AL Coushatta Tribe v. State of Texas ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    April 16, 2003
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-41030
    ALABAMA COUSHATTA TRIBE OF TEXAS,
    Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,
    versus
    STATE OF TEXAS; ET AL.,
    Defendants,
    STATE OF TEXAS,
    Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for
    the Eastern District of Texas
    (USDC No. 9:01-CV-299)
    _______________________________________________________
    Before KING, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
    set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1
    The Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas sought a declaratory judgment that high-
    stakes gaming activities on tribal lands are lawful and enjoining the State of Texas from
    interfering with such gaming activities. The State counterclaimed to enjoin the Tribe
    from conducting gaming on its lands in accord with Section 207 of Ysleta del Sur Pueblo
    and Alabama Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act. See 
    25 U.S.C. § 737
    .
    The district court ruled in favor of the State, and the Tribe appealed. As we are bound by
    this court’s decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 
    36 F.3d 1325
     (5th Cir. 1994), we
    affirm.
    In 1987, Congress passed the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama Coushatta Indian
    Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1300g et seq. (regarding the Ysleta del
    Sur Pueblo), and 
    25 U.S.C. §§ 731
     et. seq. (regarding the Alabama-Coushatta), which
    restored the trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes. The Act
    also provided that “[a]ll gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of
    Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the [Alabama Coushatta]
    tribe.” 
    25 U.S.C. § 737
    (a); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1300g-6 (prohibiting “[a]ll gaming
    activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas” on the lands of the
    Ysleta del Sur Pueblo).
    This court interpreted the meaning of section 1300g-6 in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v.
    Texas. The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo sued the State of Texas and its governor for refusing to
    negotiate a compact that would permit the tribe to engage in high-stakes gaming under the
    2
    Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). See 
    25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-25
    . The State of Texas
    argued that 25 U.S.C. § 1300g-6 barred the tribe’s suit. After examining the legislative
    history of the Restoration Act, the court concluded that the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo were
    prohibited from engaging in any gaming activity prohibited by Texas state law, and that
    California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
    480 U.S. 202
     (1987), did not alter the
    ordinary meaning of the term “prohibit” in section 1300g-6.
    We are bound by the Ysleta court’s resolution of the meaning of the language
    contained in sections 1300g-6 and 737 of Title 25. Although the Alabama Coushatta
    argue that the Ysleta court’s interpretation was dictum, and thus not binding upon this
    court, we disagree. In one of the appeals consolidated in Ysleta, the State of Texas
    asserted that the Restoration Act independently barred the tribe’s IGRA suit; thus, the
    court was required to determine whether the tribe was precluded from seeking relief
    under the IGRA because the Restoration Act placed greater limits on the tribe’s ability to
    conduct gaming operations. The Ysleta court’s decision to begin its consideration of the
    consolidated appeals was not an exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction. The Alabama
    Coushatta tribe sought a declaratory judgment that high-stakes gaming is permitted on
    tribal lands, and the district court was bound by the Ysleta court’s determination that it is
    not.
    “It has long been a rule of this court that no panel of this circuit can overrule a
    decision previously made by another.” Ryals v. Estelle, 
    661 F.2d 904
    , 906 (5th Cir. Nov.
    3
    1981) (per curiam). However sympathetic we may be to the Tribe’s argument, we may
    not reconsider Ysleta, even if we believed that the case was wrongly decided. See
    Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 
    4 F.3d 350
    , 355-56 (5th Cir. 1993), rev’d en banc on other
    grounds, 
    44 F.3d 334
     (5th Cir. 1995). Just as the district court concluded, we are bound
    by the determination that the Restoration Act precludes the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and the
    Alabama Coushatta tribes from conducting all gaming activities prohibited by Texas law
    on tribal lands.
    AFFIRMED.
    4