United States v. Lindsley ( 2001 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 99-11164
    _____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    COREY LINDSLEY, also known as Tabbas
    Defendant - Appellant
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    _________________________________________________________________
    May 3, 2001
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and ALDISERT* and BENAVIDES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:**
    Defendant-Appellant Corey Lindsley pleaded guilty to one
    count of trafficking in unauthorized computer access devices and
    one count of computer fraud and was sentenced to a forty-one
    month term of imprisonment.   Lindsley appeals the district
    *
    Circuit Judge of the Third Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
    **
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
    47.5.4.
    court’s imposition of a twelve-point sentencing enhancement as a
    result of a loss finding exceeding $1,500,000.     For the following
    reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence.
    I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    A. The Charge
    On May 3, 1999, Corey Lindsley1 pleaded guilty to one count
    of trafficking in unauthorized computer access devices in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), (c)(1), and (c)(2), and one
    count of computer fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4),
    (c)(2), and (c)(3)(A).    According to the Factual Resume filed
    with the district court on May 3, 1999, Lindsley stipulated that,
    from October 1994 through approximately February 22, 1995, he and
    his co-defendants Jonathan Bosanac and Calvin Cantrell used their
    personal computers to illegally access Sprint Corporation’s
    (“Sprint”) computer system for the purpose of obtaining something
    of value.    Lindsley specifically stipulated to two particular
    incidents.    In one, Lindsley downloaded, possessed, and stole
    more than fifteen unauthorized access devices, which were in this
    case, Sprint calling card numbers.     In the second incident,
    Lindsley admitted to calling Cantrell from Lindsley’s parents’
    1
    In the Appellant’s brief, Appellant’s last name is
    spelled “Lindsly.” He is also known by the nickname “Tabbas.”
    For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to him as
    “Lindsley.”
    2
    home in Colorado and asking Cantrell to send him calling card
    numbers.   Cantrell then illegally entered Sprint’s computer
    system and downloaded2 858 Sprint calling card numbers that he
    subsequently uploaded3 to Lindsley’s computer.
    A sentencing hearing was held on September 16, 1999.
    B. The Presentence Report
    According to the information contained in the Presentence
    Report (“PSR”), the two occasions to which Lindsley stipulated
    were but a part of a larger operation that occurred between
    August 1994 and February 1995.    The PSR provided further detail
    about Lindsley’s and his co-defendants’ activities in connection
    with this operation.    For example, according to the PSR, Lindsley
    admitted to gaining illegal access to the computer systems of
    Southwestern Bell (“Bell”), General Telephone Company (“GTE”),
    Pacific Bell, Bell Atlantic, Southwestern Bell Mobility, Sprint,
    and US West.   Further, Lindsley revealed that he had probably set
    up over fifty conference calls that were billed to innocent third
    parties.   The PSR stated that the calculable loss to the
    companies, specifically Sprint, GTE, and Bell, was $1,851,780.4
    2
    The term “download” refers to the process of
    transferring data files from a remote computer to a local
    computer.
    3
    The term “upload” refers to the process of transferring
    data files from a local computer to a remote computer.
    4
    The PSR does not discuss the losses of the other four
    companies.
    3
    This figure included a Bell loss of $684,780, a GTE loss of
    $214,000, and a Sprint loss of $953,000.
    The PSR set Lindsley’s base offense level at III and
    recommended a twelve-point enhancement based on a proposed
    finding that the loss attributable to Lindsley was $1,851,780.
    This gave Lindsley a total offense level of nineteen, which
    results in an imprisonment range of thirty-seven to forty-six
    months.
    Lindsley objected to the PSR arguing that the loss
    calculation was excessive, in part because it took into account
    consequential damages.   In response, the probation officer stated
    that the loss amount was obtained from the government and the
    case agent and verified by the companies.
