, stating that it was "unconvinced" of Ghassan's
rehabilitation. Finally, the BIA stressed the gravity of drug
offenses under our immigration laws. After balancing the factors,
the BIA dismissed the appeal.
III.
Although Ghassan questions the standard of review we apply to
BIA decisions on section 212(c) applications, we recently made
5
plain that we look for abuse of discretion. In Diaz-Resendez,
decided after the briefs were submitted in the instant case, we
stated,
The Board's denial of an applicant's petition for relief
under section 212(c) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Such denial will be upheld unless it is arbitrary, irrational,
or contrary to law . . . .
Under this standard, the Board's decision may be reversed
as an abuse of discretion when it is made without rational
explanation, or inexplicably departs from established poli-
cies. Further, a decision by the Board may be found arbitrary
if the Board fails to address meaningfully all material
factors extant.
Findings of fact supporting the Board's exercise of
discretion, however, are reviewed merely to determine whether
they are supported by substantial evidence.
Id. at 495 (citations omitted).
Ghassan argues that the BIA considered an irrelevant factor
when it stated that his wife's hardship was diminished by the fact
that she had entered the marriage with knowledge of his possible
deportation. We disagree. The factors the BIA considers are
equities, matters of fairness. Considering his wife's previous
knowledge seems eminently equitable. See In re Correa, 19 I & N
Dec. 130, 134 (BIA 1984) (discounting equities arising after a
final order of deportation).3
Ghassan also argues that the BIA failed to consider all of the
relevant evidence. Our examination of the BIA's opinion shows,
however, that to the extent it can consider evidence presented for
3
Although Correa, by its terms, applies only to equities arising after a
final order of deportation, Ghassan has provided us with no convincing reason not
to hold that prenuptial knowledge of the possibility of deportation is an
equitable factor weighing against the hardship that a spouse may suffer.
6
the first time on appeal, the BIA did consider all of Ghassan's
evidence )) it just did not find it compelling.
Finally, Ghassan argues that the BIA erred in finding that he
was not rehabilitated. His challenge has two prongs: First, he
argues that the BIA should not have disregarded the IJ's finding,
because the INS did not challenge that finding in its brief.4 We
disagree.
Unlike the circuit courts of appeals, the BIA is not a court
of error.5 See e.g., Cordoba-Chaves v. INS, 946 F.2d 1244, 1249
(7th Cir. 1991); DeLucia v. INS, 370 F.2d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). The BIA reviews the record de
novo and is not bound by the IJ's findings. Castillo-Rodriguez v.
INS, 929 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1991); Rivera v. INS, 810 F.2d
540, 541 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Lok, 18 I & N Dec. 101, 106 (BIA
1981), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Lok v. INS, 681 F.2d 109
(2d Cir. 1982).6 Indeed, where no party has appealed an IJ's
ruling, the BIA may certify proceedings to itself. 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(c) (1991). In the instant case, the BIA based its decision
4
The INS did not file a formal brief with the BIA. Rather, it filed a
memorandum adopting the IJ's findings.
5
The cases upon which Ghassan bases this portion of his argument refer not
to arguments raised before the BIA but to arguments raised for the first time
before courts of appeals. E.g., Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir.
1990); United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1989).
6
Although Ghassan likens findings of rehabilitation to findings of
credibility, in which the BIA generally defers to the IJ, that analogy is
incorrect. Findings of rehabilitation require consideration of evidence
extrinsic to that presented by the subject witness and depend upon more than his
demeanor.
7
upon the administrative record as a whole. There was no procedural
impropriety.
Second, Ghassan argues that the BIA abused its discretion
because the evidence in the record overwhelmingly establishes his
rehabilitation. We disagree again. In rejecting Ghassan's appeal
the BIA stated,
[D]espite the immigration judge's finding, we remain
unconvinced as to the respondent's rehabilitation. He
took part in an elaborate criminal conspiracy despite the
obvious consequences if he should be discovered and
despite the pernicious nature of the activity in which he
was engaged. We are not persuaded by the respondent's
good behavior since his conviction that he will not
succumb again to his family's pressure and the temptation
of the large profits to be had in such activities.
The BIA did not refer to any specific evidence to support its
finding that Ghassan is not rehabilitated. The BIA need not "write
an exegesis on every contention," however. Rather, its opinion
must reflect that "it has heard and thought and not merely
reacted." Luciano-Vincente v. INS, 786 F.2d 706, 708-09 (5th Cir.
1986) (quoting Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (5th Cir.
1984)). After reviewing the BIA's opinion and the record, we find
that the BIA provided us with sufficient basis to review its
decision.
The BIA's ruling states that Ghassan has not established that
his brother will be unable to entice him into another criminal
scheme. Ghassan has the burden of proving that he deserves
discretionary relief from deportation. Diaz-Resendez, 960 F.2d at
495. Although Ghassan introduced several affidavits to his good
character and excellent recent employment history, nothing in the
8
record shows that his brother is no longer involved in criminal
activity, nor is there evidence that Ghassan has become immune to
his brother's blandishments or has broken off contact with him.
