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 2006-04

Suda v. BP Corp N Amer Inc ( 2006 )


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  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                   April 19, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-20253
Summary Calendar
MARK L. SUDA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BP CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
doing business as BP America, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:04-CV-95
--------------------
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Mark L. Suda, a former employee of BP Corporation North
America, Inc., appeals from the district court’s summary judgment
for BP, concluding that Suda’s state-law claims of fraud and
misrepresentation were preempted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) and that Suda failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the plan.      See
    29 U.S.C. §§ 1132
    (a), 1144(a).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-20253
-2-
After BP terminated Suda’s position in April 2003, Suda
filed this lawsuit in Texas state court, alleging that a BP
official had misrepresented to him that all of the years he had
worked for BP, its predecessor Amoco Corporation, and any BP or
Amoco affiliate would be credited to him.   BP removed the action
to federal district court, arguing ERISA preemption.   In
concluding that Suda’s state-law claims were preempted by ERISA,
the district court determined that:   Suda was seeking relief
under the “2003 BP Severance Benefits Plan” (BP Plan); Suda was
eligible for a severance allowance and other benefits under the
BP Plan; he failed to sign the Employee Termination Agreement
that was necessary for participation in the BP Plan; and Suda had
not exhausted the administrative remedies under the Plan.     The
court concluded that the BP Plan was an ERISA “employee benefit
plan” and that ERISA completely preempted Suda’s state-law
claims.
Suda argues, for the first time, that the BP Plan was not an
ERISA “plan” at all, because it entitled him to receive a single
lump-sum payment, was not “complex,” and did not require an
“ongoing administrative program” or scheme.   This argument
amounts to a contention that the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to consider his state-law claims, because the
existence of an ERISA “plan” is required for federal subject-
matter jurisdiction.   See Tinoco v. Marine Chartering Co.,
    311 F.3d 617
    , 623 (5th Cir. 2002).   The existence of subject-matter
No. 05-20253
-3-
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and we will examine that
issue for the first time on appeal.     See Giles v. NYLCare Health
Plans, Inc.,
    172 F.3d 332
    , 336 (5th Cir. 1999).
Suda relies on a line of authority including Fontenot v. NL
Industries, Inc.,
    953 F.2d 960
     (5th Cir. 1992), and Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne,
    482 U.S. 1
     (1987), for the proposition that
the BP plan is not an ERISA “plan.”   In Fontenot and other Fifth
Circuit decisions, we have held that certain severance-payment
arrangements did not qualify as ERISA “plans” when they involved
single payments triggered by events that “may never materialize,”
were not “ongoing” programs, and did not require “administrative
schemes.”   See Tinoco,
    311 F.3d at 618-23
    ; Fontenot,
    953 F.2d at 961-63
    ; Wells v. General Motors Corp.,
    881 F.2d 166
    , 168, 176
(5th Cir. 1989).   Each of these decisions relied heavily on the
guidance of Fort Halifax.    Tinoco,
    311 F.3d at 622-23
    ; Fontenot,
    953 F.2d at 962-63
    ; Wells, 811 F.2d at 175-76.
In contrast to the plan in Fontenot and the language of Fort
Halifax, the BP Plan, although establishing a seemingly simple
formula for determining the severance allowance for which a
terminated BP employee was eligible, made that allowance subject
to a variety of deductions that complicated the calculation of
the severance allowance.    It also provided non-trivial criteria
for determining employee eligibility.      Moreover, the BP Plan
Administrator had wide discretion and the Plan provided for a
two-level administrative claims procedure.      Furthermore, the BP
No. 05-20253
-4-
Plan provided more than a one-time severance payment, it provided
ongoing health and life insurance, relocation, and educational
aid.    BP had to do more than “write a check.”   Cf. Fort Halifax,
    482 U.S. at 12
    ; Tinoco,
    311 F.3d at 623
    .     All of this required an
“ongoing administrative scheme,” albeit a modest one.
Accordingly, we conclude that the BP Plan is an “employee
benefit plan” under ERISA, and we affirm the district court’s
conclusion that ERISA preempts Suda’s state-law claims of fraud
and misrepresentation and that Suda failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the BP Plan.
Suda also argues that the district court abused its
discretion in granting summary judgment because he had not yet
had an opportunity to depose the BP official who allegedly made
the misrepresentations to him.    However, that testimony would
have been irrelevant to the issue of ERISA preemption.
Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
See Baker v. American Airlines, Inc.,
    430 F.3d 750
    , 756 (5th Cir.
2005).
AFFIRMED.