Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement , 426 F.3d 733 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 16, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10630
ADRIAN ROSALES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
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ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Adrian Rosales petitioned for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
to challenge his final order of deportation on due process grounds. The district
court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Rosales was not “in custody”
under § 2241 and dismissed his suit. We affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
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Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 04-10630, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 26538 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2004). The Supreme Court vacated the
opinion after the government conceded in its brief to the Court that Rosales should
be considered “in custody” according to the prevailing view in our sister circuits.
Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, __ U.S. __, 125 S.
Ct. 2541 (2005). Reconsidering the case in light of the government’s concession,
we join the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and hold that an alien who is
subject to a final order of deportation, like Rosales, is “in custody” under § 2241.
Because Rosales has not established that the immigration judge’s alleged due
process violation has prejudiced him, however, we deny the petition.
I. Background
Rosales is a Mexican citizen who became a permanent resident of the United
States in 1989. In 2000, he was convicted in Texas state court of aggravated
kidnaping and sentenced to 65 years incarceration. In February 2001, the INS
served Rosales with a Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition. The Notice
informed Rosales that the INS believed him to be in the country illegally, that he
was entitled to a hearing on whether he could remain in the U.S., that he had a right
to seek legal representation and to communicate with his consulate, and that he
could use a telephone to contact an attorney or the consulate at any time before his
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departure from the U.S. Rosales signed, initialed, and dated the Notice in the
presence of an INS officer. The officer signed a certificate of service reflecting that
Rosales had read the Notice.
The INS charged Rosales with removability as an aggravated felon under 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) in November 2001, while he was
serving time on the Texas conviction. It filed an immigration detainer concerning
Rosales with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in March 2002. At
Rosales’s immigration hearing in July 2002, the IJ advised Rosales of his right to
legal representation. Rosales waived that right, said he wished to be removed to
Mexico, and elected to proceed with his hearing that day. He conceded the grounds
for his removal, that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ found
Rosales ineligible for relief from removal and ordered him deported.
Rosales appealed to the BIA, arguing that his hearing did not afford him due
process because the IJ did not inform him of his right to contact his consulate under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Dec. 24, 1969, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77.
The BIA dismissed the appeal because it lacked jurisdiction to consider Rosales’s
constitutional claim. Rosales then filed the present habeas suit.
II. Analysis
A. Rosales is “In Custody” Under § 2241
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An individual may seek habeas relief under § 2241 if he is “in custody” under
federal authority or for violation of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). As the
Supreme Court recently noted, physical detention (or here, physical detention by
federal, rather than state, authority) is no longer required for a petitioner to meet the
custody requirement and obtain habeas relief. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,
124 S. Ct. 2711, 2719 (2004) (“[O]ur understanding of custody has broadened to
include restraints short of physical confinement[.]”); see also Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1963) (recognizing that restraints on liberty other than
physical confinement may constitute custody for habeas purposes).
At least four circuits have held that a final deportation order subjects an alien
to a restraint on liberty sufficient to place the alien “in custody.” Simmonds v. INS,
326 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003); Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291
(10th Cir. 2001); Mustata v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1021 n.4 (6th
Cir. 1999); Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1995); cf.
Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 315 F.3d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that,
where the INS had not ordered the alien deported, an immigration detainer alone did
not place him “in custody” under § 2241). We agree. The federal government has
placed a significant restraint on Rosales’s liberty by issuing a final order of
deportation against him. It must detain him once his removal period begins at his
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release from state prison. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2). He is therefore “in
custody” and may seek relief under § 2241. Simmonds, 326 F.3d at 354-55; cf.
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (holding that a
prisoner under the authority of State A may file an immediate habeas petition to
attack future confinement by State B where State B has filed a detainer against the
prisoner with State A).