    C. The Sentencing Hearing
    The sentencing hearing focused primarily on whether it was
    foreseeable that Lindsley’s co-defendants would sell the stolen
    Sprint calling card numbers and on the amount of loss caused by
    both Lindsley’s conduct and the foreseeable conduct of his co-
    defendants.   At the sentencing hearing, the government called
    several witnesses.   The case agent, FBI Special Agent Michael
    Morris, testified that, based on the evidence, he considered
    Lindsley to have the most knowledge on the telecommunications
    side, to have the most knowledge of the number of conspirators
    and their identity, and to have been aware that other members of
    the group were selling calling card numbers.     Morris also
    4
    testified as to the $214,000 loss sustained by GTE, stating that
    according to a memorandum from GTE, the company had incurred a
    loss of $23,500.65 from conference calls made by the defendants
    as well as additional losses.5
    Regarding Sprint’s claimed losses of $953,000, the
    government introduced a letter from Sprint and the testimony of
    its director of security Cloyce Fleming.   Fleming testified that
    Sprint had calculated the loss at $955,965.356 by adding up the
    reported unauthorized use for which Sprint had credited
    cardholders’ accounts.   Sprint included only the reported
    unauthorized use from those accounts that the FBI identified as
    being downloaded or uploaded from Cantrell’s line.7
    Additionally, Fleming testified regarding a second document,
    which revealed a large increase in reported fraudulent use during
    the time of the defendants’ activities.
    5
    At trial, however, a memo from GTE stated its total
    losses were $97,430.65, including $23,530.65 for eleven
    fraudulently billed conference calls and $73,900 in investigation
    expenses. This does not reach the total of $214,000 claimed in
    the PSR.
    6
    Nothing in the record explains the difference between
    the $953,000 figure and the $955,965.35.
    7
    During his testimony, Morris explained that a court-
    ordered wiretap was placed on Cantrell’s phone lines that
    captured, inter alia, the data transmissions and the downloading
    of information from the telecommunication service providers’
    databases. From the wiretap, the FBI compiled a database of 6679
    readable credit card numbers that were downloaded or uploaded
    while the wiretap was in progress. Sprint identified 2129
    accounts on which account holders had reported unauthorized use
    and for which Sprint had credited their accounts.
    5
    Finally, Ronald Youngclaus testified at sentencing regarding
    Bell’s claimed $684,240 in losses.    According to a letter
    submitted by Bell, this figure included $27,370 for the cost of
    labor to investigate the damage done to the company’s systems,
    $8,464 in labor to restore the systems to their original
    integrity, and $10,392 to replace the damaged BIGBIRD system.
    Furthermore, the letter identified a cost of $628,014 to obtain
    12,775 “smart cards” for the systems that had been compromised by
    the defendants.   Youngclaus testified that these smart cards were
    the only way to protect the system from the “sniffers”8 that the
    defendants had planted in the system.    During cross-examination,
    however, Youngclaus admitted that the cards served to make sure
    the intrusion did not happen again.
    Crediting the testimony of the government witnesses and the
    calculations contained in the PSR, the district court found that
    the loss figure was $1,851,857.   Accordingly, the court concluded
    that the loss attributable to Lindsley exceeded $1.5 million,
    resulting, pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
    (“U.S.S.G.”), in a twelve-point enhancement.    The district court
    sentenced Lindsley to forty-one months imprisonment (in the
    middle of the thirty-seven to forty-six month guideline range)
    8
    “Sniffer” refers to “sniffer programs,” which are placed
    in a computer system and capture individual’s log-on names and
    passwords. If the individual changes his or her log-on name and
    password, the “sniffer” will capture those changes and place the
    new information in a file for the computer hacker.
    6
    because Lindsley had not committed any other crimes since the
    offense.   In its Statement of Reasons, the district court adopted
    the factual findings and guideline application of the PSR.
    Lindsley timely appeals.
    II.   COST OF SMART CARDS
    Lindsley argues that the district court misapplied U.S.S.G.
