Robert Tuft v. State of Texas , 397 F. App'x 59 ( 2010 )


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  •      Case: 10-20135   Document: 00511251911   Page: 1   Date Filed: 10/04/2010
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 4, 2010
    No. 10-20135
    Summary Calendar                   Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ROBERT ALEXANDER TUFT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS; VERNON PITTMAN, Warden-Jester 3; JEROLD BRAGGS,
    Assistant Warden, Jester 3; GUY SMITH, Assistant Regional Director-Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice; DOUG WALDRON, Assistant
    Regional Director-Texas Department of Criminal Justice; J. P. GUYTON, Assistant
    Regional Director-Texas Department of Criminal Justice; SUSAN DOSTAL, University
    of Texas Medical Branch Medical Program Administrator; NATHANIEL
    QUARTERMAN, Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional
    Institutions Division; MELANIE POTTER, MLP P.A., University of Texas Medical
    Branch; JALYN WILSON, P.T. University of Texas Medical Branch; PATSY GUERRA,
    (Velasquez), Texas Department of Criminal Justice Access to Courts; VICKY
    BARROWS, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Access to Courts; ARLINE
    WALKER, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Access to Courts; RACHEL
    CROSBY, C.O.V. Texas Department of Criminal Justice; CHERYL LAWSON, Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice Grievance Analyst; MARK A. ANDREWS, Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice Chaplain; JOHN AND JANE DOE(S), Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice/University of Texas Medical Branch, Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division Staff,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:09-CV-846
    Case: 10-20135       Document: 00511251911 Page: 2             Date Filed: 10/04/2010
    No. 10-20135
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Robert Tuft, Texas prisoner # 1062966, appeals the dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     civil rights action for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 41(b).         Tuft’s amended complaint against over a dozen
    defendants raised nine claims relating to the conditions of his confinement, the
    failure to evacuate for a hurricane, the denial of access to the courts, the
    infringement of his religious freedom, and retaliation by prison officials. The
    district court ordered Tuft to file a second amended complaint that contained
    only claims related to a single set of facts in accordance with Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure 18 and 20. When he failed to do so, district court dismissed
    Tuft’s lawsuit without prejudice under Rule 41(b).
    We review such a dismissal “for abuse of discretion.” Larson v. Scott, 
    157 F.3d 1030
    , 1032 (5th Cir. 1998). However, because at least some of Tuft’s claims
    would not be time barred, the scope of the discretion is narrowed. See Berry v.
    CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 
    975 F.2d 1188
    , 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1992).
    Under Rule 20(a)(2), parties may be joined as defendants if the plaintiff
    asserts a claim against them “jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
    to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
    occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise
    in the action.” A district court has discretion under Rule 20(a) to control the
    scope of a lawsuit by limiting the number of defendants a plaintiff may hail into
    court in a particular case. Arrington v. City of Fairfield, 
    414 F.2d 687
    , 693 (5th
    Cir. 1969). In addition, “the creative joinder of actions” by prisoner plaintiffs to
    avoid the strictures of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L.
    104-134, §§ 804-05, 
    110 Stat. 1321
    , 1321-73 to -75 (2006) (codified in relevant
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    2
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    No. 10-20135
    part at 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    , 1915A), should be discouraged. Patton v. Jefferson
    Corr. Ctr., 
    136 F.3d 458
    , 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
    In this case, the district court properly found that Tuft’s amended
    complaint transgressed the limitations in Rule 20(a). However, where an action
    is time barred following a dismissal without prejudice, the standard of review is
    the same as if the action had been dismissed with prejudice. Berry, 
    975 F.2d at 1191
    . In this case, there is not a “clear record of delay or contumacious conduct,”
    and the district court has not “expressly determined that lesser sanctions would
    not prompt diligent prosecution.” 
    Id.
     In addition, the record does not show “that
    the district court employed lesser sanctions that proved to be futile.” 
    Id.
    In fact, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, “[m]isjoinder of parties
    is not a ground for dismissing an action.” Instead, a district court, “on motion
    or on its own, . . . may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party” and “may
    also sever any claim against a party.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 21. In other words, a court
    faced with misjoinder “‘has two remedial options: (1) misjoined parties may be
    dropped on such terms as are just; or (2) any claims against misjoined parties
    may be severed and proceeded with separately.’”              Acevedo v. Allsup’s
    Convenience Stores, Inc., 
    600 F.3d 516
    , 520 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting DirectTV,
    Inc. v. Leto, 
    467 F.3d 842
    , 845 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
    citation omitted))). Because the record does not show that Tuft delayed the
    proceedings in this case, acted contumaciously, or deliberately disobeyed court
    orders, the district court abused its discretion “when it dismissed this entire
    action, rather than simply dismissing” misjoined claims, dropping parties, or
    both. 
    Id. at 522
    ; see also Berry, 
    975 F.2d at 1191-92
    .
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding of misjoinder, reverse the
    dismissal of Tuft’s entire lawsuit, and remand the case for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion. We disclaim any limitation on the district court’s
    authority on remand to dismiss any of Tuft’s claims on any other basis, such as
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    No. 10-20135
    any PLRA provisions that may be applicable.   See, e.g.,
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    ;
    § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-20135

Citation Numbers: 397 F. App'x 59

Judges: Benavides, Elrod, Higginbotham, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 10/4/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023