Criollo v. Wilson , 76 F. App'x 576 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT October 7, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-21124
Summary Calendar
CARLOS CRIOLLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL A. WILSON; MICHAEL HALL; JERRY E. JACKSON; J. THOMAS;
G. TOWNSEND; P. MILLER; HARDY, Sergeant,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-99-CV-2419
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Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Carlos Criollo, TDCJ # 412608, appeals the district court’s
summary-judgment dismissal of his pro se civil rights complaint
wherein he alleged that he was exposed to dangerous working
conditions and was denied adequate medical care for an injured
elbow. This court reviews a court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for summary judgment de novo. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d
233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is proper if the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-21124
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pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with any affidavits filed in support
of the motion, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc).
Criollo argues that his claims against the defendants in
their official capacities were not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. In order to prevail in an official-capacity action, a
plaintiff generally must that a policy or custom of the
governmental entity played a part in the violation of federal
law. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). The entity
itself must have been a “moving force” behind the deprivation.
See id. Criollo does not assert that a policy or custom was the
moving force behind the deprivation, but rather that the
individual defendants’ failure to follow prison policies led to
the deprivation. Thus, his claim is defeated by his own
assertions.
Criollo next argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment on his working-conditions claim. He
argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to the severity of the weather which precluded the court
from finding a lack of deliberate indifference on the part of the
defendants. The district court addressed the severity of the
weather only with respect to Criollo’s claims for declaratory and
No. 02-21124
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injunctive relief. Because Criollo has been released from
confinement at the Wynn Unit, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment on the ground that those claims are moot. See Herman v.
Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Chriceol v.
Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1999)(this court is not
bound by the reasons articulated by the district court for
granting summary judgment and may affirm the judgment on other
grounds).
Criollo argues that the district court also erred in
dismissing his claims for emotional and mental distress pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), which requires a physical injury before a
prisoner can recover for psychological damages. See Harper v.
Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999). Although Criollo’s
allegation of an elbow injury might have supported an excessive-
force claim, see, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th
Cir. 1999), it is insufficiently connected to the working-
conditions claim to meet the requirements of § 1997(e).
Finally, Criollo argues that he alleged the excessive use of
force. “A pro se complaint is to be construed liberally with all
well-pleaded allegations taken as true.” Johnson v. Atkins, 999
F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). However, even construing Criollo’s
complaint and his more definite statement liberally, Criollo did
not originally attempt to bring a use-of-force claim. Nor did
the district court abuse its discretion by failing to grant a
motion to amend the complaint to bring such a claim. It is not
No. 02-21124
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an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny leave to
amend when the litigant’s “attempt to broaden the issues would
likely require additional discovery and another motion for
summary judgment, which would unduly prejudice the defendants and
raise concerns about seriatim presentation of facts and issues.”
Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1999).
Criollo has not shown that the district court erred in
granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.