United States v. Costly-Reyes , 168 F. App'x 612 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                February 23, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-20927
    Conference Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    KARLTON DOUGLAS COSTLY-REYES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:03-CR-312-ALL
    --------------------
    Before GARZA, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Karlton Douglas Costly-Reyes pleaded guilty to a one-count
    indictment charging him with being an alien found in the United
    States after deportation following an aggravated felony
    conviction.    He argues that the district court plainly erred when
    it determined that a prior conviction for burglary of a
    habitation was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1 and
    that his sentence should be reversed under United States v.
    Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005).    The plea agreement contained a
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 04-20927
    -2-
    waiver-of-appeal provision in which Costly-Reyes waived his
    statutory right to appeal the sentence imposed or the manner in
    which it was determined with the exception that he could appeal a
    sentence imposed above the statutory maximum or that was an
    upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines as set forth in
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    .
    The Government argues that Costly-Reyes’s appeal of his
    sentence must be dismissed because he knowingly and voluntarily
    waived his right to appeal his sentence and his challenges to his
    sentence do not fall within the reserved exceptions to the
    waiver.   Costly-Reyes has not addressed the waiver issue.   A
    defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal as part of a
    valid plea agreement if the waiver is knowing and voluntary.
    United States v. Melancon, 
    972 F.2d 566
    , 567 (5th Cir. 1992);
    United States v. Robinson, 
    187 F.3d 516
    , 518 & n.2 (5th Cir.
    1999); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N).
    In United States v. Cortez, 
    413 F.3d 502
    , 503 (5th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 502
     (2005), this court enforced an
    appeal-waiver provision substantively identical to the one in
    Costly-Reyes’s plea agreement.   Because the record shows that
    Costly-Reyes knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal
    any sentence that did not exceed the statutory maximum of 20
    years or was not an upward departure from the Guidelines, the
    waiver provision is effective and bars Costly-Reyes from
    challenging his sentence.   This part of the appeal is dismissed.
    No. 04-20927
    -3-
    Costly-Reyes also argues that the “felony” and “aggravated
    felony” provisions of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b) are unconstitutional.
    Costly-Reyes’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 235 (1998).     We
    need not decide whether this claim is barred by Costly-Reyes’s
    appeal waiver because the issue is foreclosed.   Although Costly-
    Reyes contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and
    that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule
    Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the
    basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding.    See United States
    v. Garza-Lopez, 
    410 F.3d 268
    , 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 298
     (2005).   This part of the judgment is affirmed.
    DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.