Indeed, according to his testimony during the waiver hearing,
Ghassan solicited an affidavit from his brother that asserted that
Ghassan had not been involved in the heroin conspiracy and had
pleaded guilty in a plea bargain to protect the brother, an
assertion that Ghassan admitted was not true.7 Further, as the BIA
noted, nothing reveals how Ghassan would cope with financial
hardship.
Having failed to prove rehabilitation, Ghassan could have
little hope of obtaining section 212(c) waiver of deportation.
Although rehabilitation is not a formal prerequisite for waiver, it
is a crucial factor. "As the negative factors grow more serious,
it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to introduce additional
offsetting favorable evidence, which in some cases may involve
unusual or outstanding equities." Diaz-Resendez, 960 F.2d at 496
(quoting Marin, 16 I & N Dec. at 585). "[A]n applicant with a
criminal record will ordinarily be required to make a showing of
rehabilitation before section 212(c) relief will be granted." Id.
Furthermore, as the BIA stated in its denial of the motion for
reconsideration, even if Ghassan had been found rehabilitated, such
a finding would not dispose of his application for relief.
Ghassan's crime, participation in a well organized, international
7
Additionally, at least one circuit court has recognized that the
involvement of members of a petitioner's family in crime may be a negative factor
in these proceedings. Munez-Pena v. INS, 956 F.2d 223, 226 (10th Cir. 1992).
9
scheme to smuggle heroin into the United States and distribute it,
was extremely serious.8
The BIA legitimately could conclude, consistently with its prior
holdings, that when balanced against the equities in his favor,
which were diminished because his wife married him knowing that he
might be deported, the conviction tipped the scales, especially as
his wife's son was not his by blood or adoption and Ghassan was not
a child when he came to this country.9
IV.
We next consider Ghassan's petition to reopen the deportation
proceedings. Ghassan moved for reopening so that the BIA could
consider additional evidence of his rehabilitation and the hardship
that deportation would cause him and his family. The BIA denied
the motion because it found that Ghassan was statutorily ineligible
to apply for relief under section 212(c).
In order to warrant reopening, a petitioner must make a prima
facie showing that he is eligible for the relief sought. INS v.
8
The Supreme Court repeatedly has acknowledged the severity of the
societal problems stemming from the importation of illegal drugs. See, e.g.,
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (drug
smuggling "one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our
population"); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)
(citing "veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of
illicit narcotics"); see also Scarabin v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 966 F.2d 989,
994-95 (per curiam) (discussing "drug scourge"); Guan Chow Tok v. INS, 538 F.2d
36 (2d Cir. 1976) (distinction between narcotics offenders and other offenders
reasonable) (cited in Anetekhai v. INS, 876 F.2d 1218, 1224 (5th Cir. 1989)); In
re Cerna, Interim Dec. 3161 (BIA Oct. 7, 1991) (few adverse matters BIA views as
more serious than illegal drug importation).
9
Ghassan also argues that the BIA erred in calling the hardship inflicted
by his deportation to Lebanon, where his family could not follow, an unusual
equity, rather than two unusual equities. This argument is without merit. The
BIA engages in equitable balancing, not mathematical equations. See Diaz-
Resendez, 960 F.2d at 495-96.
10
Abudu, 485 U.S. 904, 912 (1988). The BIA deems deportation
determinations final after the board's decision on appeal. E.g.,
Lok, 18 I & N Dec. at 105; see C.F.R. § 243.1 (1991). After such
a final decision, the petitioner's status as a permanent resident
alien is ended. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20). Thus, the BIA
reasoned that Ghassan's case cannot be reopened to reconsider
section 212(c) relief because after the BIA's initial determina-
tion, he no longer meets the section 212(c) requirement of seven
years as a permanent resident alien, as he is no longer a permanent
resident alien.
Although Ghassan disputes the standard of review, it is
settled that we review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse
of discretion. See INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985).
Where the denial rests on a finding of statutory ineligibility, we
also review for errors of law. Finally, we give great weight to
the agency's interpretation of it own regulations, but this
interpretation may be discounted if it is plainly unreasonable. Ka
Fung Chan v. INS, 634 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981).
Ghassan objects to the fact that the BIA treats the motion to
reopen as a new application for section 212(c) relief. If this
were the first time he had attempted to obtain relief under
section 212(c) in the context of these proceedings, such a rule
would make sense, he argues, but when a petitioner is seeking to
reopen the proceedings to present new evidence on the same grounds
for relief, treating the motion as a new application seems
unreasonable.