    § 2F1.1 by including in the amount of loss the cost of the smart
    cards purchased by Bell.   Lindsley contends that the smart cards
    did not simply restore the security of the Bell computer systems,
    but rather increased the security of the system beyond the level
    that existed at the time of the offense.   As such, their cost is
    a consequential damage and consequential damages should not be
    included in the loss valuation in this circumstance.   The
    government asserts that the security smart cards were properly
    included in the loss calculation because they were the only means
    available to prevent continued intrusion into Bell’s computer
    systems caused by the defendants’ activities.    For this reason,
    the smart cards merely repaired the system by restoring the
    systems to their prior condition.
    We review the district court’s interpretation and
    application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual
    findings in connection with sentencing for clear error.      See
    United States v. Morrow, 
    177 F.3d 272
    , 300 (5th Cir. 1999);
    7
    United States v. Parker, 
    133 F.3d 322
    , 329 (5th Cir. 1998).          A
    factual finding is not clearly erroneous, and therefore not
    subject to reversal, as long as it is plausible in light of the
    record as a whole.    See United States v. Morris, 
    46 F.3d 410
    , 419
    (5th Cir. 1995).
    The commentary to the guideline concerning U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1
    defines “loss” as “the value of the money, property, or services
    unlawfully taken.”    U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, cmt. 7
    (1994)9; see also United States v. Izydore, 
    167 F.3d 213
    , 223
    (5th Cir. 1999).   Typically, the calculation of loss does not
    include the victim’s consequential or incidental losses.           See
    
    Izydore, 167 F.3d at 223
    .    Section 2F1.1 incorporates the
    valuation of loss definition of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, see U.S.
    SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, cmt. 7 (1994), which provides:
    “When property is damaged, the loss is the cost of repairs, not
    to exceed the loss had the property been destroyed.”        U.S.
    SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. 2 (1994).   Accordingly,
    whether the cost of the smart cards was properly included in the
    loss valuation depends on whether the cards were necessary to
    repair the damage to the system caused by the defendants.
    9
    We will apply the U.S.S.G. in effect at the time of
    the offense. A sentencing court must apply the version of the
    guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing unless such
    application would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United
    States v. Greer, 
    158 F.3d 228
    , 234 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998). If
    applying the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing would
    violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the court should apply the
    guidelines in effect at the time of the offense. See 
    id. 8 In
    1997, the U.S.S.G. were amended to include specific
    guidance as to the measurement of loss in certain computer
    offenses.   Although not controlling, subsequent versions of the
    U.S.S.G. may be considered in interpreting prior versions.      See
    United States v. Armstead, 
    114 F.3d 504
    , 508 n.1 (5th Cir. 1997)
    (“According to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(2), we are to consider
    subsequent clarifying amendments to the Guidelines.”).      The 1997
    U.S.S.G. provide:
    In an offense involving unlawfully accessing, or
    exceeding authorized access to, a “protected computer”
    as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(A) or (B), “loss”
    includes the reasonable cost to the victim of
    conducting a damage assessment, restoring the system
    and data to their condition prior to the offense, and
    any lost revenue due to interruption of service.
    U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. 7 (1997).
    If the cost of the smart cards was the “reasonable cost to
    [Bell] of . . . restoring the system and data to their condition
    prior to the offense,” 
    id., it was
    properly included, as the cost
    of repairing the damaged system, in the loss valuation.      Lindsley
    argues that the cards constituted an improvement to the system
    and did more than return it to its condition prior to the offense
    because the system was vulnerable to the sniffers prior to the
    defendants’ activities.    However, Youngclaus testified that the
    defendants penetrated deeply into the Bell computer system, that
    Bell located many of the sniffers but could not be sure it found
    all of them, and that “[t]here was no other way [to return this
    system to its original integrity before the day it was hacked by
    9
    this group] other than putting smart card technology in place
    because of the proliferation of sniffers in [Bell’s] network.”
