Randolph v. Cervantes , 130 F.3d 727 ( 1997 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 97-60035.
Blanche RANDOLPH, as Conservator of Deborah Randolph, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
v.
Al CERVANTES, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
Employee of Pine Belt Mental Health Center; Mary Phillips, In Her
Official Capacity as Employee of Pine Belt Mental Health Center;
Charles Main, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
Executive Director of Pine Belt Mental Health Center; Pine Belt
Mental Health Center; James T. Crane, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Commissioner of Region Twelve Mental Health
Commission; Jack D. Triggs, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Commissioner of Region Twelve Mental Health Commission;
Greg Breland, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
Commissioner of Region Twelve Mental Health Commission; Joe B.
Thompson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commissioner
of Region Twelve Mental Health Commission; Ray Humphreys,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of Region
Twelve Mental Health Commission; Lela Buckley, Individually and in
Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of Region Twelve Mental
Health Commission; Alfred Lott, Individually and in His Official
Capacity as Commissioner of Region Twelve Mental Health Commission;
Kathy Evans, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as
Commissioner of Region Twelve Mental Health Commission; and Region
Twelve Mental Health Commission, a Body Politic, Defendants-
Appellees.
Dec. 22, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi.
Before MAGILL,* SMITH and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
MAGILL, Circuit Judge:
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 DeShaney claim is on appeal from the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
state-actor defendants. The law being settled in this Circuit, we
*
Circuit Judge of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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affirm.
I.
Pine Belt Mental Health Center (Pine Belt) serves patients
located in Mississippi's Region XII, a geographic region including
nine counties. In addition, Pine Belt owns and operates Pine Hill
Apartments, an apartment complex, and leases units in the complex
to patients enrolled in Pine Belt's transitional living program.
Between 1978 and 1991, Deborah Randolph was committed to
various Mississippi state mental hospitals on at least nine
separate occasions. In December 1991, after Randolph allegedly set
fire to her mother's mobile home, Randolph's mother refused to
allow Randolph to live with her and again initiated involuntary
commitment proceedings against Randolph.
On December 11, 1991, the Forrest County Chancery Court
conducted a sanity hearing for Randolph. Al Cervantes, one of Pine
Belt's caseworkers, testified that Randolph could remain in the
community and did not need to be involuntarily hospitalized. After
considering "[o]ut-patient care, day treatment in a hospital, night
treatment in a hospital, home health services, and custodial
placement with an individual, and others ... as alternatives to
institutionalization," I J.A. at 51 (emphasis added), the Chancery
Court released Randolph on her own recognizance and ordered
Randolph to attend out-patient treatment at Pine Belt under
Cervantes's supervision.
After being released on her own recognizance, Randolph
executed a lease for her own government-subsidized apartment. She
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resided at the apartment until June 1992, when she was evicted for
failing to comply with her rent agreement.
Cervantes then helped Randolph apply for residence at Pine
Hill Apartments. On July 1, 1992, Randolph executed a lease with
Pine Belt for a unit at Pine Hill Apartments. The lease required
Randolph to abide by Pine Hill Apartments's rules and to
participate in various programs sponsored by Pine Belt. The lease
also provided that either Randolph or Pine Belt could terminate the
lease upon thirty days written notice. Randolph's residence at
Pine Hill Apartments was voluntary, and Randolph at all times
retained the right to come and go from her unit and Pine Hill
Apartments at will.
On August 18, 1992, Randolph found a used insulin syringe in
a diabetic neighbor's garbage receptacle. Randolph then injected
some of that neighbor's insulin into each of her own eyes. Despite
emergency surgery, Randolph lost one eye entirely and retained only
limited light perception in her other eye.
Randolph's mother, acting as Randolph's conservator, filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Region XII commissioners,
Pine Belt, Pine Belt's executive director, and two Pine Belt
employees (collectively, the defendants), asserting that Randolph's
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated while she was
residing at Pine Hill Apartments because the defendants did not
prevent Randolph from injuring herself. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the defendants
did not have a constitutional duty to protect Randolph from her
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self-inflicted injuries. Randolph's mother appeals.
