Despres v. City of San Antonio , 211 F. App'x 283 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT December 15, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-51611
MICHAEL E. DESPRES; ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
LAWRENCE DOYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(5:04-CV-150)
Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Summary judgment was awarded the City of San Antonio,
dismissing Officer Lawrence Doyle’s claim of retaliation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000(e), et seq. At issue is whether, for summary-judgment
purposes, Officer Doyle sufficiently showed an adverse-employment
action.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Officer Doyle, an employee of the San Antonio Police
Department (SAPD), filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission based on: the San Antonio Police Chief’s
calling Officer Doyle and his fellow members of the Union
Bargaining Team (UBT) “lily white”; documents Officer Doyle found
at work characterizing him as “lily white”; and his and other UBT
members’ being removed and replaced by non-whites. Officer Doyle
claims the SAPD retaliated against him for filing the complaint by
counseling him, issuing a formal complaint notice requiring him to
obtain authorization for overtime in excess of two hours, and
subjecting him to special overtime rules not required of other
officers and which reduced his ability to earn overtime
compensation.
Upon exhausting administrative requirements, Officer Doyle
filed this action. For a Title VII retaliation claim, Officer
Doyle must establish a prima facie case showing: (1) he engaged in
activity protected by Title VII; (2) his employer took an adverse-
employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists
between the protected activity and the adverse-employment action.
E.g., Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 414 (5th
Cir. 2003). The City’s summary-judgment motion was granted on the
ground that, for summary-judgment purposes, Officer Doyle failed to
show an adverse-employment action pursuant to our precedent.
2
Subsequent to the briefs being filed for this appeal, the
Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006), which held the test for an adverse-
employment action is whether “a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, [meaning] ... it
well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination”. Id. at 2415 (internal
quotes omitted). This standard differed from our precedent. See,
e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997). Accordingly, we called for
supplemental briefs on that point.
Pursuant to this recent Supreme Court decision and the
parties’ briefs, we remand for reconsideration of the summary-
judgment motion, or for such other proceedings as may be
appropriate. On remand, in the light of this new standard for an
adverse-employment action, if the City continues to seek summary
judgment, the district court should consider whether additional
evidence should be received, including through additional
discovery, prior to ruling on the motion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
3