United States v. Jackson ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 23, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-31148
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEROME LANG JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CR-32-ALL-C
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Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jerome Lang Jackson appeals his conviction following a jury
trial for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argues
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the firearm found and his statements made to an officer following
an allegedly invalid investigative stop of his vehicle. He also
asserts that his statements were not voluntarily given.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-31148
-2-
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing and trial
show that the officer had probable cause to believe that Jackson
had violated traffic laws by parking his vehicle in the middle of
the roadway and subsequently proceeding down the road without
headlights. Thus, the decision to stop the vehicle was
reasonable. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810
(1996). His further detention was justified by the discovery of
the firearm and the information that he was a convicted felon.
See United States v. Colin, 928 F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1991).
Insofar as Jackson challenges the voluntariness of his
statements, the record reflects that Jackson voluntarily provided
inculpatory statements prior to being arrested and after being
placed in custody and advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). There was no evidence that any of
his statements were made as the result of any form of coercion.
Thus, the record supports the district court’s determination that
the statements were voluntarily made. See United States v.
Mullin, 178 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1989).
Jackson also argues that the evidence was not sufficient for
a reasonable trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
he possessed the firearm found in his vehicle. Jackson admitted
to the officer that the firearm belonged to him and that he was
using it for self-protection. The weapon was in his actual
possession at the time of the stop. The jury apparently did not
No. 02-31148
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find credible Yolanda Jackson’s testimony that she accidently
left the weapon in Jackson’s vehicle. This finding is entitled
to great deference. United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600, 602
(5th Cir. 1994).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson had
been convicted of a felony and that he was in possession of a
firearm that had a nexus with interstate commerce. Thus, the
evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. See United
States v. Ortega-Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1998); 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
AFFIRMED.