11
Our prior decisions preclude Ghassan's argument. We have
already effectively upheld the BIA's practice. In Garcia-Hernandez
v. INS, 821 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1987), where we had affirmed
the denial by the BIA of section 212(c) relief before a motion to
reopen was filed, we stated, "[W]hen that [section 212(c)] claim
was defeated finally by denial in appeal to this court and the
determination of deportability had also become final before that
time, there was no longer any authority to reopen . . . because
petitioner clearly was no longer in lawfully admitted permanent
residence." We also have upheld the INS's position that a
deportability decision becomes final at the time the BIA renders
its decision and that permanent resident alien status ends at that
time. See Rivera v. INS, 810 F.2d 540, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1987),
vacating on reh'g 791 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1986).
In Rivera we considered whether a petition for section 212(c)
relief could be instituted after a final decision of deportability.
In the instant case, as in Garcia-Hernandez, the original petition
for section 212(c) relief was filed before the final decision of
deportability; thus, Ghassan had the right to pursue that relief.
Unlike the circumstance in Garcia-Hernandez, the BIA's decision to
deny section 212(c) relief has not been upheld by this court. That
does not provide a basis upon which to distinguish this case.
In Garcia-Hernandez we concluded that the BIA was correct in
holding that the petitioner was no longer eligible for
section 212(c) relief because he was no longer a lawful resident
and so could not obtain reopening. 821 F.2d at 224. Under Rivera
12
an alien's lawful status ends when the BIA rules him deportable.
810 F.2d at 541-42. Thus, after the BIA decides that an alien is
deportable, he is no longer a legal resident and thus is not
eligible for section 212(c) relief, so his petition for reopening
must be rejected.10 Accordingly, the BIA did not err in denying
Ghassan's motion to reopen.
V.
Ghassan makes three arguments as to his motion to reconsider.
First, he raises essentially the same points as in his petition on
the merits. Second, he contends that the BIA erred by not
considering evidence that was submitted during the appeal and with
the motion to reconsider. Third, he states that the BIA erred in
refusing to reconsider that a change in INS policy, banning
deportees from reentry for twenty years, rather than five,
increased the hardship on him and his family.
We review the denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of
discretion. Osuchukwu, 744 F.2d at 1141. Reopening and
reconsideration are not favored. Abudu, 485 U.S. at 107. We do
not believe that the BIA erred.
Ghassan's first point of error reiterates his arguments
concerning the plural nature of his outstanding equities, the BIA's
consideration of his rehabilitation, and the BIA's discounting of
his family hardship because his marriage occurred after deportation
10
Accord Gonzales v. INS, 921 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding
rule). Contra Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding rule arbitrary
and capricious).
13
proceedings had begun. We already have rejected those arguments
and need not revisit them.
Nor do we accept Ghassan's second argument that the BIA erred
by not considering additional evidence of his rehabilitation and
hardship that he submitted during the administrative appeal. The
BIA stated that it did not consider this evidence because the BIA
considers only the record that was before the IJ. The BIA is
correct.
When evidence is submitted with a motion to reopen or
reconsider, the BIA considers that evidence only as necessary to
determine whether a new hearing is warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8
(1991) ("Motions to reopen shall state the new facts to be proved
at the reopened hearing . . . ."). It would be inappropriate for
the BIA to revise its opinion based upon evidence that had not been
tested in the "crucible of the judicial process," including cross
examination.11
Finally, Ghassan argues that the BIA should have reconsidered
because his hardship was increased by a change in INS policy,
whereby his reentry after deportation would be barred for twenty
years instead of five.12 The BIA correctly noted that this was, in
essence, a motion to reopen for consideration of additional
evidence and thus, as we have explained, was not available to
11
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983); Marrero v. City of
Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Imbler v. Pechtman, 424 U.S.
409, 439-40 (1976) (White, J., concurring)).
12
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(B) (deported alien convicted of an aggravated
felony who seeks admission within 20 years is excludable). In 1991 the INS
announced that it would apply that provision to convictions that predate its
enactment in 1988. 68 Interpreter Releases 341 (Mar. 25, 1991).
14
Ghassan. The BIA further stated that even if it considered the
matter to be a motion to reconsider, Ghassan had not demonstrated
any additional hardship he will suffer on account of the change in
the law.
We do not believe that the BIA abused its discretion in
rejecting the motion. The portion of Ghassan's motion addressing
the INS policy seeks to convince the BIA to consider new facts that
were not before the IJ. It is thus a motion to reopen, not a
motion to reconsider. See Pierre v. INS, 932 F.2d 418, 421-22 (5th
Cir. 1991); 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1991). For reasons already discussed,
Ghassan was no longer eligible for reopening, and we reject his
argument.
VI.
We recognize that deporting Ghassan may cause hardship to him,
his wife, and her son. Nevertheless, in light of the well
established public policy against drug trafficking, we cannot say
that the BIA abused its discretion in mandating Ghassan's
deportation. As the importation of illegal narcotics continues to
pose a grave menace to society, those involved with the drug trade
can expect to find that they inevitably hurt those they care for as
well as those upon whom they prey.
AFFIRMED.
15