United States v. McCuiston , 183 F. App'x 474 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                      United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                June 28, 2006
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 05-40908
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    BRIAN MCCUISTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    No. 2:04-CR-676-2
    --------------------
    Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Brian McCuiston challenges his conviction for conspiracy
    to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of
    methamphetamine.     The indictment alleged that the conspiracy
    began on January 1, 1993, and continued until the time of the
    indictment, November 23, 2004.     McCuiston argues that a fatal
    variance existed between the indictment, which alleged a single
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 05-40908
    -2-
    conspiracy,   and   the   proof   at   trial,   which   purportedly
    established multiple conspiracies.        Viewed in the light most
    favorable to the Government, McCuiston and his coconspirators
    became friends in childhood when they began selling small
    amounts of methamphetamine under the supervision of others in
    the CC Mob. When the CC Mob collapsed the three friends banded
    together and moved to Oregon and then Kansas to escape law
    enforcement and to continue to sell methamphetamine.        As time
    went on the three continued their concerted methamphetamine
    distributing to the point where they operated in different
    cities. This view of the evidence would not preclude a finding
    of a single conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.            United
    States v. Morrow, 
    177 F.3d 272
    , 291 (5th Cir. 1999); United
    States v. DeVarona, 
    872 F.2d 114
    , 118 (5th Cir. 1989).
    McCuiston argues, based on his assertion that there were
    multiple conspiracies, that the district court did not have
    jurisdiction over a prosecution for his acts as a juvenile.
    McCuiston concedes that if that the Government did prove a
    single conspiracy, his argument is defeated by United States
    v. Tolliver, 
    61 F.3d 1189
    , 1196 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated and
    remanded on other grounds, 
    516 U.S. 1105
     (1996)(remanded for
    further consideration in light of Bailey v. United States, 
    516 U.S. 137
     (1995))
    No. 05-40908
    -3-
    McCuiston argues that the district court should have
    instructed the jury that they could not consider those acts
    when determining guilt.     McCuiston concedes that he did not
    raise this issue in the district court and that it may be
    reviewed only for plain error. As McCuiston also concedes that
    the circuits are split on whether a jury may consider juvenile
    conduct when assessing guilt for a conspiracy that was ratified
    after the age of majority, it is not plain that a failure to
    instruct the jury as now suggested by McCuiston is error.       See
    United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731-37 (1993).
    McCuiston argues that the district court erred by allowing
    testimony regarding his gang, CC Mob, affiliation.      He argues
    that the gang evidence was extrinsic to his offense and that
    the evidence should have been excluded under FED. R. EVID.
    404(b), as it was irrelevant to any issue other than character
    and   its   prejudicial   impact   substantially   outweighed   any
    probative nature.     This court reviews the district court’s
    admission of testimony for an abuse of discretion.         United
    States v. Clements, 
    73 F.3d 1330
    , 1334 (5th Cir. 1996).
    “Evidence that is inextricably intertwined with the evidence
    used to prove a crime charged is not extrinsic evidence under
    Rule 404(b).    Such evidence is considered intrinsic and is
    admissible so that the jury may evaluate all the circumstances
    No. 05-40908
    -4-
    under which the defendant acted.”           United States v. Royal, 
    972 F.2d 643
    , 647 (5th Cir. 1992)(citation and quotation omitted).
    That McCuiston and his coconspirators were all initiated into
    the business of selling methamphetamine and other drugs at ages
    as    early   as    12   as   part   of   the    CC   Mob   is    part   of   the
    relationship formed between these three men and would help the
    jury to determine the nature of that bond.                  The evidence was
    intrinsic to showing that McCuiston, Daniel, and Mott were
    involved in the same conspiracy that spanned so many years and
    endured under changing conditions.               United States v. Stovall,
    
    825 F.2d 817
    , 825 (5th Cir.), amended, 
    833 F.2d 526
     (1987).
    Additionally, the district court gave the jury a limiting
    instruction        regarding   the   gang       evidence.        The   jury   was
    instructed that it could not consider the gang evidence as
    evidence of guilt generally and could consider it only to
    determine whether McCuiston participated in the conspiracy.
    Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.                        United
    States v. Wyly, 
    193 F.3d 289
    , 299 (5th Cir. 1999).                     McCuiston
    has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in
    admitting the evidence and instructing the jury on how to use
    it.
    McCuiston argues that the district court erred by using
    more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, the amount charged in
    No. 05-40908
    -5-
    the indictment, to calculate his base offense level.                After
    Booker, the court continues to review the district court’s
    interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo and
    its factual determinations for clear error.            United States v.
    Charon, 
    442 F.3d 881
    , 887 (5th Cir. 2006).                 The district
    court’s determination of the amount of methamphetamine relevant
    to   the   conspiracy   was   based    on    facts    contained    in   the
    presentence report (PSR). On appeal, McCuiston does not assert
    that    the   information   in   the   PSR    was    materially   untrue,
    inaccurate, or unreliable.       United States v. Huerta, 
    182 F.3d 361
    , 364 (5th Cir. 1999).
    McCuiston argues that the district court somehow erred in
    sentencing him because the court “did not feel able to treat
    the Guidelines as truly advisory.”           In this case, the district
    court noted that consideration of the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
     had persuaded the court to impose a sentence that was
    44 months below the bottom of the applicable range.               Contrary
    to McCuiston’s argument, it is plain from the record that the
    district court was aware that the Guidelines were advisory
    after Booker. The Government has not appealed the sentence and
    McCuiston has not shown that the sentence imposed by the
    district court was unreasonable.        United States v. Mares, 402
    No. 05-40908
    -6-
    F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 43
    (2005).
    AFFIRMED.