B. Rosales Has Not Established Prejudice
We consider the merits of Rosales’s petition rather than remanding because §
106 of the REAL ID Act has divested the district courts of jurisdiction over § 2241
petitions attacking removal orders. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (May
11, 2005); Enwonwu v. Chertoff, No. 05-10511-WGY, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13890, *121-23 (D. Mass. July, 12, 2005). Section 106 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory),
including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas
corpus provision, . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive
means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under
any provision of [the Immigration and Nationality] Act . . . .
The section took effect upon its enactment and applies “to cases in which the final
administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion was issued before, on, or
after the date of enactment of this division.” Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(b). This
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court is thus the exclusive forum for Rosales’s challenge to his removal order.
Although aliens have no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at deportation
hearings, Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 385 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001), due
process requires that such hearings be fundamentally fair. Animashaun v. INS, 990
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1993). “[T]o succeed on a collateral attack of a deportation
order on due process grounds, an alien must first demonstrate that he has suffered
actual prejudice.” Ojeda-Terrazas v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 2002).
Rosales argues that his hearing was not fundamentally fair because the IJ did not
inform him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate. He contends that this
alleged due process violation caused him prejudice because, had he been informed
of the right, he would have contacted the consulate and the consulate would have
provided him free legal representation at the hearing.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations requires the
“competent authorities” of the arresting country to inform an alien arrestee of his
rights under the Convention, including his right to contact his consulate.
Immigration regulations contain the same requirement. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(e)
(“Every detained alien shall be notified that he or she may communicate with the
consular or diplomatic officers of the country of his or her nationality in the United
States.”). The government complied with these provisions in the present case, by
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informing Rosales of his Vienna Convention rights in the Notice of Rights and
ensuring that he read it. Rosales contends the Notice was insufficient because he
actually did not read it or could not understand it because his English was not good
enough. He argues that due process requires, either in addition to or instead of the
Notice, that the IJ inform an alien of his right to contact his consulate during the
immigration hearing.
It is unclear whether Rosales’s Vienna Convention rights are protected under
the Due Process Clause. See Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he privilege of communication with consular officials . . . [is] not [a]
fundamental right[] derived from the Constitution”); cf. Medellin v. Dretke, __ U.S.
__, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005) (dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted in a case raising the issue of whether federal courts are bound by the
International Court of Justice’s ruling that the Vienna Convention confers
individually enforceable rights on detained aliens); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,
376 (1998) (noting that the Vienna Convention “arguably” confers a right to
consular assistance on an alien following arrest); United States v. Jimenez-Nava,
243 F.3d 192, 198-200 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the defendant’s arguments that the
Vienna Convention confers a judicially enforceable right on a detained alien to
contact his consulate and holding that the government’s failure to inform a detainee
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of such a right does not warrant suppression of evidence). It is also unclear
whether, if the right is within due process, the Notice did not provide sufficient
process under the principles of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944-47 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
INS provided sufficient process under Mathews v. Eldridge by informing only those
aliens who the agency believed could be subject to persecution if returned home of
their right to petition for asylum). We need not address these questions, because
Rosales has not shown that he suffered prejudice due to the IJ’s failure to inform
him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate. Rosales admitted in the
immigration hearing that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony, which
makes him deportable. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(iii). He does not
argue that he is eligible for any relief from deportation. Because he makes no
showing that assistance from his consulate would have changed the result of the
hearing, he is not entitled to relief on due process grounds. Ojeda-Terrazas, 290
F.3d at 302 (holding that, where an alien had not shown that the procedural
safeguards he sought would have changed the result of his deportation hearing, the
alien failed to establish prejudice and the court was not required to evaluate the
merits of his due process claim).
Rosales also argues that his due process rights were violated because the
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government did not immediately deport him after it obtained the final order of
deportation against him. This argument is without merit—by statute, Rosales’s
removal period does not start until his state term of incarceration ends. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(1)(B)(iii).
III. Conclusion
We hold that an alien subject to a final deportation order is “in custody” for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We consequently have jurisdiction over Rosales’s
habeas petition. Rosales has not established that he has suffered prejudice because
the IJ did not inform him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate, however,
dooming his due process claim. We accordingly deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
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