    Based on the record as a whole, we do not find the district
    court’s factual finding regarding the cost of repairing the Bell
    computer system to be clear error.
    III.   SPECIFIC FINDING OF LOSS
    Lindsley argues that although the district court concluded
    that the total loss caused by the defendants was $1,851,780, it
    only found him responsible for some amount over $1.5 million.
    Lindsley contends that the district court’s failure to make a
    finding of the specific amount of loss attributable to Lindsley
    violates Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1)10 and
    Lindsley’s due process right to notice of the grounds on which
    the district court based its guideline determination.   The
    government contends that the judge found Lindsley responsible for
    the entire amount of loss, as it was the result of foreseeable
    conduct of all the defendants, and properly used the $1.5 million
    figure because it was the threshold figure for the offense level
    enhancement.
    10
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) requires:
    “For each matter controverted, the court must make either a
    finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is
    necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into
    account in, or will not affect, sentencing.” FED. R. CRIM. P.
    32(c)(1).
    10
    “We review de novo whether a district court complied with a
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.”     United States v. Myers, 
    150 F.3d 459
    , 461 (5th Cir. 1998).   Although Rule 32 requires the
    court to make findings regarding any controverted facts in the
    PSR, this circuit has “rejected the proposition that a court must
    make a ‘catechismic regurgitation of each fact determined,’”
    United States v. Carreon, 
    11 F.3d 1225
    , 1231 (5th Cir. 1994)
    (quoting United States v. Sherbak, 
    950 F.2d 1095
    , 1099 (5th Cir.
    1992)), and “we have allowed the district court to make implicit
    findings by adopting the PSR.”   
    Id. Furthermore, “[t]his
    adoption will operate to satisfy the mandates of Rule 32 when the
    findings in the PSR are so clear that the reviewing court is not
    left to ‘second-guess’ the basis for the sentencing decision.”
    
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Hooten, 
    942 F.2d 878
    , 881 (5th Cir.
    1991)).
    The district court found:
    However, the presentence report in Mr. Cantrell’s
    case, like the presentence report in Mr. Lindsley’s
    case, specifically finds, and I find that the probation
    officer reached the correct conclusion that the total
    amount of loss for all of the defendants involved in
    this is $1,851,787. Indeed, that’s reflected in the
    restitution calculations where it shows a 1.8 million
    dollar figure. Although that wasn’t ordered as
    restitution for Mr. Cantrell and won’t be either for
    Mr. Lindsley, I simply note that the evidence does
    sustain a substantial loss figure. I think it sustains
    a loss figure of at least 1.85 million dollars.
    The government takes the position today that the
    court should at least find that the loss figure
    exceeded 1.5 million and I do on the credible evidence
    that was presented to me.
    11
    We find no error.   The district court expressly adopted the
    findings of the PSR and found Lindsley responsible for a loss
    valued at $1,851,787.     This finding satisfies the mandate of Rule
    32.   The $1.5 million dollar figure was used simply to identify
    the loss category in which the $1,851,787 loss placed Lindsley’s
    offense.11
    IV.   EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT LOSS VALUATION
    Lindsley argues that the losses claimed by GTE and Sprint
    are based on conclusory statements and unaccompanied by any
    documentation.12    To rely on such speculative and undocumented
    evidence, he continues, would violate the standard of proof
    11
    In support of his argument, Lindsley cites United States
    v. Aubrey, 
    878 F.2d 825
    (5th Cir. 1989). We do not agree that
    Aubrey controls. In Aubrey, the PSR estimated the loss
    attributable to the defendant at over $3 million. See 
    id. at 828.
    The defendant challenged the $3 million figure, and the
    district court found it to be inflated. See 
    id. “However, the
    judge made no specific finding regarding the loss; rather, he
    mused that the figure ‘had to be well over a million dollars.’”
