Rogers v. Archer Daniels ( 1995 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-10030
Summary Calendar
JIMMY E. ROGERS,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross
Appellant,
versus
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(5:93 CR 283 C)
( August 31, 1995 )
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jimmy Rogers sued his former employer, Archer Daniels Midland
Company, alleging retaliatory discharge under the Texas Workers'
Compensation Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307c, now Texas
Lab. Code Ann. § 451.001, and discriminatory termination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ADM
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
appeals the jury's award of damages to Rogers on his retaliatory
discharge claim, and Rogers cross appeals the judgment for ADM on
his ADA claim entered on the jury's verdict. We affirm.
I.
ADM terminated Rogers, who was working for ADM as a milling
supervisor, five months after Rogers had an accident and filed for
workers' compensation benefits. Rogers sued ADM, alleging that ADM
violated the Texas Workers' Compensation Act by discharging him for
filing a workers' compensation claim, and that ADM violated the ADA
by terminating him because he was disabled from his accident. The
jury awarded Rogers $250,000 on his retaliatory discharge claim,
including $75,000 for future mental anguish, but found for ADM on
his ADA claim. The district court entered judgment accordingly.
ADM appeals the jury's findings of retaliatory discharge and future
mental anguish, and Rogers cross appeals its finding that ADM did
not terminate him because of his disability.
II.
ADM contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to
support either the jury's finding of retaliatory discharge or its
award of damages for future mental anguish. We disagree.
We may reverse the jury's verdict for insufficiency only if
the facts and inferences, considered in the light most favorable to
Rogers, so strongly favor ADM that reasonable persons could not
find in favor of Rogers. See Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 970
2
F.2d 16, 22 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331 (1993).
Thus, ADM is liable to Rogers under the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act unless a reasonable jury could not find that Rogers' workers'
compensation claim was a causal factor in his discharge, even if
ADM had other reasons for terminating him. See General Elec. Co.
v. Kunze, 747 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.--Waco 1987, writ denied).
Rogers may rely on circumstantial evidence to show a causal
link between his claim for workers' compensation benefits and his
discharge by ADM. See Gifford Hill Am., Inc. v. Whittington, 899
S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1995, n.w.h.). Rogers worked
at the Harvest Queen Mill in Plainview, Texas, for twenty years
before it was acquired by ADM in 1984. His work continued there
until the discharge complained of here--some twenty-nine years.
Testimony at trial indicated that ADM knew about Rogers' claim;
that Gabriel Lopez, the mill manager who dismissed Rogers,
exhibited a negative attitude toward his injury; that ADM was
concerned about reducing workers' compensation costs; that Lopez
had departed from company procedures in his handling of Rogers'
termination; and that many of Rogers' colleagues did not believe
that his job performance was unsatisfactory. While ADM has offered
rebuttal evidence to justify the dismissal, we note that the
assessment of witness credibility and the resolution of conflicting
evidence are within the jury's fact-finding province and entitled
to deference from this court. See Gibralter Sav. v. LDBrinkman
Corp., 860 F.2d 1275, 1297 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1091 (1989). Since many of this case's disputed facts turn on the
3
relative credibility of opposing witnesses, we cannot say that it
was unreasonable for the jury to resolve the conflicting testimony
in Rogers' favor and infer from circumstantial evidence that his
workers' compensation claim was a causal factor in his discharge.
Neither can we conclude that the jury acted unreasonably in
awarding Rogers damages for future mental anguish. Under Texas
law, recovery for future mental anguish is appropriate if the jury
finds a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will suffer "a
mental sensation of pain resulting from such painful emotions as
grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame,
despair, and/or public humiliation." Wichita County v. Hart, 892
S.W.2d 912, 926 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, writ granted).
Rogers indicated on a Social Security form that he had
"significant mental or emotional problems," but indicated elsewhere
on the same form that his mental or emotional problems did not
"significantly affect his day-to-day living or work." Since future
mental anguish "is necessarily speculative and particularly within
the jury's province to resolve," Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360,
366 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, writ denied), we must be careful
about second-guessing the jury's resolution of this conflicting
evidence. In our view, the jury could have decided that Rogers and
his wife were credible witnesses, and that their testimony on his
suicidal behavior, his difficulty in finding other jobs, and his
feelings of humiliation established that, because of his discharge,
Rogers would continue to suffer from grief, severe disappointment,
indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair or public humiliation.
4
III.
ADM contends that the district court erred in refusing to
submit ADM's requested jury instructions on employee termination,
and in admitting into evidence an alleged hearsay document. Both
claims are unavailing.
We review a district court's refusal to include a requested
jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard, finding
reversible error only where: "(1) the requested instruction is
substantially correct; (2) the actual charge given to the jury did
not substantially cover the content of the proposed instruction;
and (3) the omission of the instruction would seriously impair the
defendant's ability to present his defense." United States v.
Jensen, 41 F.3d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1835 (1995). In diversity actions, "we afford our district courts
latitude in presenting state law as long as that presentation is
substantively correct." Turlington v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 795
F.2d 434, 442 (5th Cir. 1986).
ADM suggests that the district court's jury instruction on
employee termination was neither comprehensive nor balanced, and
that ADM's requested instruction would have been clearer. ADM does
not contend, however, that the district court's instruction was
inaccurate or misleading. Without questioning the clarity of ADM's
preferred instruction, we are satisfied that the district court's
instruction provided a correct statement of the applicable Texas
law and covered the content of ADM's requested language. Hence, we
5
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to submit ADM's requested instruction to the jury.
We also find that the district court did not err in admitting
Plaintiff's Exhibit 38, the notice of complaint from OSHA, under
the hearsay exception for public records involving "matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law." Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
The district court could have determined that the OSHA letterhead
was sufficient to authenticate the letter as an agency record for
purposes of this exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(4).
IV.
Rogers cross appeals the judgment for ADM on his ADA claim,
entered on the jury's verdict, arguing that ADM discriminated
against him because of his disability in requiring a 100% medical
release before allowing him to return to work. We disagree; even
though the jury found that Rogers was a qualified person with a
disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), Rogers himself testified that
he did not believe that his disability was a factor in his
discharge. The jury could have relied on the testimony of Rogers
and ADM's witnesses in deciding that Rogers had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that ADM dismissed him because of his
disability. Such a finding is not inconsistent with the jury's
determination that Rogers' claim for workers' compensation was a
motivating factor in his discharge.
6
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
7