Goynes v. Dretke , 139 F. App'x 616 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 20, 2005
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-70053
_______________________
THEODORE GOYNES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DOUG DRETKE, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Institutions Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the U.S. District Court
Southern District of Texas
No. H-02-2665
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
Petitioner Theodore Goynes (“Goynes”) has already been
granted federal habeas relief on an Penry claim. In this appeal,
he seeks a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) from this court on
two issues relating to his conviction: (1) whether he was denied
due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, because he was mentally incompetent to stand trial; and
(2) whether he was denied due process of law, in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as a result of the trial court’s
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
failure to sua sponte hold a hearing to determine Goynes’s
competency to stand trial. Finding neither issue debatable, we
affirm the district court and deny COA.
BACKGROUND
There is no dispute about the facts of this case, the
account of which we borrow heavily from the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals’s (“CCA”) unpublished decision, Goynes v. State, No. 71,387
(Tex. Crim. App., Dec. 14, 1994). On October 6, 1990, Linda Marie
Tucker (“Tucker”) left her workplace in northeast Houston, Texas,
and stopped at a grocery store. As she exited the store, Goynes
followed her. When Tucker opened her car door, Goynes shoved her
into the car, pushed the front seat forward, and forced himself
into the back seat. She briefly struggled, but was subdued once
Goynes brandished a weapon. Goynes then held her with one arm,
pointed the gun at Tucker’s head with his other arm, and ordered
her to drive away.
Tucker’s family, who were waiting to surprise her at home
for her birthday, learned that she had been abducted and began
searching for her with police. Around 1:00 a.m. the next morning,
a wrecker reported finding Tucker’s car in an abandoned apartment
complex. The police shortly thereafter discovered her body lying
on a staircase with a single gunshot wound to the head.
Witnesses to the abduction identified Goynes as the man
lingering outside the store and attacking Tucker. Other witnesses
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confirmed that a man wearing a jacket bearing the name, “Forest
Brook” was the attacker. Police obtained an arrest warrant for
Goynes. When they arrived at Goynes’s apartment, they did not find
him, but did find a jacket matching the witnesses’ description and
a blood-stained rug. A more detailed search resulted in discovery
of a box containing a pair of gloves, a revolver with six live
rounds of ammunition, and a six-round “bullet holder” with five
live rounds in the living room. The bullet taken from Tucker’s
head matched the weapon discovered at Goynes’s home.
On October 9, 1990, police inadvertently discovered
Goynes while responding to an unrelated disturbance call. After
his arrest, Goynes confessed to the abduction and murder of Tucker.
Goynes was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death for the kidnaping and murder of Tucker. He directly appealed
his conviction and sentence to the CCA, which affirmed the
conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion filed
December 14, 1994. The Supreme Court of the United States denied
Goynes’s petition for certiorari on June 26, 1995. Goynes v.
Texas, 515 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995). Goynes then filed a
state application for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court on
October 24, 1997. The trial court subsequently entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law recommending Goynes be denied relief.
The CCA adopted the trial court’s findings and conclusions, and
denied relief on June 26, 2002. Ex parte Goynes, No. 52,487-01.
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On July 15, 2002, Goynes filed a skeletal habeas petition
in the district court with that court’s permission. Goynes then
filed a supplemental habeas petition on July 31, 2003. On
November 30, 2004, the district court granted Goynes’s petition
based on a Penry claim and denied his petition and his COA request
with regard to all other claims. The result of the district
court’s partial grant of relief, which the Director has not
appealed, is that Goynes must be resentenced.1 However, Goynes
persists in his challenge to the underlying conviction itself.
Thus, we must address whether a COA should issue, and an appeal on
the merits be heard, on Goynes’s two claims relating to his
competence to stand trial.
DISCUSSION
Goynes’s § 2254 habeas petition, filed on July 15, 2002,
is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S. Ct.
1910, 1918 (2001). Under AEDPA, Goynes must obtain a COA before he
can appeal the district court’s denial of habeas relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (2000); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478, 120 S.
Ct. 1595, 1600 (2000). “[U]ntil a COA has been issued federal
courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on the merits of
1
We granted the Director’s unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal on
the sentencing issue on February 3, 2005. Goynes v. Dretke, No. 05-70001 (5th
Cir. Feb. 3, 2005).
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appeals from habeas petitioners.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003).
To obtain a COA, Goynes must make “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)
(2000); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S. Ct. at 1039; Slack, 529
U.S. at 483, 120 S. Ct. at 1603. To make such a showing, he must
demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at
336, 123 S. Ct. at 1039 (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S. Ct.
at 1603-04).
In Miller-El, the Supreme Court instructed, as it had
previously held in Slack, that federal courts entertaining a COA
application should “limit [their] examination to a threshold
inquiry into the underlying merit of [the petitioner’s] claims.”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S. Ct. at 1034. The Court observed
that “a COA ruling is not the occasion for a ruling on the merit of
petitioner’s claim . . . .” Id. at 1036. Instead, our
determination must be based on “an overview of the claims in the
habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Id. at
1039. “This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration
of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.”
Id. We do not have jurisdiction to justify the denial of a COA
based on an adjudication of the actual merits of the claims. Id.
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Accordingly, we cannot deny an “application for a COA merely
because [we believe] the applicant will not demonstrate an
entitlement to relief.” Id. “[A] claim can be debatable even
though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been
granted and the case has received full consideration, that
petitioner will not prevail.” Id.