    
    Id. In holding
    that the finding did not comport with Rule 32,
    this court noted that “[g]iven the disparity between the
    government’s figure and appellant’s, it was not sufficient for
    the court simply to guess at a figure somewhere between the two
    and then characterize that as a ‘finding’ as to the matter
    controverted.” 
    Id. Unlike the
    district court in Aubrey, the
    district court here did not find the $1,851,787 figure to be
    inflated. The district court in this case simply found that the
    loss figure was correct at $1,851,787, which placed the loss
    within the special offense characteristic category of a loss
    exceeding $1.5 million.
    12
    Lindsley did not object to any of the claimed losses by
    Bell, other than the cost of the smart cards 
    discussed supra
    in
    Part III.
    12
    required for such a substantial sentence enhancement.       The
    government argues that the evidence was not insufficient or
    speculative and that actual losses were likely much higher.
    The government has the burden of proving by a preponderance
    of the evidence the facts necessary to support an increase in
    sentence level.   See United States v. Sanders, 
    942 F.2d 894
    , 897
    (5th Cir. 1991).13   “The sentencing court ‘need not determine the
    loss with precision,’ as long as its estimate is ‘reasonable
    . . . given the available information.’”      United States v.
    Humphrey, 
    104 F.3d 65
    , 71 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
    GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, Application Note 8); see also U.S.
    SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, cmt. 8 (1994).   “In resolving
    any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the
    sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant
    information without regard to its admissibility under the rules
    of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information
    13
    Lindsley argues that, because the twelve-point
    enhancement turned a four-to-ten month sentence into a thirty-
    seven-to-forty-six month sentence, a clear and convincing
    standard may be more appropriate, or even constitutionally
    required. However, the correct standard in this circuit remains
    a preponderance of the evidence standard. In United States v.
    Mergerson, 
    4 F.3d 337
    (5th Cir. 1993), this court acknowledged
    that in certain cases “where a sentencing fact is a ‘tail that
    wags the dog of the substantive offense,’” a finding of beyond a
    reasonable doubt might be required. See 
    id. at 344.
    However, in
    United States v. Carreon, 
    11 F.3d 1225
    (5th Cir. 1994), this
    court found the difference between a sentence of six years and
    one of twenty years “d[id] not constitute such a dramatic effect
    that it would justify considering, much less imposing, the higher
    burden of proof.” 
    Id. at 1240.
    It is similarly unjustified in
    this situation.
    13
    has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
    accuracy.”   U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (1994).
    “Facts contained in a PSR are considered reliable and may be
    adopted without further inquiry if the defendant fails to present
    competent rebuttal evidence.”     United States v. Parker, 
    133 F.3d 322
    , 329 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Sidhu, 
    130 F.3d 644
    , 651 (5th Cir. 1997).     “If information is presented to
    the sentencing judge with which the defendant would take issue,
    the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
    information cannot be relied upon because it is materially
    untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable.”      United States v. Angulo, 
    927 F.2d 202
    , 205 (5th Cir. 1991).     “Mere objections do not suffice
    as competent rebuttal evidence.”       
    Parker, 133 F.3d at 329
    .
    Lindsley alleges that the Sprint losses of $953,000 are
    conclusory and not supported by any documentation.       In addition
    to that amount of loss being stated in the PSR, Fleming, a Sprint
    employee, testified as to Sprint’s losses.      Further, a letter
    provided by Sprint indicated that the amount of phone card fraud
    suffered by Sprint was $955,965.35.      The letter and Fleming’s
    testimony indicate that the loss was calculated by tabulating the
    amount of fraud that had been reported on the account numbers
    provided to Sprint by the FBI.     See supra note 3.    Lindsley
    provided no evidence to rebut the amount of loss alleged by
    Sprint.   We find that Lindsley has failed to demonstrate that the
    14
    evidence relied upon to establish the amount of the Sprint loss
    is materially untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable.
    Lindsley also challenges the evidence supporting the losses
    claimed by GTE.   According to the PSR adopted by the district
    court, GTE attributed $214,000 of losses to the Lindsley.
