Gulf South Medical and Surgical Institute v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. ( 1994 )


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  •                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 94-30353
    Summary Calendar
    GULF SOUTH MEDICAL AND SURGICAL
    INSTITUTE, ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    ET AL.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    (CA-93-1674-F)
    (November 10, 1994)
    Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Dr. George Farber, Gulf South Medical and Surgical Institute,
    and Burks-Farber Clinics appeal entry of summary judgment in favor
    of Aetna Life Insurance Company in their suit to recover health
    insurance benefits.   Finding no error, we affirm.
    *
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
    have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
    the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
    expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
    Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published.
    Background
    From 1988 to 1990 Dr. Farber treated Edwin Delaney, Jr. for
    skin disorders, excising multiple lesions and performing skin
    grafts.      Delaney, an employee of Lafarge Corporation, filed for
    insurance benefits under Lafarge's benefit plan.        Aetna, which
    administered the plan, obtained an evaluation of Delaney's claims
    from Medical Review Institute and, in concurrence with MRI's
    recommendation, disallowed approximately 80 percent of the amounts
    claimed.     Obtaining an assignment of Delaney's claims, Dr. Farber,
    Gulf South Medical, and Burks-Farber Clinics sued Lafarge, Aetna
    and MRI in state court, invoking the civil enforcement provisions
    of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 and also
    alleging defamation.       MRI was dismissed for lack of personal
    jurisdiction and the remaining defendants removed the action to
    federal court.     The district court granted defendants' motion for
    summary judgment.     This appeal timely followed.
    Analysis
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming if
    there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2      Faced with a properly
    supported motion, as here, the nonmovant must present sufficient
    evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to find in his favor.3
    1
    29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
    2
    Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
    3
    Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
     (1986); Matsushita
    Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    (1986).
    2
    The plaintiffs did not satisfy this burden.
    Aetna's decisions to deny coverage rested on factual grounds.
    To prevail on their ERISA claim the plaintiffs must establish that
    these decisions by Aetna constituted an abuse of discretion.4                         We
    find   no    hint   of   such   in    the       summary   judgment     record.       The
    decisionmaking process used by Aetna was rational.                       It referred
    Delaney's claims to MRI, a nationally recognized company accredited
    in   numerous   states,     for      evaluation      by   a   doctor   certified      in
    dermatology by the National Board of Medical Examiners.                             Aetna
    reviewed the evaluation and accepted it, except for instances in
    which its regional estimate of the reasonable and customary charge
    exceeded MRI's.
    Nor   have    the   plaintiffs           adduced   evidence      of    anything
    unreasonable in the substance of Aetna's decisions. In no instance
    did Aetna change Dr. Farber's diagnosis; plaintiffs' contrary
    protestations misread the MRI evaluations.                      Although some MRI
    reports point out that lesions diagnosed as "carcinoma in situ" by
    Dr. Farber and his pathologist are benign and could be treated more
    economically by freezing rather than surgery, Aetna did not reduce
    benefits or otherwise disallow charges on that basis.                        In several
    instances     Aetna      changed      procedure       codes     pursuant       to    MRI
    recommendation, but only to conform with Dr. Farber's own reports.
    Other disallowances were of procedures that were not reflected on
    Dr. Farber's reports, supplies customarily incorporated in the
    4
    Pierre v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 
    932 F.2d 1552
    (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    112 S. Ct. 453
     (1991).
    3
    charge for the surgery, and duplicative surgery charges -- Aetna,
    for example, refused to pay for three full surgeries when three
    lesions were removed at one time.
    Dr. Farber complains that Aetna did not obtain an opinion from
    a dermatopathologist, as recommended by an MRI reviewing physician
    and an examining dermatologist, Dr. Robert Rietschel. According to
    Dr. Rietschel, a dermatopathologist could have established whether
    "the lesions excised were what they are represented to be."      Aetna,
    however, accepted Dr. Farber's diagnoses.      Delaney and Dr. Farber
    therefore   lost    nothing   by   Aetna's   failure   to   consult   a
    dermatopathologist.
    Dr. Farber further challenges the district court's reliance on
    the MRI reports, contending that they are hearsay.          The reports
    provide a reliable indication of the bases of Aetna's decisions and
    therefore were properly considered in the inquiry whether Aetna
    abused its discretion.5       Dr. Farber also contends that Aetna
    singled out his bills for special scrutiny.     In support, he points
    to a notation on Aetna records of Delaney's claims: "Do not pay any
    claims to Burks-Farber/Send to C[ost] C[ontainment] U[nit] 1st."
    We conclude that this notation would not support a finding that
    Aetna failed to exercise impartial judgment.
    The appeal of the dismissal of the defamation claim is equally
    devoid of merit.6   The plaintiffs contend that Aetna defamed them
    by communicating its disallowance of charges to Delaney.        Clearly
    5
    Pierre, supra.
    6
    We do not decide whether this claim is preempted by ERISA.
    4
    such communications are qualifiedly privileged.            There is no
    evidence of malice required to overcome this privilege.7
    The plaintiffs also appeal the dismissal of MRI for lack of
    personal   jurisdiction.   The   foregoing   disposition    moots   this
    assignment of error.8
    AFFIRMED.
    7
    See Rouly v. Enserch Corp., 
    835 F.2d 1127
     (5th Cir. 1988).
    8
    MRI's motion to dismiss this portion of the appeal likewise
    is denied as moot.
    5