Because the district court denied relief on the merits of
the claims for which Goynes seeks a COA, he “must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Barraza v.
Cockrell, 330 F.3d 349, 351 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller-El, 537
U.S. at 338, 123 S. Ct. at 1040).
Goynes first seeks a COA on whether he was denied due
process of law because he was mentally incompetent to stand trial.
The Constitution prohibits trial and conviction of a defendant who
is mentally incompetent to stand trial. See Cooper v. Oklahoma,
517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1376 (1996); Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S. Ct. 836, 839 (1966). There is a two part
standard for ascertaining competence to stand trial: (1) whether
the defendant has the “sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and
(2) “whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 789 (1960). On habeas, a petitioner may
collaterally attack his conviction by initially showing that “the
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facts are sufficient to positively, unequivocally and clearly
generate a real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to his mental
competency at the time of trial.” Dunn v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 302,
306 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted); Carter v.
Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 460 (5th Cir. 1997). This threshold burden
is “extremely heavy.” Johnson v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 232, 238 (5th
Cir. 1983). Once the petitioner presents enough probative evidence
to raise a substantial doubt as to his competency at the time of
trial, he must then prove that incompetency by a preponderance of
the evidence. Moody v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1998).
The district court’s dismissal of this claim is not
debatable. Despite a history of mental health problems and
borderline intelligence, Goynes fails to make any initial showing
that his competency was in doubt at the time of his trial. A
psychiatric examination carried out at Vernon State Hospital found
Goynes competent to stand trial. Goynes understood the charges
against him, the facts underlying those charges, that he was on
trial, and that he faced the death penalty. Goynes never sought a
competency hearing at his trial. Additionally, four different
experts evaluated Goynes’s competency between his arrest and the
trial, and all of them determined he was competent to stand trial.
Goynes’s strongest piece of evidence is that a psychologist
retained by his trial lawyers, who reviewed only his medical
history and never personally interviewed Goynes, stated that
Goynes, “while competent to stand trial for a simple offense, may
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not be competent to stand trial for a complicated offense.” 8 RR 4
(emphasis added). Counsel for Goynes presented this information to
the trial court, but even further qualified it by saying that he
was unsure whether the defense could offer any substantive evidence
of Goynes’s incompetence. Thus, despite repeated opportunities to
raise this issue at trial, to present evidence as to his
competency, or to request further examination or a hearing, Goynes,
through his counsel, failed to pursue a claim that he was
incompetent to stand trial. Goynes bolsters his claim with
numerous post-conviction affidavits, reports, and data, all of
which indicate Goynes’s difficulty in verbalizing and processing
information. None of his information, however, contains a single
expert opinion stating he is (or was) incompetent to stand trial.
Contrary to Goynes’s assumption, the presence of a mental defect
does not demonstrate mental incompetence to stand trial. Cf. Bruce
v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1976). Moreover, almost
all of this new information is inapposite: Goynes’s trial counsel,
for example, did not submit any information about trouble working
with Goynes or concerns over his ability to communicate with them
during trial until six years after the fact. The proper inquiry
for an incompetency claim is the petitioner’s mental state at or
near the time of trial. See, e.g., Martin v. Estelle, 583 F.2d
1373, 1374 (5th Cir. 1978). The evidence put forward by Goynes was
properly rejected by the district court under the standards
supplied by AEDPA, and jurists of reason could not find dismissal
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of the incompetence claim debatable. Whether viewed in terms of
the reasonableness of the state court’s application of federal
constitutional standards of competency or in terms of the adequacy
and reasonableness of the state courts’ factfinding, the rejection
of Goynes’s contention is not debatable.
Goynes also requests a COA on his claim that the trial
court should have sua sponte granted him a competency hearing. The
trial court is required to cease proceedings and hold a competency
hearing, sua sponte if necessary, when a question arises at trial
about the defendant’s competency. Robinson, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.
Ct. at 842. A procedural violation occurs if the trial court
failed to conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s mental competency
when the evidence raised a bona fide doubt as to his competency at
the time of trial. Id.; Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452, 459 n.10
(5th Cir. 1997). The legal question a reviewing court must ask is
whether the trial judge received “information which, objectively
considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about a
defendant’s competency and alerted him to the possibility that the
defendant could neither understand the proceedings or appreciate
their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his
defense.” Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir. 1980)
(internal citations omitted).
Goynes points to no record evidence that would make the
district court’s dismissal of this claim debatable to a reasonable
jurist. Trial testimony offered as to whether Goynes had the
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ability to understand and waive his Miranda warnings did not relate
to his competency to stand trial. Additionally, some of the
Miranda testimony would have pointed the trial court in the
opposite direction. Dr. Brown, for example, testified that Goynes
had a mental illness and limited intellectual abilities, but he
also stated that at a police interrogation, Goynes did not reveal
the presence of any mental illness or impairment. Dr. Brown
further testified that Goynes had the capacity to understand what
was happening during the murder trial. Moreover, Goynes exhibited
no erratic behavior during trial that would have indicated to the
trial judge any change in his mental ability to continue to be
tried. Goynes points to evidence of his mental problems, but, as
previously stated, the presence of a mental defect does not
demonstrate incompetence at the time of trial nor does it
necessarily manifest such overt symptoms as to demand the trial
court’s convening of a hearing sua sponte. Goynes is thus unable
to show that jurists of reason would find debatable the district
court’s denial of this claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the application for COA is
DENIED.
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