    Lindsley claims that only $23,530.65 of those losses was
    supported by evidence at the sentencing hearing.     We need not
    address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the claimed
    GTE losses.   Even disallowing all of GTE’s losses over the cost
    of the conference calls, to which Lindsley does not object, the
    district court’s sentence withstands our clear error review.
    Because the district court judge adopted the total PSR finding of
    $1,851,787, subtracting the additional $190,469.35 would not
    reduce the loss finding below the $1.5 million required for the
    twelve-point increase.
    We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the
    district court’s loss finding.
    V.    DISTRICT COURT’S COMMENTS
    Lindsley makes a final argument regarding allegedly improper
    comments made by the district court.    The full text of the
    remarks to which Lindsley objects are as follows:
    MS. AINSLIE: . .   . . [The hackers] were --
    considered themselves   to be above other hacking groups
    because they were not   in it for the money. They were
    not trying to -- this   was a group that did it for the
    15
    fun of it, I hate to say. You know, it’s a very
    perverted sense of idea of fun, but they were there to
    show off to each other -- for the mental stimulation,
    for the challenge of it.
    THE COURT: Mr. Rupp, the public defender, is a
    very good lawyer. He pled his client to a substantial
    loss. It wasn’t like it was fun and games.
    MS. AINSLIE: I’m sorry?
    THE COURT: I said it wasn’t like it was fun and
    games. He didn’t make that argument. I’m talking
    about the co-defendant who pled guilty.
    MS. AINSLIE: I understand.
    THE COURT: He’s a very fine lawyer.
    MS. AINSLIE: Oh, absolutely, Your Honor, and I’ve
    talked to him.
    THE COURT: He negotiated a loss figure that was
    substantially higher than what you’re arguing.
    Lindsley argues that these comments by the district court
    were improper and indicated that the district court relied on
    matters outside the record, namely Cantrell’s stipulated loss
    amount and the reputation of his counsel, in making its finding
    of loss.   Specifically, Lindsley asserts that trial counsel did
    not have a reasonable opportunity to respond to that evidence and
    that those facts should not have been considered in Lindsley’s
    sentencing.   The government contends that the comments made by
    the district court were made in response to allegations that the
    computer hacking was for fun, and therefore, the district court’s
    response that the co-defendant had admitted to a profit motive
    was not improper.   Furthermore, the government argues that even
    16
    if some of the remarks were improper, the remarks alone are
    insufficient to require reversal on plain error.
    “A federal district judge may comment on the evidence,
    question witnesses, [and] bring out facts not yet adduced. . . .
    ‘Improper’ comments by a trial judge do not entitle the defendant
    to a new trial unless the comments are error that is substantial
    and prejudicial to the defendant’s case.”   United States v.
    Wallace, 
    32 F.3d 921
    , 928 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
    Furthermore, a sentencing court may rely on any evidence that has
    “sufficient indicia of reliability,” United States v. Huskey, 
    137 F.3d 283
    , 291 (5th Cir. 1998), and testimony from the trial of a
    third party is not barred as a matter of law.    See United States
    v. Ramirez, 
    963 F.2d 693
    , 708 (5th Cir. 1992).   As Lindsley’s
    trial counsel did not object to these comments, we review
    Lindsley’s claim under the plain error doctrine.    See United
    States v. Carpenter, 
    776 F.2d 1291
    , 1295 (5th Cir. 1985).
    We have reviewed the record, and we do not find the comments
    of the trial judge to be improper.   Lindsley’s counsel was
    suggesting that the defendants were not committing these acts for
    profit, and the judge’s comments merely reflected that at least
    one of his co-defendant’s viewed the matter differently.    We find
    that the district court’s comments do not amount to error that is
    substantial and prejudicial to the defendant’s case, and
    therefore, any error does not rise to the level of plain error.
    17
    VI.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the sentence given by
    the district court.
    18