Weaver v. Amoco Production ( 2004 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-40064
Summary Calendar
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JIM WEAVER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
2:93-CV-14
_________________________________________________________________
July 19, 1996
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
FORTUNATO P. BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge*:
Defendant-Appellant Amoco Production Company ("Amoco") appeals
the district court's order and judgment granting Plaintiff-Appellee
Jim Weaver's ("Weaver") motion for an award of front pay and
denying Amoco's motion for reinstatement and judgment in favor of
Weaver for $280,000 plus interest. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from the district court's order after
remand in this case on the issue of reinstatement and front pay
following a jury verdict in favor of Weaver on his age
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
discrimination claim.1 In the first appeal, we vacated the front
pay award and remanded to the district court for a more thorough
review of Amoco's offer of reinstatement and for articulated
findings. Weaver, 66 F.3d at 89. On remand, the district court
concluded that Weaver met his burden of demonstrating that
reinstatement was not feasible. Specifically, the court found that
although Amoco offered to reinstate Weaver, Amoco's excessively
hostile attitude toward Weaver throughout the litigation of the
case has rendered the environment too hostile for an employment
situation to succeed. In addition, the court noted that the
numerous technological advances that have been made since Weaver's
termination would necessitate extra time for Weaver to train, and
that the court believed that Amoco would not allow Weaver the
necessary time to improve. Finally, the court determined that a
front pay award of $280,000, in addition to the jury's liquidated
damage award of $105,000, was not excessive considering the
evidence at trial indicating that Weaver would lose around $600,000
by 65 if he was unable to locate a new job.
REINSTATEMENT VERSUS FRONT PAY
Front pay is not awarded unless the plaintiff demonstrates
that reinstatement is not feasible. Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co.,
952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola
Metro Bottling Co., Inc., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 842, 110 S. Ct. 129, 107 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1989)). "We
1
For a complete summary of the facts and procedural history
in this case, see Weaver v. Amoco Production Co., 66 F.3d 85 (5th
Cir. 1995).
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review the district court's decision that reinstatement was not
feasible for an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing Deloach v.
Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1990)). We find that
the district court's conclusions on remand, supported by an
articulated finding that hostile relations exist between Amoco and
Weaver, sufficiently demonstrate that Weaver's reinstatement is not
feasible. The district court judge is in the best position to make
a determination regarding the feasibility of reinstatement because
he is able to witness, first hand, the evidence presented at trial
along with post-trial motions and hearings before the court. The
court in this case concluded that Amoco's hostile attitude toward
Weaver exceed the animosity level that commonly arises between
opposing parties throughout the litigation process. Taking into
consideration the district court's findings and the fact that
Amoco's offer of reinstatement, which was not made until after the
jury return a verdict in favor of Weaver, is for a position that no
longer exists at Amoco, we find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that reinstatement is not
feasible.
Furthermore, we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding front pay in addition to the jury's
liquidated damage award. We have previously stated that a
substantial liquidated damage award may indicate that an additional
award of front pay is inappropriate. Walther, 952 F.2d at 127.
However, our review of the record reveals that the district court
properly addressed this factor in allowing the additional award of
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front pay. See id. at 127-28. The district court found that
"[a]lthough the Court has considered the $105,000 award of
liquidated damages which was assessed against Amoco, a front pay
award of $280,000 is still necessary to make the plaintiff whole."
The court's finding is supported by evidence presented a trial
indicating that Weaver could lose up to $600,000 by the time he
reaches 65 if he is not able to find another job. Therefore, we
find the district court's front pay award of $280,000 is not
excessive or inappropriate.
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
Weaver seeks an additional award of $5,000 in attorneys' fees
for services rendered on this second appeal. It is within our
discretion to award attorneys' fees for the appeal of an ADEA case.
Hendrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981).
We find that due to the simplicity of the issues raised in this
appeal an award of $2,000 in attorneys' fees is reasonable.
Accordingly, we award $2,000 in attorneys' fees for services
rendered in connection with this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, the order and judgment of
the district court awarding front pay is AFFIRMED. Attorneys' fees
are awarded to Weaver in the amount of $2,000 for services rendered
on appeal.
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