II.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo and examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line
Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.1992).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a plaintiff must
(1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th
Cir.1994).1 In this case, Randolph's mother alleges that the
defendants had a constitutional duty to protect Randolph from her
self-inflicted injuries because either (1) a "special relationship"
existed between Randolph and the defendants or (2) the defendants
created the danger that befell Randolph. We disagree.
A.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers
upon an individual the right to be free of state-occasioned damage
to her bodily integrity, not the entitlement to governmental
protection from injuries caused by non-state actors. See DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97, 109
S. Ct. 998, 1003-04, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989); Walton v. Alexander,
44 F.3d 1297, 1302 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc). Thus, as a general
1
We assume, without deciding, that Pine Belt is a state actor
subject to potential liability under § 1983.
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rule, "a State's failure to protect an individual against private
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, 109 S.Ct. at 1004.
The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this general
rule where a special relationship exists between the state and the
individual. See id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06.
Particularly, the Supreme Court has explained that a state may have
the constitutional duty to protect an individual from private
violence if the state, "through incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty," has limited the individual's freedom to act on her own
behalf. Id. at 200, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. This Court has explained,
however, that the DeShaney special relationship exists "only when
the state, by its affirmative exercise of power, has custody over
an individual involuntarily or against his will...." Walton, 44
F.3d at 1303. "Absent this "special relationship,' the state has
no duty to protect nor liability from failing to protect a person
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
violence at the hands of a private actor." Id. at 1306.
In this case, Randolph was not involuntarily confined against
her will when she resided at Pine Hill Apartments. The Chancery
Court released Randolph on her own recognizance and only ordered
her to obtain out-patient treatment from Pine Belt. Randolph
voluntarily entered into the lease with Pine Belt and became Pine
Belt's tenant. While Randolph's lease at Pine Hill Apartments
required her to attend various Pine Belt programs, the lease also
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specifically enabled Randolph to terminate the lease upon thirty
days written notice. Moreover, Randolph was free to come and go
from Pine Hill Apartments at any time.
Randolph's mother further contends that a "special
relationship" existed between Randolph and the defendants because
Randolph's mental condition made Randolph compliant with
Cervantes's suggestions and reliant on Cervantes's and Pine Belt's
care and services. However, the mere fact that Randolph's mental
condition may have made her functionally dependant on Pine Belt and
Cervantes does not transform her voluntary tenancy at Pine Hill
Apartments into an involuntary confinement creating a "special
relationship." See Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc.,
961 F.2d 987, 992 (1st Cir.1992) (finding no special relationship
where the mental patient's dependency on his caretakers resulted
from his own mental condition and where "[h]is helplessness was not
attributable to the state's having taken him into custody
involuntarily").
In this case, the defendants never took the affirmative step
of restraining Randolph's liberty so that she was rendered unable
to care for herself, and the defendants never held her
involuntarily or against her will. Accordingly, a "special
relationship" did not exist between Randolph and the defendants.
B.
The state-created danger theory has not been adopted in this
Circuit. See Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412,
1415 (5th Cir.1997) (en banc); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51
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F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir.1995). However, even if we were to adopt
this theory, Randolph's mother could not recover. To prevail under
the state-created danger theory, "[t]he environment created by the
state actors must be dangerous; they must know it is dangerous;
and, to be liable, they must have used their authority to create an
opportunity that would not otherwise have existed for the third
party's crime to occur." Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38
F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir.1994). "The key to the state-created danger
cases ... lies in the state actors' culpable knowledge and conduct
in affirmatively placing an individual in a position of danger,
effectively stripping a person of her ability to defend herself, or
cutting off potential sources of private aid." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Randolph's mother, the defendants allowed and
encouraged Randolph to voluntarily reside at Pine Hill Apartments
as a tenant having the right to come and go from the premises at
any time and having the right to cancel her lease. This will not
trigger a duty under the state-created danger theory, even if we
were to adopt such a theory.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
summary judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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